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ABSTRACT 
 In this thesis I address the question of sympathetic action - action by one group of 
workers designed to aid another group of workers in their struggle with an employer, manifested 
most obviously through refusals by workers to cross a picket line - through the lens of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.   As the law currently stands in Canada, undertaking 
sympathetic action collectively is invariably illegal as it is considered an illegal "strike" under 
Canadian labour legislation.  Further, workers who undertake sympathetic action - whether 
collectively or individually - can be subject to discipline or discharge by their employer.  I argue 
that workers who undertake sympathetic action can have numerous motivations, ranging from 
economic self-interest to deeply-held political or moral beliefs (the latter manifested through the 
concept of "solidarity"), and that when those motivations include expressive or conscientious 
interests, sympathetic action should be entitled to protection by the fundamental freedoms of 
conscience, expression, and association found in section 2 of the Charter.  I further argue that a 
each of these freedoms represents a different aspect of the inherent dignity and worth of an 
individual, and that a right to sympathetic action promotes both those freedoms and Charter 
values.  Finally, I argue that a constitutional right to sympathetic action is a free-standing right 
that can exist even in the absence of a constitutional right to strike. 
 This thesis reviews the current and historical state of Canadian law (in both the statutory 
labour relations regimes and in common law) regarding sympathetic action, the potential 
application of the Charter freedoms of conscience, expression, and association to sympathetic 
action, and finally options for reform that reduce or eliminate restrictions on sympathetic action 
and therefore make our labour relations system more in keeping with Charter values. 
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INTRODUCTION 
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One of the great strengths of the trade union movement is the spirit 
of solidarity. By standing together as a collective whole, trade 
unionists are able to aspire to improved wages and working 
conditions unattainable if each individual member were left to his 
or her own devices.  Solidarity is made manifest when one group of 
workers is on strike. Fellow unionists and other sympathetic 
members of the public are made aware of the strike by the 
presence of picketers. Picketing sends a strong and automatic 
signal: do not cross the line lest you undermine our struggle... 
 
Chief Justice Brian Dickson
1
 
 
 
 
This Government had an idea, and Parliament made it law. 
Seems like it’s illegal to fight for the Union any more. 
So which side are you on, boys?  Which side are you on? 
Which side are you on, boys?  Which side are you on? 
 
    Billy Bragg
2
 
  
 
 In labour relations, sympathetic action is at its most basic "action by one group of 
workers designed to aid another group in their struggle with an employer"
3
.  It is a broad term 
that manifests in many ways.  It can include, inter alia, workers refusing to cross a picket line or 
"locked gate"; refusing to handle goods from a struck workplace; or refusing to enable their own 
employer to increase production to make up for shortfalls due to another workplace being struck.  
It is an expression of solidarity among workers, and is a key plank in the foundation upon which 
organized labour's early successes were built. 
                                                          
1
 BCGEU v. British Columbia (Attorney-General) (“BCGEU”), 1988 CanLII 3 at para. 28. 
2
 “Which Side Are You On”. Life’s a Riot/Between the Wars (1985, CD Presents USA). 
3
 Labour Law Casebook Group, Labour and Employment Law: Cases, Materials and Commentary (6th Ed.) 
(Kingston: IRC Press, 1998) at 452. 
3 
 
 Under the current Canadian model of labour law, however, sympathetic action is almost 
always illegal.  It generally qualifies as a "strike"
4
, whether it arises in response to a strike (or 
lockout) or not; but while it is therefore subject to all of the restrictions on strike action present in 
Canadian labour law, it does not have the corresponding freedoms.  Sympathetic action cannot 
be authorized by strike vote, for instance, nor are sympathy strikers given the protections 
afforded strikers in an "ordinary" strike.  Indeed, unions and workers who engage in sympathetic 
action can injunctions, fines, or sanctions under labour relations legislation, as they can with any 
illegal strike.
5
  Individual workers are vulnerable to discipline or dismissal.  Both unions and 
workers may be vulnerable to being sued for damages pursuant to the so-called "industrial 
torts".
6
 
 I contend, however, that the prohibition on sympathetic action in Canadian labour law 
infringes upon the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms
7
 and, specifically, the freedoms of conscience, expression, and association 
that are protected under sections 2(a), (b), and (d) respectively of the Charter.  I will argue that 
there is a right to undertake sympathetic action on the part of unions and workers represented by 
unions but also on the part of individual, non-unionized, employees.
8
  And I will argue that the 
right to take sympathetic action is not inherently tied to the right to strike in itself, and that the 
freedoms of expression and conscience, at least, protect the right to sympathetic action even in 
                                                          
4
 Local 273, International Longshoremen's Association et. al. v. Maritime Employers' Association et. al., [1979] 1 
S.C.R. 120; Grain Workers’ Union, Local 333 et. al. v. British Columbia Maritime Employers Association et. al., 2009 
FCA 201 (CanLII) ("Grain Workers"), leave to appeal denied 2009 CanLII 71475 (S.C.C.). 
5
 A union can even face penalties for not taking an active role, or not an active enough role, in preventing or ending 
an illegal strike.  E.g. Westroc Inc. v. National Automobile Aerospace Transportation and General Workers Union of 
Canada (CAW Canada), [2002] CanLII 41383 (Ont. LRB). 
6
 See e.g. Harry Arthurs, “Tort Liability for Strikes in Canada” (1960), 38 Can. Bar Rev. 346. 
7
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to The Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.) (the "Charter"). 
8
 While "sympathetic action" tends to refer to collective action by workers, for the purposes of this paper I will also 
use the term to reflect individual action in support of other workers. 
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the absence of a right to strike.  For the sake of convenience I will use the term "industrial 
action" to encompass both "true" strikes and sympathetic action. 
Theoretical Approach 
 Before turning to the law, it may be helpful to review the theoretical approach towards 
labour rights which underlie this paper.  While I do not view the right to sympathetic action as 
inherently tied to the right to strike stricto sensu, the rationales for protecting sympathetic action 
are similar to those for protecting the right to strike. The right to undertake industrial action 
(whether against one own's employer or in sympathy with other workers striking against theirs) 
could, broadly speaking, be seen as a socio-economic right, a political right, or a civil right (or 
civil liberty).
9
  Each approach brings its own set of assumptions and justifications. The socio-
economic perspective emphasizes the importance of industrial action as "an important factor in 
the maintenance of fair wages and reasonable working conditions...This is premised on the 
understanding that there is an imbalance in bargaining power between an employer and workers, 
such that in the absence of a right to strike 'collective bargaining would amount to collective 
begging'."
10
  The political perspective views the right to industrial action as an important part of 
democracy both in the workplace (the concept of  'industrial democracy') as well as in society in 
general.  The imbalance of power between employers and workers remains an important 
presumption but the "political" right centres around protecting and promoting the participation of 
workers in decision-making and politics.
11
  Finally, the civil liberty perspective recognizes "the 
difference in status between 'socio-economic' rights and 'civil liberties' under certain national 
                                                          
9
 See Tonia Novitz,  International and European Protection of the Right to Strike (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
2003), ch. 3. 
10
 ibid. at 49-50. 
11
 ibid. at 56ff. 
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constitutions and international human rights instruments" and attempts to "forge a link between 
the right to strike and more commonly recognized civil liberties, the prime example being 
freedom of association."
12
  This was the approach taken by the dissent at the Supreme Court of 
Canada in the so-called Labour Trilogy
13
 in 1987 and by the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's 
Bench in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan
14
 explicitly recognizing the right 
to strike.   
 The argument herein is based upon the Charter and approaches the right to industrial 
action as a fundamental right.  As such, it approaches the right to strike primarily from a "civil 
liberty" perspective.  However, it is impossible to separate the Charter argument from the socio-
economic or political perspectives.  The socio-economic and political value of industrial action 
are necessary considerations when determining if limitations on the right to industrial action are 
reasonable and justified.  Furthermore, the political value is important when considering whether 
one fundamental freedom in particular - freedom of expression - applies to industrial action at 
all. 
 
 
                                                          
12
 ibid. at 65. 
13
 Reference re Public Service Employees Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (the “Alberta Reference”); Public 
Service Alliance v. The Queen, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (“PSAC”); R.W.D.S.U., Local 544 v. Government of Saskatchewan, 
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (“Dairy Workers”).  Harry Arthurs has succinctly described the results of the Labour Trilogy as 
“management three, labour nil”:  “Labour and the ‘Real’ Constitution”, (2007) 48 C. De D. 43 at para. 8. 
14
 Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan, 2012 SKQB 62 ("Saskatchewan Federation of Labour"), 
rev'd 2013 SKCA 43.  While the portion of Saskatchewan Federation of Labour  that dealt with the right to strike 
was overturned on appeal, the methodology and approach taken in the lower court were not dealt with 
specifically.  For other examples of the "civil liberties" approach to the right to strike, see also British Columbia 
Teachers' Federation v. British Columbia Public School Employers' Association, 2009 BCCA 39 ("BCTF"), leave to 
appeal denied 2009 CanLII 44624 (S.C.C.), where the B.C. Court of Appeal held that the right to engage in protest 
strikes was protected by section 2(b) of the Charter; and the dissent in Grain Workers, supra note 4, which held 
that the right to engage in sympathetic action was protected under s. 2(d) - though the prohibition of sympathetic 
action was found in Grain Workers to be reasonable under section 1 of the Charter. 
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The Right to Sympathetic Action as an Individual Right 
 Based as they are upon the Charter, the arguments herein also accept that a right to 
sympathetic action is an individual, rather than a collective, right.
15
  Therefore, when a worker 
chooses to engage in sympathetic action alone, that is an expression of an individual right to do 
so - whether for conscientious or expressive reasons.  When doing so in association with other 
workers, however, the right is an individual right exercised collectively - freedom of association 
remains an individual right.
16
  For the purposes of this thesis I will not challenge this conception 
of Charter rights.  It should be noted, however, that individual sympathetic action does not run 
afoul of statute (though employer retaliation against a worker doing so is a distinct possibility).  
Only collective sympathetic action does. 
 Nonetheless, to view sympathetic action through the lens of individual rights can present 
problems.  In any given sympathetic action situation, workers will undertake sympathetic action 
(or choose not to) for a variety of reasons.  It is potentially unwieldy to ask the Courts or labour 
arbitrators to inquire individually about every striker's motive in a given strike situation.
17
 
 When undertaken collectively, one may also raise the further criticism that an emphasis 
on "personal philosophy" may "make it too easy to escape the statutory peace obligation."
18
  
These same criticisms, however, may be levied at the Canadian courts' treatment of religion, and 
the courts have not shied away from taking individual applicants' beliefs into account in 
                                                          
15
 For recent discussion of collective rights, see e.g. Dwight Newman, "Collective Interests and Collective Rights" 
(2004) 49 Am. J. Juris. 127, and Community and Collective Rights: A Theoretical Framework for Rights Held by 
Groups (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011). 
16
 See a more detailed discussion of freedom of association as an individual right infra, p. 104 herein. 
17
 That said, if unionized workers are disciplined during at strike for respecting a picket line, it seems likely that, in 
any grievances brought by the Union regarding that discipline, an arbitrator would be called upon to do just that in 
any event, even absent Charter argument. 
18
 Geoffrey England, "Statutory Definition of 'Strike': Whether Honouring Picket Lines Constitutes a 'Strike'" (1979), 
11 Ottawa L. Rev. 771 at 788. 
7 
 
situations concerning statutory restrictions or prohibition on religious practices.
19
  As one 
commentator has noted, "there seems to be no reason in principle why a genuine and honest 
belief in union solidarity should not constitute evidence of individual decision-making so long as 
the employee's testimony is credible."
20
  The potential difficulties should not preclude judicial 
oversight of labour relations legislation, nor should they prevent an evolution of the common law 
to conform to Charter values. 
 In the end result, as the Supreme Court noted in Edwards Books, "[b]y its nature, 
legislation must, to some degree, cut across individual circumstances in order to establish general 
rules."
21
  However, as the law currently stands, workers are unable to engage in sympathetic 
action at all.  If undertaken individually, workers are subject to penalties and discipline from 
their employers.  If undertaken collectively, statutory penalties may be invoked.  The general 
rules amount to a prohibition.  It is, I suggest, more desirable that when developing general rules, 
laws err on the side of allowing the exercise of Charter rights than restricting them. 
Ideological Approaches to Labour Relations 
 The argument herein also approaches the question of sympathetic action from a particular 
ideology; as Professor Geoffrey England noted, "[a]ny evaluation of...legislation must be 
coloured by the ideological perspective of the evaluator."
22
  This is perhaps especially so in the 
realm of labour relations and, in particular, the politically charged subject of industrial action.  
The various ideological approaches to labour relations can be divided (albeit broadly) into five 
                                                          
19
 E.g. Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37 (objections to mandatory photo identification); 
Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 ("Multani") (the right to carry a kirpan - 
a ceremonial knife - at school by a Sikh student); R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd. [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 ("Edwards 
Books") (the right for retailers who observed Saturday Sabbath to remain open on Sunday). 
20
 England,  "Statutory Definition of 'Strike'", supra note 18 at 788-789. 
21
 Edwards Books, supra note 19 at para. 137. 
22
 Geoffrey England, "Evaluating the Merits of the 2008 Reforms to Collective Bargaining Law in Saskatchewan" 
(2008), 71 Sask. L.R. 307 ["Evaluating the Merits"] at 309. 
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categories:
23
 the neoconservative, which emphasizes the maximization of economic efficiency,  
provides little role for industrial conflict, and which downplays or dismisses the inequality of 
bargaining power between employers and workers; the managerialist, which focuses on 
managerial policies and practices towards workers and is primarily concerned with maximizing 
worker motivation and productivity; the orthodox pluralist, which "reflects the traditional 
philosophy underlying labour law in North America" and whose primary concern is to "find a 
balance between the need for efficiency in the economy with the need for equity and fairness in 
employment relations";
24
 the liberal-reformist, which is concerned with "reducing or eliminating 
inequalities and injustices in the treatment afforded workers" and views the employment 
relationship as an "asymmetrical or imbalanced one in which management is in a dominant 
position by virtue of its authority";
25
 and the radical, which maintains that the interests of labour 
and capital are diametrically opposed, that unions are of only limited effectiveness if they 
attempt to work within a capitalist system,
26
 and that legislation that enhances employee rights is  
problematic because it institutionalizes industrial conflict and enshrines the superior position of 
employers.
27
   
 For the most part, this paper sits most comfortably in the liberal-reformist category.  Its 
emphasis on industrial action necessarily means that conflict is seen as central to labour 
relations; its thesis that industrial action is constitutionally protected inherently recognizes the 
value of collective action and the inequality of power within the workplace, as well as the strike 
as valuable in itself.  As such its approach is hostile to the neoconservative and managerial 
                                                          
23
 John Godard, Industrial Relations, the Economy, and Society (2d ed.) (North York: Captus Press, 2000) at 11ff. 
24
 ibid. at 16. 
25
 ibid. at 17. 
26
 ibid. at 18-19. 
27
 England, "Evaluating the Merits", supra note 22 at 307. 
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perspectives.  Although the balancing of interests between employers and workers is an 
important consideration (especially regarding section 1 analysis), a focus on fundamental rights 
cannot have balance as its primary focus and therefore is not suited for orthodox pluralism.  That 
said, this paper recognizes the legitimacy of the Charter and of the courts in matters of labour 
relations, and does not challenge the assumptions of market capitalism to the extent of the radical 
perspective.   
 Nonetheless this paper accepts that the employer, in the vast majority of cases, has 
bargaining power superior to that of the individual employee.  Both labour standards and  labour 
relations legislation have as a primary goal an equalization of the power imbalance inherent in 
the employment relationship, and  a reflection of a post-World War II consensus that workers 
have what Professor Harry Arthurs has, in his Report on labour standards, termed a "right to 
decency": 
 
Labour standards should ensure that no matter how limited his or her bargaining power, 
no worker in the federal jurisdiction is offered, accepts or works under conditions that 
Canadians would not regard as "decent."... 
 
[T]his first principle [i.e. decency] is the pre-eminent principle.  In the event of conflict, it 
trumps the other principles...it is of the essence not only of labour standards legislation, 
but of Canada's entire social, economic and political development. ...
28
 
 Similarly, in his famous dissent in the Alberta Reference Dickson C.J. noted the 
importance of collective bargaining in promoting important values that underlie the Charter: 
 
Human dignity, equality, liberty, respect for the autonomy of the person and the 
enhancement of democracy are among the values that underlie the Charter...all of these 
                                                          
28
 Commission on the Review of Federal Labour Standards, Fairness at Work: Federal Labour Standards for the 21st 
Century (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2006) (the "Arthurs Report") at p. 47.  This sentiment had earlier been 
recognized, if not in those terms, by the Supreme Court in Re Rizzo and Rizzo Shoes Ltd., [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, where 
the Court held that employment standards legislation is to be interpreted in a "broad and generous manner" (para. 
36); and in that case (at para. 40) and in Machtinger v. H.O.J. Industries Ltd., [1992] 1 S.C.R. 986 where it was held 
that the object of employment standards legislation was "to protect the interests of as many employees as 
possible." 
10 
 
values are complemented and, indeed, promoted, by the protection of collective 
bargaining in s. 2(d) of the Charter...the right to bargain collectively with an employer 
enhances the human dignity, liberty, and autonomy of workers by giving them the 
opportunity to influence the establishment of workplace rules and thereby gain some 
control over a major aspect of their lives, namely their work...
29
 
 At the core of this paper's constitutional inquiry are the fundamental questions: Does the 
current status of sympathetic action promote or interfere with workers' right to decency?  Does it 
promote the Charter values identified by Chief Justice Dickson?   
Criticisms of Charter Discourse in Labour Rights 
 There are of course ample criticisms of viewing industrial action through the lens of 
Charter rights and freedoms.  There has been and is significant hostility within the labour 
relations community to a rights- or Charter-based analysis of labour law.  Such hostility is 
perfectly understandable, whether it is based on distrust of the judiciary
30
 after a “century of 
bruising encounters with judges determined to manipulate the common law and legislation to 
extinguish rights of workers”;31 scepticism over the efficacy or practicality of constitutional 
litigation as a means of protecting labour rights;
32
 or a rejection of rights-based rhetoric or 
legalism in labour relations generally.
33
    
                                                          
29
 Alberta Reference, supra note 13 at paras. 81-82. 
30
 E.g. Eric Tucker, “The Constitutional Right to Bargain Collectively: The Ironies of Labour History in the Supreme 
Court of Canada” (2008), 61 Labour/Le Travail 151; Judy Fudge, “Labour, Courts, and the Cunning of History” 
(2010), 16 Just Labour 1; Michael Mandel,  The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada 
(Toronto:  Thomson Educational Publishing, Inc., 1994), Ch. 5; Harry Arthurs, “’The Right to Golf’: Reflections on 
the Future of Workers, Unions and the Rest of Us Under the Charter” in Labour Law Under the Charter (Kingston: 
Queen’s Law Journal and Industrial Relations Centre, 1988)  17.   
31
 Sandra Freedman, ““Scepticism Under Scrutiny:  Labour Law and Human Rights” in Tom Campbell et. al. (eds), 
Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 197. 
32
 E.g. Bryan Palmer, “What’s Law Got to Do With It?: Historical Considerations on Class Struggle, Boundaries of 
Constraint, and Capitalist Authority” (2003), 41 Osgoode Hall L.J. 465; Harry Arthurs, “The Constitutionalization of 
Employment Relations: Multiple Models, Pernicious Problems” (2010), 19 Social & Legal Studies 43, and 
“Constitutionalizing the Right of Workers to Organize, Bargain and Strike: The Sight of One Shoulder Shrugging” 
(2010), 15(2) C.L.E.L.J. 373; Bob Hepple, "The Right to Strike in an International Context" (2010), 15(2) C.L.E.L.J. 
133; Harry Arthurs and Brent Arnold, “Does the Charter Matter?” (2005), 11 Rev. Const. St. 37; Judy Fudge, “The 
Supreme Court of Canada and the Right to Bargain Collectively: The Implications of the Health Services and 
Support case in Canada and Beyond” (2008), 37 Indus. L.J. 25; Paul J.J. Cavaluzzo, “Freedom of Association – its 
Effect upon Collective Bargaining and Trade Unions” in Labour Law Under the Charter, supra note 30 at 267 
11 
 
 The criticisms of Charter discourse in the labour relations sphere are part of an ongoing 
debate among those sympathetic to unions since the advent of the Charter - one between, in 
Brian Etherington's terms, Charter "romantics," "realists," and "pragmatists."
34
  That said, it 
must be noted that there are also those who have seen Charter rights (and the use of the language 
of human rights generally) as a welcome addition to the labour field
35
 and caution that exclusion 
from constitutional discourse leaves labour vulnerable to government action.
36
   
 Nonetheless, with each of the concerns mentioned above comes a fear that opening the 
existing system of labour relations to criticism can create opportunities to weaken those rights 
currently enjoyed by labour.  Charter arguments can cut both ways.  But despite the problems 
inherent to constitutional litigation in the labour field, to simply cede the field to labour's 
opponents is, in my view, unwise.   Regardless of whether labour attempts to use the Charter in 
its favour, those opposed to the interests of unions can be relied upon to use the Charter against 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
["Freedom of Association"]; Charles W. Smith, "Labour, Courts and the Erosion of Workers' Rights in Canada" in 
Stephanie Ross and Larry Savage (eds.), Rethinking the Politics of Labour in Canada (Winnipeg: Fernwood 
Publishing, 2012) 184. 
33
 E.g. Palmer,  ibid.; Eric Tucker, "Labor's Many Constitutions (And Capital's Too)" (2012), 33 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y 
J. 355; Harry Arthurs, “Labour Law Without the State?” (1996), 46 U. of T. L.J. 1 and “The New Economy and the 
New Legality: Industrial Citizenship and the Future of Labour Arbitration” (1999), 7 C.L.E.L.J. 45;  Larry Savage, 
“Labour Rights as Human Rights?  A Response to Roy Adams” (2008), 12 Just Labour 68; Allan Hutchinson and 
Andrew Petter, “Private Rights/Public Wrongs:  The Liberal Lie of the Charter” (1988), 38 U. Of T. Law Journal 278. 
34
 Brian Etherington, “An Assessment of Judicial Review of Labour Laws Under the Charter:  of Realists, Romantics 
and Pragmatists” (1992), 24 Ottawa L. Rev. 685. 
35
 E.g. Roy Adams, “The Revolutionary Potential of Dunmore” (2003), 10 C.L.E.L.J. 117, “From Statutory Right to 
Human Right:  The Evolution and Current Status of Collective Bargaining” (2008), 12 Just Labour 48, and Labour 
Left Out:  Canada’s Failure to Protect and Promote Collective Bargaining as a Human Right (Ottawa:  Canadian 
Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2005); Ken Norman, “What’s Right is Right: The Supreme Court Gets It” (2008), 12 
Just Labour 16 and “Ficus Elastica” (2010), online at http://blogs.usask.ca/foa2010/2010/03/ 
ficus_elastica.html (last visited April 29, 2013); Bradley Walchuk, “The Best of Both Worlds:  A Pragmatic Approach 
to the Construction of Labour Rights as Human Rights”, 14 Just Labour 75 at 78; Guy Davidov, “Judicial 
Development of Labour Rights – Contextually” (2010), 15(2) C.L.E.L.J. 235;  David Beatty,  Putting the Charter to 
Work:  Designing a Constitutional Labour Code (Kingston:  McGill Queen’s University Press, 1987); Canadian 
Foundation for Labour Rights website, www.labourrights.ca. 
36
 E.g. David Beatty, "Labouring Outside the Charter" (1991), 29 Osgoode Hall L.J. 839; Alan Hyde, "Exclusion is 
Forever:  How Keeping Labour Rights Separate from Constitutional Rights Has Proven To Be a Bad Deal for 
American Trade Unions and Constitutional Law" (2010), 15(2) C.L.E.L.J. 251. 
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labour.
37
  Even if Charter litigation does not have much power to improve the lot of unions and 
workers, it seems clear that discounting the Charter has the possibility of worsening their lot, 
allowing governments to run roughshod over labour rights without oversight, and granting anti-
union groups free reign in the judicial arena.  It is important to make those unfriendly to labour 
aware that there is risk in acting too cavalierly in stripping away the rights unions have fought 
hard to win.   
 Further, while this thesis accepts (for the purposes of the arguments herein) the 
legitimacy and value of Charter discourse in the labour field, this acceptance (and hence my 
response to the criticisms mentioned above) is mostly pragmatic.   The Charter is a fait 
accompli; perhaps the courts are not the ideal arbiters of labour policy, but “the Charter, 
especially in s. 1, makes it plain that, for better or worse, the courts are expected to deliberate on 
the pith and substance of legislative policy choices.”38   
 Charter arguments for labour rights are part of a broader conversation within society 
about the role of unions and the value of labour relations.  They are not the only, or even the 
best, argument to make; but they will, hopefully, provide a basis for political or moral arguments 
in the broader political sphere even if they do not result directly in victories in court. And as has 
been noted in the American context “the complete exclusion of labour activity from the 
Constitution has been tried in the United States, and it has failed.  It does not improve 
constitutional law to be walled off from problems raised by labour activity.”39  Similarly “a 
                                                          
37
 The National Citizens’ Coalition, a conservative lobby group, for instance, funded the applicant’s challenge 
against a union’s ability to use dues in political action:  Lavigne v. OPSEU, 1991 CanLii 68 (S.C.C.).  The Open Shop 
Contractors’ Association, a group dedicated to dismantling the union, and even agency, shop system in Canada, 
was an intervenor in R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209. 
38
 Geoffrey England, "Some Thoughts on Constitutionalizing the Right to Strike" in Labour Law Under the Charter, 
supra note 30, 168 ["Constitutionalizing the Right to Strike"] at 176. 
39
 Alan Hyde, “Exclusion is Forever: How Keeping Labour Rights Separate from Constitutional Rights Has Proven to 
be a Bad Deal for American Trade Unions and Constitutional Law” (2010), 15(2) C.L.E.L.J. 251. 
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judicial endorsement of a fundamental right – especially in a politically charged context – can, 
arguably, exert considerable influence on political and legal culture which, in turn, can influence 
the development of enforceable legal norms.”40   
 The Charter should not (and cannot) replace advocacy and organizing on the part of the 
labour movement in promoting the rights of unions and their members.  Nonetheless, in 2007 the 
Supreme Court fully embraced collective bargaining as a constitutional right
41
 after just as fully 
rejecting that position twenty years earlier in the Labour Trilogy, and constitutional argument 
now appears to be a much more viable tool to promote the rights of labour than it did prior to 
B.C. Health Services.   The Charter can be part of a “muti-faceted fight back campaign to protect 
and promote the rights of working people;” a strategy for labour that “employ[s] rights-based 
arguments and use[s] the Charter and international labour accords to its advantage, while 
simultaneously recognizing the limitations inherent in this strategy.”42 
Thesis Structure 
 In approaching the question of sympathetic action, I have divided this paper into three 
Parts.  
 In Part I, I review the status and history of sympathetic action in Canadian law.  I analyze 
the characterization of sympathetic action as a "strike" and the reasons for and assumptions 
inherent in the now-universal prohibition on sympathetic action.  I also review the status of 
sympathetic action under the common law as it relates to the non-unionized worker. 
                                                          
40
 James Gray Pope, “The Right to Strike Under the United States Constitution:  Theory, Practice, and Possible 
Implications for Canada” (2009), found online at http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/conferences2/ 
StrikeSymposium09_Pope.pdf (last visited July 31, 2013). 
41
 Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Association v. British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27 ("B.C. 
Health Services"). 
42
 Walchuk, supra note 35 at 87. 
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 In Part II, I apply three Charter freedoms - conscience, expression, and association - to 
sympathetic action.  I will argue that these three freedoms all protect a right to sympathetic 
action in different ways - in particular, the freedom of conscience will most clearly apply to the 
non-unionized worker - and that each freedom brings with it a different set of justifications for 
the right to industrial action.  I examine whether the prohibition on sympathetic action under 
labour legislation can be saved under section 1 of the Charter and consider the balance of 
various private and public interests as part of this assessment.  I conclude that a legislative 
blanket prohibition on sympathetic action is unconstitutional and that it is not justifiable under 
section 1. 
 In Part II, I also examine those same freedoms as they apply to the non-unionized worker.  
I argue that the Canadian common law, which treats sympathetic action by a worker as a breach 
of that worker's contract of employment, is not consistent with Charter values and that it must 
change to conform with those values. 
 In Part III I put forward suggestions for reform.  Because (or so I argue) the current 
limitations on sympathetic action cannot be saved under section 1 of the Charter, reform is 
necessary to labour relations legislation.  I do not argue that there is an unrestricted right to 
sympathetic action, and therefore I examine options for a regulated right.  I also suggest changes 
to the common law - either through changes to the common law itself or through legislative 
reform - to reflect Charter values. 
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SYMPATHETIC ACTION IN CANADIAN LAW 
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Canadian Legal Regimes 
 In Canada, broadly speaking, there are "three closely interrelated regimes that regulate 
the employer-employee relationship."
43
  The first, the common law of employment, is based on 
the notion of the employment relationship as a contract negotiated between free and equal 
contracting parties and enforceable in the courts.  The second, collective bargaining, accepts that 
the employee is usually the weaker party in any negotiation of an employment contract, and that  
the individual contract of employment is not a satisfactory regulatory mechanism.  The 
individual employment contract is therefore replaced by collective negotiation between 
bargaining agents (unions or groups of unions) and employers or groups of employers.  The third 
regime, direct statutory regulation, has historically been subordinate to the other two regimes.  It 
includes employment standards and health and safety regulation, and its purpose was generally 
viewed as to provide basic protections to those workers who either could not obtain the 
protections of collective bargaining, or whose bargaining power (collective or individual) was 
not sufficient to win acceptable terms and conditions of employment.
44
 
 The vast majority of Canadian employees operate under the common law of employment.  
They are neither union members nor bound by a collective agreement.  Nationally, 
approximately thirty percent of Canadian workers were covered by a collective agreement in 
2011, and therefore operated under the collective bargaining regime, but the national average is 
                                                          
43
 Labour and Employment Law, supra note 3 at 1.  These regimes notably deal with "employees".  Excluded from 
these regimes are workers who are true "independent contractors" and whose contractual relationship is based on 
the principles of commercial contracts generally rather than the principles underlying contracts of employment. 
While independent contractors may certainly take action in support of a union (for instance a consultant or lawyer 
who refuses to cross a picket line), this paper deals solely with sympathetic action taken by workers who are 
"employees", whether they be party to an individual contract of employment or covered by a collective 
agreement.   
44
 ibid. 
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misleading.  While three in four workers in the public sector were unionized, the unionization 
rate for workers in the private sector was less than one in five.
45
    
 The common law contract of employment predates statutory recognition of collective 
bargaining.  The common law regime and the collective bargaining regime have very different 
underlying principles.  Government gradually became a "party to the employment relationship," 
by introducing labour standards legislation (part of the third regime described above) and labour 
relations legislation, as a response to "the hardships created by unemployment, 
underemployment, sweated labour, low wages, long hours, brutal supervision and unsafe and 
unhealthy working conditions."
46
   However under both the common law and collective 
bargaining regimes as they currently stand, sympathetic action remains illegal.  (Nor has the 
direct regulation regime altered this fact.
47
)   While restrictions on strikes over the past century-
and-a-half were gradually relaxed
48
 (admittedly with an increase in restrictions on strike activity 
since the 1980s
49
) sympathetic action was in most Canadian jurisdictions illegal and remains so 
today.  
 Canadian labour law favours a "pluralist" approach to labour relations.  The role of the 
state under such an approach is to maintain "a balance of power between labour and 
management."
50
  The state, in theory, remains neutral between the interests of unions and 
                                                          
45
 Sharanjit Uppal, "Unionization 2011", report for Statistics Canada, online: http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75-
001-x/2011004/article/11579-eng.pdf (last visited November 3, 2012).   
46
 ibid at 13. 
47
 See below, however, regarding the potential impact of fundamental labour rights in human rights legislation. 
48
 For a summary of the evolution of strike regulation in Canada, see Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, "The Freedom to 
Strike In Canada: A Brief Legal History" (2010), 15(2) C.L.E.L.J. 333. 
49
 See e.g. Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz, From Consent to Coercion: The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms 
(Aurora: Garamond Press, 2003) at p. 25 (where the increase in back-to-work legislation is characterized as 
"permanent exceptionalism") and p. 54; Charlotte Yates, "In Defence of the Right to Strike" (2009), 59 U.N.B.L.J. 
128. 
50
 Godard, supra note 23 at 283.  See also Labour and Employment Law, supra note 3 at 421ff. 
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employers.  Its role is to adjudicate and mediate disputes, so that the parties can meet on 
relatively equal terms and pursue their respective interests with minimum conflict.
51
  The 
freedom of contract between the union and the employer is a central consideration;
52
 while there 
is government intervention, the system remains an "essentially capitalistic although mixed 
enterprise economy."
53
  As a result, those who support the pluralist approach tend to view 
industrial action as valuable only as a tool - not a "fundamental, inalienable, personal right," but 
justified "because of its instrumental role in our larger industrial relations system."
54
   
 While the strike has been described as “an indispensable part of the Canadian industrial 
relations system”55, some scholars of labour relations, critical of the Canadian model of strike 
regulation and dubious about the power of the strike therein, have referred dismissively to the 
“(non)-right to strike”56, or to strikes in Canada as a “velvet fist in an iron glove.”57  Yet despite 
being essential or ineffectual (or both), strikes inspire strong emotion, and similarly 
inflammatory language.  The strike has been described as “economic warfare”;58 it is a “blunt 
instrument”59.  Governments treat it “like a bomb waiting to go off.”60   It can “cause chaos” and 
“is too powerful an instrument to go unrestrained.” 61   It may even have “a revolutionary 
                                                          
51
 ibid. 
52
 Paul Weiler, Reconcilable Differences: New Directions in Canadian Labour Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1980) at 64. 
53
 Canadian Industrial Relations: The Report of Task Force on Labour Relations (the "Woods Report") (Ottawa: Privy 
Council office, 1968) at 12. 
54
 Weiler, supra note 52 at 66. 
55
 Ibid. at 408. 
56
 Larry Haiven, “PC 1003 and the (Non) Right to Strike: A Sorry Legacy” in Cy Gonick, Paul Phillips, and Jesse Vorst 
(eds.),  Labour Gains, Labour Pains:  50 Years of PC 1003 (Winnipeg:  Fernwood Publishing, 1995) 215. 
57
 Daniel Drache and Harry Glasbeek, The Changing Workplace: Reshaping Canada’s Industrial Relations System 
(Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1992), Ch. 6. 
58
 There are innumerable examples of this turn of phrase.  See, for example, Toromont Cat v. International Union of 
Operating Engineers, Local 904, 2008 NLTD 22 (CanLII) at para. 30; Canadian National Railway Company, 2007 
CanLII 72581 (CIRB) at para. 83. 
59
 Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan Mining Ltd. v. Todd [1987] 2 W.W.R. 481 (Sask. C.A.) at 526. 
60
 Weiler, supra note 52 at 60. 
61
 A.W.R. Carrothers et al., Collective Bargaining Law in Canada (2
nd
 Ed.) (Toronto: Butterworths, 1986) at 70. 
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flavour...[that] is anathema to the authorities, even if they are by no means totalitarian”62.   The 
Anglo-Canadian judiciary has long been willing and eager to use its imagination in finding ways 
to stymie trade unions in general and strikes specifically.
63
    Governments have "accepted strikes 
only grudgingly, with considerable ambivalence," and "[a] primary factor driving the evolution 
of Canadian labour law has been a desire to limit what are seen to be the detrimental effects of 
strikes."
64
   
 Strict limits on sympathetic action are an important part of this Canadian pluralist 
approach to labour relations.  A strike – even a particularly vicious and chaotic one – at a single 
workplace can inspire fear and uncertainty in the local community, and potentially invite 
government involvement either through the police or through the Courts via the injunction.  Its 
impact will nonetheless be, for the most part, local – the “chaos” or “revolutionary flavour” 
relatively limited.  But the impact of a strike is magnified if other workers and unions refuse to 
cross the picket line or take other sympathetic action.  Of course it would be further magnified if 
fellow workers engaged in full sympathy strikes that would affect a number of workplaces and 
possibly a number of jurisdictions.  Therefore as mentioned previously, workers and unions who 
undertake sympathetic action are vulnerable to fines and penalties under labour relations 
legislation, and to retaliation from employers for breach of contract.   
Sympathetic Action as a "Strike" 
 At common law any sympathetic action short of cessation of labour will not be 
considered a strike; certainly in the English context, it has been argued that anything short of 
                                                          
62
 Jean-Michel Servais, “The ILO Law and the Freedom to Strike” (2010), 15(2) C.L.E.L.J. 147 at 147. 
63
 See, e.g., Arthurs, “The Right to Golf”, supra note 30 at 17 and “Tort Liability for Strikes in Canada” supra note 6; 
Beth Bilson, “Enter Stage Right:  Players and Roles in a Post-B.C. Health Services World” (2009), 59 UNB L.J. 67; 
Fudge and Tucker, “A History of the Freedom to Strike”, supra  note 48. 
64
 Labour and Employment Law, supra note 3 at 421. 
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actual stoppage of work is not a strike.
65
  Nonetheless the modern Canadian labour relations 
regime will view almost any sympathetic action, if taken collectively, as a "strike",
66
 and this can 
apply to collective action whether taken by workers certified under the relevant labour relations 
legislation or not.  "Because the timing of strikes is strictly regulated...[sympathetic] action is 
likely both to constitute a strike and to be untimely."
67
   Among the industrialized market 
economies, Canadian restrictions on sympathetic action are among the most expansive: 
 
In many countries solidarity strikes (sympathy strikes) are at risk if they are about non-
economic matters, but they enjoy equal protection to that of other strikes as long as they 
are based on economic matters...At the other end of the spectrum are countries like 
Canada, New Zealand, Japan, Switzerland, and Britain, where almost every sympathy 
strike, that has as its objective, putting pressure on a secondary employer, is considered 
unlawful.
68
 
 Workers who are certified are prohibited from striking during the term of their collective 
agreement by the so-called “peace obligation”69 – the absolute ban on strike activity by workers 
or their union (as well as a bar on lockouts by their employer
70
) during the term of their 
collective agreement.  Every labour relations statute of general application in Canada contains 
some version of the peace obligation,
71
 allowing strikes to take place only during “carefully 
                                                          
65
 See, e.g., Richard Hyman, Strikes, 2
nd
 Ed. (London: Fontana, 1977) at 17; Otto Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law, 
2
nd
 Ed., (London: Stevens & Sons, 1977) at 227; Otto Kahn-Freund and Bob Hepple, The Law of Strikes, (London: 
Fabian Society, 1972) at 4; Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations 1965-1968 (London: 
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1968, reprinted 1975) (the "Donovan Report") at 242. 
66
 George W.Adams, Canadian Labour Law (2nd. Ed.) (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2006-) at 11-5ff. 
67
 Labour and Employment Law, supra note 3 at 452. 
68
 A.T.M. Jacobs, "The Law of Strikes and Lockouts" in Roger Blanpain (ed.), Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations in Industrialized Market Economies  (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004) 549 at 560-561. 
69
 Geoffrey England, “Some Thoughts on the Peace Obligation” (1980), 12:52 Ottawa Law Rev. 521 at 521. 
70
 Canadian labour relations legislation usually sets up a symmetry between strike and lockout provisions, but this 
symmetry is illusory and it would be a mistake to view strikes and lockouts as equivalent.  The countervailing 
power of the employer is not the lockout, but its right to manage the workplace, and its ability to “take a strike”, 
rather than its right to lock out its workers.  See Geoffrey England, "Constitutionalizing the Right to Strike", supra 
note 38  at 177.   
71
 British Columbia Labour Relations Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 244, s. 57; Alberta Labour Relations Code, R.S.A. 2000, 
c. L-1, ss. 71-74; Saskatchewan Trade Union Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. T-17, s. 44; Manitoba Labour Relations Act, C.C.S.M. 
c. L10, ss. 89 and 91; Ontario Labour Relations Act, S.O. 1995, c. 1, s. 79; Québec Labour Code, R.S.Q. c. C-27, s. 107 
and 108; New Brunswick Industrial Relations Act, R.S.N.B. c. I-4,  s. 53; Nova Scotia Trade Union Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, 
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regulated periodic bouts of bargaining for a collective agreement.”72  Those labour relations 
statutes of more specific application (or more specific provisions within the general legislation), 
especially those dealing with public sector workers,
73
 usually have more stringent provisions 
against strike activity, either limiting the extent of strike action
74
 or outlawing strikes entirely.
75
   
Disputes under a collective agreement are resolved via referral to a neutral arbitrator rather than 
through economic tests of power.  Union members engaged in a legal strike receive a number of 
statutory protections, insofar as they are protected from employer retaliation
76
 and the employer 
has certain further obligations, such as to maintain payments to benefit and pension plans
77
 and 
to allow the workers to return to their previous jobs once the strike is over.
78
   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
c. 475, s. 47; Prince Edward Island Labour Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. L-1, s. 36; Newfoundland Labour Relations Act, 
R.S.N.L. 1990, c. L-1, s. 99; Canada Labour Code, R.S. 1985, c. L-2, s. 88.1. 
72
 Brian Langille, “What is a Strike?”, (2010), 15(2) C.L.E.L.J. 355 at 361. 
73
 Legislation dealing with particular industries within the private sector may impose additional limits or erect 
additional procedural hurdles that a union must respect prior to taking strike action, however.  This is particularly 
evident in the construction industry, which is often treated differently in labour relations legislation.  See, for 
example, The Construction Industry Labour Relations Act, 1992, S.S. 1992, c. 29-11, s. 22, requiring that conciliation 
take place prior to a strike or lockout commencing; Ontario Labour Relations Act, supra note 71, s. 150.3, 
prohibiting strikes and lockouts in the residential construction industry after June 15 of any given year; Alberta 
Labour Relations Code, supra note 71, s. 185 setting out special requirements for strike votes in the construction 
industry. 
74
 For example, a number of statutes and statutory provisions set out that minimum staffing levels must be 
maintained by public service workers in the event of a strike; see The Public Service Essential Services Act, S.S. 
2008, c. P-42.2; The Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act, S.O. 1993, c. 38; The Government Essential 
Services Act, S.M. 1996, c. 23.  Others extend the notice period required prior to a strike or lockout for particular 
public employees, e.g. The Police Act, 1990, S.S. 1990-91, c. P15-01, s. 85 (120 hours notice required for police); 
Québec Labour Code, supra note 3, s. 111.0.23 (seven clear days notice required for public service employees). 
75
 Such provisions generally remove the strike and lockout from the collective bargaining process and instead 
mandate arbitration to resolve bargaining disputes.  E.g. The Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act, R.S.O. 1990, 
c. H.14, s. 11 (hospitals); Nova Scotia Trade Union Act, supra note 71, s. 52A (police) and 52AA (firefighters); 
Québec Labour Code, supra note 71, s. 105 (police and firefighters). 
76
 E.g., Saskatchewan Trade Union Act, supra note 71, s. 11(1)(l); Nova Scotia Trade Union Act, supra note 71, s. 
53(3)(a). 
77
 E.g., British Columbia Labour Code, supra note 71, s. 62; Saskatchewan Trade Union Act, supra note 71, s. 47. 
78
 E.g. Saskatchewan Trade Union Act, supra note 71, s. 2(f)(iii) “’Employee’...includes on strike or locked out in a 
current labour-management dispute who has not secured permanent employment elsewhere...” and s. 46(1), 
“Following the conclusion of a strike or lock-out, where an employer and a trade union have not reached an 
agreement for reinstating striking or locked-out employees, the employer shall reinstate striking or locked-out 
employees in accordance with this section.”  See also Ontario Labour Relations Act, supra note 71, s. 80. 
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 Therefore sympathetic action, including refusals to cross another union’s picket line,79 
boycotts and refusal to handle “hot cargo” from struck employers,80 and of course “true” strikes, 
in sympathy of other unions are all also subject to the peace obligation. As Geoffrey England 
notes: 
 
[T]he scope of unions to take sympathetic action in support of striking or locked out 
workers is very narrow under Canadian law.  In view of the emergence of large, multi-
plant companies which can shift operations between plants to counter union pressure, the 
value of sympathetic action to unions is obvious.  Yet, the combination of the statutory 
“no-strike” ban during the collective agreement, the expansive definitions of “strike” as 
including action taken in support of other workers’ disputes and the practice of certifying 
relatively narrowly drawn bargaining units renders this very potent weapon almost 
always illegal.  Moreover, the law in most jurisdictions does not allow the union’s pickets 
and “hot cargo” edicts to reach these secondary workers whose support it needs....[T]he 
rationale for laws restricting so-called “secondary” action has nothing to do with 
neutrality, quarantine or the rule of law, but is really concerned with keeping trade union 
power within “acceptable” boundaries (acceptable to the capitalist state, that is)...81 
 While sympathetic action will currently be considered a "strike" under the laws of all 
Canadian jurisdictions, this has not always been the case.  Saskatchewan, for example, did not 
have a definition of “strike” at all in its legislation until 1983.82  As a result, prior to the 1983 
statutory amendment, the common law definition of strike governed,
83
 and it was not a “strike” if 
workers in Saskatchewan refused to cross a picket line.
84
  In British Columbia prior to 1984, if 
                                                          
79
 Grain Workers, supra note 4; Local 273, International Longshoremen’s Association et. al. v. Maritime Employers’ 
Association et. al. , supra note 4.  However individual refusals to cross a picket line may not constitute a “strike”.  
See, for example, Unilux Boiler Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, Local 3950, 2005 CanLII 20765 (Ont. 
L.R.B.). 
80
 See, for example, Re Kingston Whig-Standard and Communication Workers of America, Loc. 204 (1995), 51 L.A.C. 
(4th) 137 (H.D. Brown), in which a “hot cargo clause” in a collective agreement was found to be contrary to the ban 
on mid-contract strikes in the Ontario Labour Relations Act.  See also, however, East Kootenay Newspapers Ltd. v. 
Vancouver Printing Pressmen, Assistants and Offset Workers' Union, Local 25 et. al., [1987] B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 113, 
where a refusal to handle advertisements from a company subject to a “hot” declaration was ruled not to be an 
illegal strike due to a clause in the collective agreement that allowed workers to refuse struck work, to refuse to 
cross a picket line, and/or to refuse to handle “hot” goods. 
81
 Geoffrey England, "Constitutionalizing the Right to Strike", supra note 38 at 201. 
82
 Saskatchewan Trade Union Act, as amended S.S. 1983, c.81, s.3 
83
 Re Dominion Bridge Co. and U.S.W.A., Local 5917,  15 L.A.C. (2d) 295 (Vancise). 
84
 Re Wascana Hospital and SGEU, [1983] Jan. Sask. Labour Rep. 41. 
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workers refused to cross a picket line out of a feeling of solidarity for the striking workers, that 
would not be a "strike" under the B.C. legislation.
85
  The New Brunswick Supreme Court has 
held in one case that it was not a "strike" when workers refused to cross picket lines,
86
 but that 
case dealt with a "common employer" situation and, notably, does not appear to have been 
followed in subsequent cases in that province.
87
 
 However, a broad definition of “strike" that will include most if not all sympathetic 
action, whether work actually ceases or not, is now essentially uniform across Canada.  The 
definition of a “strike” in the Canada Labour Code is representative of Canadian labour 
legislation: 
 
“Strike” includes a cessation of work or a refusal to work or to continue to work by 
employees, in combination, in concert or in accordance with a common understanding, 
and a slowdown of work or other concerted activity on the part of employees in relation 
to their work that is designed to restrict and limit output.
88
 
 Such a broad definition has been described as “objective”89 or “effects-based”90 in that 
the purpose of the activity is not relevant, only that it be done collectively (“in combination, in 
concert or in accordance with a common understanding”) and that it limit production (“designed 
to restrict and limit output”).  Six provinces have similar statutory language.91 Québec differs in 
that its strike definition refers to a “cessation” of work rather than to the broader “restriction of 
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 MacMillan, Bloedel Packaging Limited v. Pulp, Paper & Woodworkers of Canada, Local 5 et. al., [1975] 
B.C.L.R.B.D. No. 92 (QL) at 4. 
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 Furness Withy & Co. Ltd. v. Local 273, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, [1973] N.B.J. No. 211 (N.B.S.C.(Q.B.)(QL). 
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 Adams, Canadian Labour Law, supra note 66 at 11-6. 
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 Canada Labour Code, supra note 71 at s. 2.     
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 Langille, "What is a Strike?", supra note 72 at 355; England, "Peace Obligation", supra note 69 at 537. 
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 BCTF, supra note 14 at para. 3. 
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 While the actual wordings differ, the provisions are similar enough – insofar as they have no “subjective” 
element – that they are not reproduced here.  British Columbia Labour Relations Code, s. 1(1); Saskatchewan Trade 
Union Act, s. 2; Ontario Labour Relations Act, s. 1; New Brunswick Industrial Relations Act, s. 2; P.E.I. Labour Act, s. 
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production” definition, but it is similar in that the motivation for the strike is irrelevant. 92  
Alberta,
93
 Manitoba,
94
 and Nova Scotia
95
 differ from the Canadian norm in that they have a 
“subjective” element in their statutory language, in that to be considered a “strike” industrial 
action must have the purpose of compelling an employer to agree to terms and conditions of 
employment.   The purpose component, however, does not bar sympathetic action from being a 
"strike".
96
    
 British Columbia’s labour legislation prior to 1984 differentiated between strikes for 
collective bargaining purposes (which were forbidden during the term of a collective agreement) 
and those for other purposes, such as political protest strikes (which were permitted).  This was 
by virtue of the definition of “strike”, which required that a “strike” under the Labour Code be 
for the purpose of “compelling” an “employer” – whether the workers’ own or another – to 
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 Québec Labour Code, supra note 71, s. 1(g): “”strike: the concerted cessation of work by a group of employees”.  
However the Code includes a restriction on other, lesser, forms of industrial action as well, just not within the 
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“agree to terms or conditions of employment”.97  As a result the B.C. Labour Relations Board 
held that, for example, strikes in support of a “national day of protest” were not “strikes” under 
the Code.
98
  This definition was amended in 1984, in reaction to protest strikes in 1983 against 
the Social Credit government’s amendments to labour legislation, to conform to the current 
“effects-based” definition.99   
 In Nova Scotia, however, while on the face of it the legislation still contains a “purpose” 
requirement for activity to be considered a “strike” - legislative language very similar to that in 
British Columbia, pre-1984 – the Nova Scotia courts have rejected the pre-1984 British 
Columbia approach, and have interpreted the definition of “strike” in the Nova Scotia Act to be 
in fact “effects-based”, and have therefore found that “strikes” include the range of lesser 
industrial action mentioned above.
100
  This is because the statutory language is not exhaustive 
and refers to a “strike” including activities intended to compel an employer to agree to terms and 
conditions of employment, which suggests that activities with a different purpose - including 
sympathetic action - are also included. 
 Manitoba and Alberta do not appear to have interpreted their strike definitions in the 
same way as has Nova Scotia.  In those two provinces, therefore, a “purposive” definition seems 
to still govern.  However, the Alberta Board has held that refusing to cross a picket line is, prima 
facie, an attempt to compel an employer to agree to the strikers’ demands: 
 
We find ourselves less reluctant to infer an intention, among those who choose to honour 
a picket line, to compel an employer to agree to terms and conditions of employment. 
This inference will not always arise. There may be facts which suggest that other 
motives, such as personal safety, are more credible. However, when a group of 
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employees refuse to cross a picket line we generally infer that they do so in the belief that 
their support for the picketing will, directly or indirectly, put pressure on the employer in 
the dispute to settle with the striking employees. Solidarity is not blind. Employees picket 
and other employees honour the picket line because they believe it will generate a 
settlement of the primary dispute. Sometimes there is a feeling of reciprocity involved. If 
I honour your line, hopefully you will honour mine. It is the Board's view that such an 
intent is sufficient to bring the action within the subjective purpose required by s. 1(1)(u). 
In the absence of circumstances to suggest another intent, the Board will, if a stoppage as 
a result of a picket line is established, infer such an intention.  [Emphasis added.]
101
  
 Therefore under the Alberta statute, while industrial action generally may have a purpose 
requirement, it seems that in cases of sympathetic action the Board will infer the purpose 
necessary to find that the action is an illegal strike. 
 Even workers who are not represented by a certified bargaining unit may contravene 
labour relations legislation if they collectively take action in support of other strikers or in 
support of or opposition to a given policy or cause.  Under the Ontario Labour Relations Act, for 
instance, employees are not permitted to strike when no collective agreement is in operation 
unless a conciliation officer or mediator has been appointed by the Minister.
102
  However the Act 
does not provide for the appointment of a conciliation officer or mediator unless a trade union 
has been certified; hence, a strike by non-unionized employees will always be illegal.
103
  
 For a further example, see s. 11(2)(d) of the Saskatchewan Trade Union Act: 
 It shall be an unfair labour practice for any employee, trade union or any other person... 
...  
...to declare, authorize or take part in a strike unless a strike vote is taken by secret ballot 
among the employees who are: 
 
(i) in the appropriate unit concerned; and 
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(ii) affected by the collective bargaining; 
 
and unless a majority of the employees voting vote in favour of a strike, but no strike vote 
by secret ballot need be taken among employees in an appropriate unit consisting of two 
employees or fewer... 
 What is not explicitly set out in the Saskatchewan Act is that if the employees are not 
represented by a certified bargaining agent, there cannot be an "appropriate unit" for the purposes 
of the Act; and therefore any strike activity (in sympathy with other workers or otherwise) by 
workers who are not certified may also contravene the statute.   
Exceptions in Labour Relations Legislation 
 Some jurisdictions do allow for legal sympathetic action under their labour relations 
statutes.  Two types of sympathetic action – refusal to cross a picket line, and refusal to handle 
“hot cargo” – have been the subject of significant consideration across Canada.  Each has been 
subject to statutory provisions and contained within many collective agreements due to its 
centrality to sympathetic action and to union solidarity. 
 British Columbia, for instance, appears to exempt from the definition of “strike” a refusal 
to cross a legal picket line: 
 
[a strike] does not include...a cessation, refusal, omission or act of an employee that 
occurs as the direct result of and for no other reason than picketing that is permitted under 
this Code
 104
   
 The section does not appear to have been considered in its present form, however.
105
  
Prior to the current strike definition, refusal to cross a picket line – like any strike action – 
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required a subjective component: to compel an employer to agree to terms or conditions of 
employment, as discussed supra.  This meant that if employees refused to cross a picket line out 
of a feeling of solidarity, rather than explicitly to compel the struck employer into capitulating, 
that would not be a “strike”.  As the B.C. Labour Relations Board stated: 
 
[O]ne cannot automatically transfer the motivation of the picketers to those who 
encounter the pickets and react to them. The latter rarely arrive at a collective decision to 
respect the picket line, inform themselves about the labour dispute, and act for the 
specific purpose of compelling that employer to a settlement. In the typical case, the 
individual employee automatically and instinctively refuses to cross the picket line, 
simply because it is there.
 106
 
 Notably, a belief in union solidarity in MacMillan Bloedel, supra, meant that the refusal 
to cross a picket line was not an illegal strike, because it was neither concerted nor for the 
purpose of compelling an employer to a settlement. Indeed, it is inherent in the statutory 
definition of "strike" in all jurisdictions that the activity be in concert or pursuant to a common 
understanding; if it can be shown that a group of employees refused to cross without a common 
understanding (i.e. each worker chose individually not to cross the picket line), there will be no 
strike.
107
  However, the B.C. approach is in marked contrast to the Longshoremen’s Case, supra, 
where union solidarity was the very basis for ruling that refusal to cross a picket line was an 
illegal strike.  It should be noted, however, that MacMillan Bloedel pre-dated Longshoremen.  In 
any event the newer definition of “strike” in the B.C. Code removes the subjective element, and 
as noted, does not appear to have been substantively considered in this regard.   
 The B.C. Board’s approach also differs from the Alberta application of its strike 
definition to refusal to cross a picket line.  The Alberta approach suggest that there is no need for 
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evidence that employees have taken collective steps to respect the picket line nor to inform 
themselves of the details of the strike, as suggested in MacMillan Bloedel.  The British Columbia 
cases seem to suggest that union solidarity is instinctive, moral, and perhaps even irrational.  The 
Alberta cases, on the other hand, seem to suggest that union solidarity – “not blind” to the 
realities of labour law, as the Board notes in McGavin Foods – is pragmatic and based upon 
enlightened self-interest. 
 Seemingly alone in Canada, the Manitoba Labour Relations Act provides explicit 
protection for an employee who takes sympathetic action, as follows: 
 
An employee who is in a unit of employees of an employer in respect of which there is a 
collective agreement in force and who refuses to perform work which would directly 
facilitate the operation or business of another employer whose employees within Canada 
are locked out or on a legal strike is not by reason of that refusal in breach of the 
collective agreement or of any term or condition of his employment and is not, by reason 
of that refusal, subject to any disciplinary action by the employer or the bargaining agent 
that is a party to the collective agreement.
108
 
 
 The wording of the Manitoba statute is remarkably broad, and conceivably covers not 
merely refusal to handle hot cargo, but also refusal to cross a picket line and refusal to do work at 
one’s own workplace that might, for instance, supply goods to a struck workplace. Despite its 
broad wording, however, this section is subject to a number of limitations.  It expressly sets out 
that an employer is not required to pay an employee for work not done,
109
 which seems neither 
surprising nor unreasonable.  However it also does not allow an employee to refuse work that 
would facilitate production at a struck or locked-out workplace that is run by the same employer, 
even if that other workplace is in a different province.
110
  The section specifies facilitating 
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production of another employer, not another workplace.  In addition it specifies that the action 
must be in support of employees "within Canada", hence, the action cannot be in sympathy with 
foreign workers.
111
 
 More significantly for this thesis, however, is that the protection is exclusively individual.  
It does not extend to the union to which the employee may belong, as sympathetic action that is 
taken collectively and urged or co-ordinated by the employee’s union could constitute an illegal 
work stoppage under the Act.
112
  It is not clear if a group of workers that undertakes sympathetic 
action, absent encouragement from union officials, would be in breach of the Act’s peace 
obligation; it seems likely that such activity would be considered an illegal strike, however. 
Sympathetic Action Under Contract 
 For both unionized and non-unionized workers in most Canadian jurisdictions (Manitoba 
being the most obvious exception), individually refusing to cross a picket line, to handle goods 
from a struck workplace, or otherwise refuse work in solidarity with striking workers, can lead to 
discipline for insubordination.
113
   
 The British Columbia Board has consistently upheld clauses in a collective agreement 
that allow for sympathetic action.  This contrasts with Ontario
114
 and Alberta,
115
 where clauses 
that allow for sympathetic action cannot authorize a strike  because they contradict the statutory 
prohibition on mid-term strike action, though they can insulate employees from discipline for 
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refusal to cross.  Even in British Columbia, however, the phrasing of the clause matters.  A 
collective agreement clause that allows explicitly for mid-term strike action is prohibited.
116
  
However a clause or clauses that relate to the scheduling of “work” can arguably be upheld 
because if work is not scheduled then there can be no cessation of work by the union.
117
   
 For the worker who is not unionized, because sympathetic action will inevitably involve a 
refusal to perform certain duties, an individual worker who refuses a legitimate order
118
  to 
perform work is vulnerable to discipline: 
 
Where the job action takes the form, not of a full-scale walkout, but of a work-to-rule, 
go-slow, overtime ban, mass sick-out, the English precedents hold that such conduct will 
also repudiate the employee's implied obligation to further the employer's interests unless 
their contract of employment clearly entitles them to refuse to perform the work 
assignments in question.  The same analysis would appear to hold good for employees 
who refuse to cross a picket line; they are in breach of their obligation to work, unless 
there is some express or implied provision in their contract of employment that excuses 
them from working in such circumstances.
119
  [Citations omitted] 
 The one exception may a refusal of overtime (for instance, to prevent an increase in 
production intended to make up for loss of production at a struck work site), which would seem 
to be protected to a certain extent under labour standards legislation in some jurisdictions, so, for 
instance, employees in those jurisdictions are free to refuse to work more than a certain number 
of hours of overtime in a week.
120
  A concerted refusal by workers to work overtime has been 
held to be a "strike" in Ontario
121
 and Saskatchewan
122
 but not in British Columbia.
123
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 It seems to be the case in Canada “that strikes and other forms of industrial action will 
amount to a breach of contract”;124 at common law, "going on strike almost certainly constitutes 
a repudiatory breach of the employee's implied obligation to his or her employer so as to warrant 
summary dismissal."
125
   Professor Brian Langille describes it thusly: 
 
The common law “right” to strike amounts to this: it is the freedom of a group of 
workers, playing by the rules of contract termination, and acting for a certain purpose 
(i.e., (re)negotiation of their contract with the employer), to stop working in an effort to 
get the employer to come to terms...But it is purely a freedom at common law, and one 
not protected by a perimeter of rights.  There is no protection, no right, against employer 
retaliation for the exercise of the freedom (and the employer has no duty not to dismiss, 
no duty to rehire, etc.)...[That protection] did not exist at common law and...is withheld 
from all workers who are excluded from the statute.
126
 
As McIntyre J. noted in his concurring reasons in the Alberta Reference: 
 
It is not correct to say that it is lawful for an individual employee to cease work during 
the currency of his contract of employment.  Bezil J.A., in the Alberta Court of Appeal, 
in the case at bar, dealt with this point in these words: 
 
The argument falters on the premise that cessation of work by one person is 
lawful.  The rationale advanced for that premise is that the courts will not compel 
a servant to fulfil his contract of service, therefore cessation of work by a servant 
is lawful.  While it is true that the courts will not compel a servant to fulfil his 
contract of service, the servant is nevertheless bound in law by his contract and 
may be ordered to pay damages for the unlawful breach of it.  It cannot be said 
that his cessation of work is lawful. 
 
...The individual has, by reason of the cessation of work, either breached or terminated 
his contract of employment.
127
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 If a strike is a breach of contract, it would open an employee to liability for damages and 
dismissal on that basis.  If it is a termination, then the employer need not take any disciplinary 
action at all; the contract is at an end, and the employer can freely treat the strike as a 
resignation.   
 The ability of unions and workers to take sympathetic action in Canada is thus severely 
limited, even action that is not a “strike” stricto sensu and even action taken over issues – such as 
solidarity strikes, protest strikes, or disputes over matters not negotiated – where there is no 
recourse to any dispute resolution mechanism to resolve matters.   
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PART II 
SYMPATHETIC ACTION AND THE CHARTER 
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Application of the Charter 
 The two employment regimes dealt with in this thesis - labour relations legislation, on the 
one hand, and the common law contract of employment, on the other - will require different 
approaches to the question of Charter protection of sympathetic action.  The Charter will apply 
directly to legislation.  However it does not apply directly to the common law; rather, the 
common law must comply with "Charter values", rather than the Charter itself.   
 The Charter expressly applies to government action;
128
 as such the statutory prohibitions 
on sympathetic action are directly subject to Charter review.  The Supreme Court definitively 
rejected the argument that the statutory labour relations regime was a purely private matter 
between an employer and a union: “once the state has chosen to regulate a private relationship 
such as that between employer and employee...it is unduly formalistic to consign that 
relationship to a “private sphere” that is impervious to Charter review."129 
 The Charter does not, however, apply to relationships between private parties.
130
  Private 
parties owe each other no constitutional duties; therefore, a litigant cannot found a cause of 
action on a Charter right, nor can they claim that the common law violates the Charter because 
"Charter rights do not exist in the absence of state action."
131
 
 The Charter therefore does not apply to the common law contract of employment unless 
a government actor relies upon the common law in which case the Charter will apply directly.
132
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Rather, absent a government actor, the common law must be interpreted in such a way as to 
conform to Charter "principles" or "values". 
 
It is clear from Dolphin Delivery...that the common law must be interpreted in a manner 
which is consistent with Charter principles. This obligation is simply a manifestation of 
the inherent jurisdiction of the courts to modify or extend the common law in order to 
comply with prevailing social conditions and values. 
133
  
 Therefore when dealing with protection of sympathetic action under the freedoms of 
association, expression, and conscience, two questions must be asked:  first, does the statutory 
prohibition on sympathetic action infringe upon that freedom?  And second, where there is no 
government actor or action, are the various common law prohibitions or penalties regarding 
sympathetic action inconsistent with Charter values or principles? 
 The indirect application of the Charter to the common law and the caution of the courts 
in amending the common law will also be factors considered in Part III of this thesis and, in 
particular, regarding the question of whether reform should be accomplished through statutory 
reform or whether the courts would be justified in amending the common law. 
 It is worth noting, however, that three Canadian jurisdictions - Saskatchewan, Québec, 
and the Yukon Territory - have included fundamental freedoms similar to those found within s. 2 
of the Charter within their provincial legislation.
134
  While this thesis is concerned with the 
Charter, it would seem undeniable that similar arguments for protection of sympathetic action 
may be made under these provincial statutes and that these statutes, unlike the Charter, may 
apply directly to private action.  When dealing with the common law, therefore, the impact of 
provincial legislation will also be considered. 
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Sympathetic Action and Section 2 of the Charter 
 Before dealing with the application of the various freedoms to sympathetic action, 
however, it is necessary to consider whether section 2 of the Charter protects sympathetic action 
at all.  On the face of it, it seems that the Charter has the potential to protect such a right.  While 
the Supreme Court in 1987 held that the Charter did not protect the right of workers to 
collectively bargain or to strike, the 2007 B.C. Health Services case reversed this ruling; it is now 
the law in Canada that the right to collectively bargain is protected by section 2(d).  It is still an 
open question whether the right to strike is afforded Charter protection beyond the expressive 
right to picket during an otherwise legal strike.  Nonetheless, labour relations are no longer 
inherently excluded from Charter review. That said, the Federal Court of Appeal in Grain 
Workers
135
- the one case to consider sympathetic action post-B.C. Health Services - has held that 
there is no right to strike and therefore necessarily no right to sympathetic action.  In the 
majority's view, the right to respect a picket line rose and fell with the right to strike simpliciter. 
 Because Grain Workers is the one case since 2007 that is squarely on-point and because 
its reasoning applies to section 2 generally, it is summarized here in some detail rather than in 
one of the sections dealing with a specific freedom.  Following that summary, I argue that the 
reasoning of the majority in Grain Workers is fundamentally flawed, and that even the dissent of 
Evans J.A. does not fully address the question of sympathetic action. 
 The majority decision – represented by the decision of Blais J.A. and the concurring 
decision of Ryer J.A. – is formalistic, minimalist, and acontextual.  It is very much a holdover 
from the days of the Labour Trilogy.  The decision of Evans J.A. is more in keeping with 
Dickson C.J.’s dissent in the Alberta Reference and of the Supreme Court in R.W.D.S.U. v. 
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Pepsi-Cola and B.C. Health Services.  However it, too, has limitations, in particular around its 
application of section 1 of the Charter and the Oakes test – though in fairness, the parties to the 
appeal agreed that the s.1 analysis would be the same as it relates to s. 2(d) as it is to 2(b).  For 
reasons explored later, I believe this is a problematic conclusion, but Evans J.A. clearly has a 
sounder grasp of the realities of labour relations, and of the interests protected by the Charter in 
the labour context, than does the majority. 
 Grain Workers’ Union involved a number of unions and locals - the Public Service 
Alliance of Canada (“PSAC”) and Grain Workers’ Union, Local 333, (“GWU”), as well as three 
locals of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union:  ILWU-Canada, ILWU Local 500, 
and ILWU Ship & Dock Foremen, Local 514.  (The ILWU locals will be referred to collectively 
herein as simply “ILWU”.)   PSAC represented employees of the Canada Grain Commission 
(“CGC”, a public employer) , who are responsible, under the auspices of the Canada Grain 
Act,
136
 for inspecting grain being stored and shipped at grain terminals at the Port of Vancouver.  
GWU represented employees of the grain terminals themselves, while ILWU-Canada and 
ILWU, Local 500 represented employees of stevedoring companies responsible for loading grain 
for shipment. ILWU Ship & Dock Foremen, Local 514 represented foremen dispatched to the 
worksites of the stevedoring companies as required. 
 The case also involved three employers or employers’ organizations.  The CGC was party 
to a collective agreement with PSAC.  The B.C. Terminal Elevator Operators’ Association 
(“BCTEOA”) was party to a collective agreement with GWU. Finally, the B.C. Maritime 
Employers’ Association (“BCMEA”) was party to a collective agreement with ILWU.  A fourth 
employer organization, the Waterfront Foremen Employers Association, had ceased to exist by 
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the time the appeal was heard, and its collective bargaining relationship with ILWU Ship & 
Dock Foremen, Local 514 had been assumed by the BCMEA. 
 Members of PSAC were in a legal strike position and ultimately took strike action against 
the CGC.  PSAC members set up picket lines around the grain terminals.  Most, if not all, of the 
members of GWU and ILWU refused to cross those picket lines although performance of their 
work duties required them to do so.  It is not clear from either the Federal Court of Appeal 
decision or the earlier decision of the Canada Industrial Relations Board whether the refusal to 
cross the picket lines was authorized or promoted by union officials within GWU or ILWU.  Nor 
is it clear whether the refusal to cross the picket lines was universal among GWU and ILWU 
members.  It does appear that the refusals to cross were widespread, however. 
 Both GWU and ILWU had, in the collective agreements with their respective employers, 
negotiated clauses that stated the employer did not expect members of the union to cross a picket 
line.
137
 The BCMEA and the BCTEOA each applied to the Canada Industrial Relations Board 
for interim back-to-work orders on the basis that the members of GWU and ILWU were engaged 
in illegal strike activity contrary to the Code; the CIRB granted these orders in quick succession.   
 The unions stated that they wished to argue sections 2(b) (freedom of expression) and 
2(d) (freedom of association) of the Charter in their defence.  These arguments were heard at a 
later date
138
 but the CIRB rejected the unions’ submissions that their members’ freedom of 
association
139
 and freedom of expression
140
 had been infringed; or that in the alternative, any 
infringement of freedom of expression was justified under s. 1.
141
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 That Board decision was released on the same day that the Supreme Court released the 
B.C. Health Services decision.  As a result the unions applied for reconsideration of the Board’s 
decision.  However, in its reconsideration decision,
142
 the Board held that B.C. Health Services 
did not affect the earlier decision. 
 Before the Federal Court of Appeal, the parties agreed that refusal to cross a picket line 
was an illegal “strike” under s. 3(1) and section 88.1 of the Code.  The unions challenged the 
constitutional validity of the strike prohibition and the Board’s interpretation of them.143 
 Though all three judges upheld the statutory prohibition on mid-term strikes as 
constitutionally valid, each wrote a separate decision and only Evans J.A. held that the 
prohibition infringed the workers’ Charter rights (though he ultimately held that the 
infringement was justifiable under s. 1).  Blais J.A. held that the prohibition did not infringe on 
the workers’ Charter rights at all.  Ryer J.A., generally concurring with Blais J.A.’s analysis, 
offered a concurring opinion agreeing that the prohibition on mid-term strikes did not infringe s. 
2(b).  
 Justice Blais agreed with the CIRB that the Code’s definition of “strike” does not infringe 
s. 2(b) “because neither the purpose nor effect of a prohibition on mid-term strikes infringes the 
applicants’ freedom of expression.”144   The purpose of the peace obligation is not to silence 
expressions of solidarity among unionists, but to “limit the negative consequences that strikes 
have on employers in the interest of providing certainty and stability in industry labour 
relations.”145  It aims to control the physical consequences of certain human activity, not to 
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control expression itself.
146
  He rejected the unions’ argument that the form of the expression 
(withdrawal of services) was indivisible from its content – “that the message ‘we will shoulder 
the same burden as you’ could not be demonstrated by other means.”147 
 Because he held it was not the purpose of the legislation to infringe freedom of 
expression, Blais J.A. turned to the purpose of the expression to determine if the legislation had 
the effect of infringing freedom of expression.  Citing the principles set out in Irwin Toy,
148
 
Justice Blais found that refusing to cross a picket line “had neither a social or political purpose”; 
it was, rather, “an intrusion into a private contractual dispute”.149  It promoted neither seeking 
and attaining the truth, participating in social and political decision-making, or cultivating 
diversity in the form of individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing (set out in Irwin Toy).  
Therefore, as the expression did not fall within the type of expression protected by s. 2(b), the 
provision of the Labour Code infringed freedom of expression in neither purpose nor effect. 
 Justice Blais concluded that “strikes are not afforded constitutional protection” and that 
the unions’ arguments are simply a reformulation of the issues “to try to avoid the consequences 
of engaging in an unlawful strike”.150 
 Ryer J.A., in his brief reasons, essentially concurred with Blais J.A.’s analysis, adding 
that in his view the decision-making in this case related to the private contractual affairs of 
PSAC employees and the CGC, and “decision making that takes place in a private context 
is...not within the ambit of ‘participation and social and political decision making’ as 
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contemplated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Irwin Toy.”151  Furthermore, the ambit of 
expression is limited to those with a legal right to participate in the decision-making in question; 
as the decision-making related to the private dispute between PSAC and the CGC, and members 
of GWU and ILWU had no legal right to participate in contractual negotiations between PSAC 
and CGC, the refusal by GWU and ILWU members to cross the picket line was not protected 
expression.
152
  The fact that CGC is a “government emanation” was not sufficient to connect 
private negotiations with political decision-making.
153
 
 While concurring in the result, Evans J.A. took the position that the Code’s definition of 
“strike” does in fact infringe workers’ freedom of expression;154  however, the infringement is 
justifiable under s. 1.
155
  He noted that the Supreme Court has not hesitated to apply s. 2(b) in the 
context of legislation governing “expressive activities undertaken during a strike”.156   Notably, 
while he recognized that Dunmore v. Ontario
157
 and B.C. Health Services have expanded the 
applicability of s. 2(d) to labour cases, he held that it is unnecessary to consider s. 2(d); s. 2(b) is 
the relevant provision.
158
  Like Justice Blais, Justice Evans held that the purpose of the peace 
obligation was not to limit expression but rather to limit the “adverse consequences of mid-
contract work stoppages” 159  – an “important component of the Code’s attempt to balance 
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equitably the interests of labour and management.”160  Therefore Justice Evans turned to the 
purpose of the expression and the effect of the legislation. 
 However, Evans J.A. held that the effect of the peace obligation in this case did, in fact, 
limit the freedom of expression of the union members.  He based this conclusion on three 
factors:  first, the relatively low threshold required to demonstrate an infringement of s. 2(b);
161
 
second, the fundamental importance, as expressed by the Supreme Court, of freedom of 
expression in labour disputes;
162
 and third, that the prohibition, in fact, limits employees’ ability 
to express support for another union – that a picket line is an “admittedly expressive activity” 
and that “by requiring employees to cross a picket line, the prohibition has the effect of forcing 
employees to engage in conduct that may convey the message that they do not support the 
strike.”163 
 From there, Evans J.A. considered whether the peace obligation had the effect in law of 
infringing on s. 2(b).  In finding that it did so, he noted that in Irwin Toy the Supreme Court 
paraphrased “participation in social and political decision-making” as “participation in the 
community”, suggesting that the value is of broad application.164  He also noted that labour 
disputes involve fundamental legal, political and social issues, and bring debate about labour 
conditions into the public realm.
165
   
 Justice Evans placed some weight on the fact that the Canada Grain Commission is a 
government agency.  The strike action in Grain Workers was not overtly political, but he agreed 
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with the B.C. Court of Appeal in British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v. British Columbia 
Public School Employers Assn.
166
 (“BCTF”) that the primary target of a strike is government and 
public opinion, and is in that sense political.  He further held that public sector strikes are 
inherently “political” because they almost invariably implicate public policy issues such as 
allocation of public resources, level of services to be provided, and how additional costs are to be 
defrayed – all matters of “community concern”.167   Rendering refusal to cross a picket line 
illegal therefore interferes with employees’ ability to participate in social and political decision-
making and in the community.
168
 
 However Justice Evans concluded by holding that the infringements on s. 2(b) are 
justified under s.1.  The parties agreed that s.1 analysis would lead to the same result whether 
considering s. 2(b) or s. 2(d).
169
  For reasons that are explored below, I do not believe that s.1 
analysis will necessarily lead to the same result when applied to the various freedoms set out in 
s.2 of the Charter.  
In applying the Oakes test, he held that the peace obligation is rationally connected to the 
objective of limiting unpredictable work stoppages.
170
  The impairment is minimal – allowing for 
some margin for legislatures to achieve their ends
171
 - and “carving out” an exception to allow 
parties to contract out of the Code’s statutory objectives could jeopardize those objectives.172  
Finally the impact is proportional; workers may express their support for the strike in other ways, 
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and “in view of the well-recognized social costs of industrial conflict” the infringement is not 
“disproportionate to the benefits of achieving the pressing and substantial objective of the 
Code.”173 
 Grain Workers, therefore, did not disturb the existing legal regime and maintained the 
application of the "peace obligation" to sympathetic action.   
 While Grain Workers is technically a freedom of expression case, it has implications 
beyond s. 2(b).  The majority decision, of course, bluntly states that there is no Charter right to 
strike, but it is also significant that the majority then assumes that that answers the question of a 
right to sympathetic action.  If there is no right to strike, there can be no right of sympathetic 
action; sympathetic action, in other words, can only be derived indirectly from a right to strike. 
Furthermore the majority considered neither freedom of association nor freedom of conscience in 
their reasons. 
 In my view the analysis applied by both Blais J.A. and Ryer J.A. is difficult to accept 
post-Dunmore and B.C. Health Services.  The issue is not whether the employer is public or 
private, or whether workers, by refusing to cross the picket line, are intruding into a private 
contractual dispute, but rather, that the government has chosen to regulate labour relations in 
such a way that it has, by way of statute, inserted a prohibition on mid-term strikes into every 
collective agreement covered by the Code.  That must attract Charter scrutiny.  After all as the 
Court held in Dunmore (per Basterache J.),  
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Once the state has chosen to regulate a private relationship such as that between employer 
and employee, I believe it is unduly formalistic to consign that relationship to a “private 
sphere” that is impervious to Charter review. As Dean P. W. Hogg has stated, “[t]he 
effect of the governmental action restriction is that there is a private realm in which 
people are not obliged to subscribe to ‘state’ values, and into which constitutional norms 
do not intrude. The boundaries of that realm are marked, not by an a priori definition of 
what is ‘private’, but by the absence of statutory or other governmental intervention”. 
[citation omitted]
174
 
 Basterache J. was speaking in terms of underinclusive statutes, but I believe the same 
reasoning applies here.  Workers, by virtue of the restriction on mid-term strikes, are required to 
subscribe to ‘state’ values.  They must ignore their own beliefs in union solidarity in favour of 
the state value of industrial peace.  The nature of the employer is irrelevant; it is the state’s 
legislation of contractual terms and industrial relations norms that attracts Charter scrutiny. Yet 
Blais J.A. and Ryer J.A. both seem to “consign the relationship” between PSAC and the CGC “to 
a ‘private sphere’ that is impervious to Charter review,” thereby making it easier to characterize 
the sympathetic action undertaken as unconnected to the values protected by s. 2(b). 
 Evans J.A.'s concurring reasons are significant beyond their interpretation of freedom of 
expression in that they also described a right to sympathetic action that is necessarily tied to a 
right to strike simpliciter.  Furthermore while he did recognize the existence of a right to strike, 
he expressly held that freedom of association was not the fundamental freedom from which that 
right ultimately derived.  Nor did he consider freedom of conscience at all, though in fairness s. 
2(a) was not pleaded in Grain Workers.  Finally, in upholding the statutory peace obligation 
under s. 1, he held that the same s. 1 factors applied whether 2(b) or 2(d) were considered - 
though again, in fairness, the parties agreed with that approach.   
 The parties in Grain Workers did not raise the question of freedom of conscience and 
none of the Justices considered section 2(a) in their reasons.  Similarly, the justices did not 
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consider freedom of association in their reasons.  Whether either consideration would have had 
any substantive impact on the decisions of any of the Justices is debatable, but in my view it is 
regrettable that they were not addressed.
175
  By considering only the expressive aspects of 
sympathetic action, and not the associational or conscientious aspects, the analysis of 
sympathetic action was unduly restricted.  This is further compounded by viewing considerations 
under s. 1 as identical regardless of which freedom is affected; I will argue later that limitations 
that may be justifiable under one right (say, freedom of expression) may nonetheless by 
unjustifiable under another.   
From "Me" to "You" to "Us" : Interaction Between Section 2 Freedoms 
 I argue that three of the fundamental freedoms in section 2 of the Charter - conscience, 
expression, and association - protect a worker's and a union's right to engage in sympathetic 
action.  The fourth freedom under section 2 - freedom of assembly under s. 2(c) - has not 
received significant treatment by Canadian courts and would seem to have only incidental 
application to a right to sympathetic action in any event. 
 Each freedom protects different interests and each will have a different application to 
sympathetic action.  Sympathetic action may be protected under one, two, or all three of these 
freedoms; this is, as has been noted by Justice La Forest at the Supreme Court, to be expected: 
 
...[A] person is not deprived of protection under a provision of the Charter merely 
because protection may also be derived under another. The rights overlap in defining 
Canadian society, and I see no reason for depriving a litigant of success because he has 
chosen one provision that legitimately appears to cover the matter of which he or she 
complains, rather than another. That would often be the effect if the individual rights and 
freedoms were construed as discrete rather than overlapping.
176
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 Depending on which freedom serves as the "lens" through which sympathetic action is 
viewed, the characterization of the right to sympathetic action may also vary.  Ironically, it is 
under the freedom that has been most canvassed in the labour context - freedom of association - 
that it may be most complicated to justify a right to sympathetic action.  At the same time 
freedom of association may provide for the most robust protection of sympathetic action when 
considering section 1, provided justification is proven in the first instance.  Sympathetic action 
engages both freedom of conscience and freedom of expression, and I argue that the argument 
under freedom of association for protection of sympathetic action, as a collective expression of 
those other Charter freedoms, is therefore strengthened.  In particular, I will argue that the 
exercise of freedom of conscience or freedom of expression collectively is closer to the core of 
the interests protected by freedom of association than are some other forms of association 
covered under s. 2(d). 
 In a sense, the freedoms under section 2 expand outwards.
177
  The freedoms of 
conscience and religion are part of a person's moral and philosophical core.
178
  Timothy 
Macklem has written that "[c]onscience, or at least the possibility of it, is in everything we do.  
Anything that we believe we have reason to do may, under the correct conditions, become a 
question of conscience for us."
179
   
 
In some...cases conscience is married to religious conviction; in nearly all it is political, 
involving as it does the refusal of a person to do what the political community has called 
upon him or her to do.  In every case it is dramatic and dissentient, principled and 
autonomous, a matter of following the dictates of one’s own reasoning rather than the 
dictates of others in the discharge of one’s moral obligations, and thus a matter of taking 
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a stand against what one has been called upon to do by exempting oneself from its 
demands.  Not me, or at least not in my name, goes the cry.
180
 
 As the most "internal" of the fundamental freedoms, freedom of conscience is also the 
most profoundly individual freedom.  All of the section 2 freedoms are individual rights, but 
only conscience speaks entirely to the individual's moral centre.  As Macklem puts it, 
 
[conscience] often speaks to us in private and in our own voice, reminding us of who we 
are, what we believe, and what we have committed ourselves to, not only in those matters 
affecting others, the matters that we think of as our moral life, but also in those matters 
that affect ourselves alone.
181
  
 Freedom of expression includes thought and opinion, but addresses the importance of 
vibrant discussion within society; that is, s. 2(b) has an inherently interactive element.  Richard 
Moon has argued: 
 
Whether the emphasis is on democracy, autonomy, or self-expression, each of the 
established accounts of the value of freedom of expression rests on a recognition that 
human autonomy/agency is deeply social in its creation and expression.  Each recognizes 
that human judgment, reason, feeling, and identity are realized in communicative 
interaction with friends, family, co-workers, and other members of the community.
182
   
 Freedom of assembly (which has been described as part of the “pantheon of freedom of 
expression”183) follows, and expands the circle to encompass expressing an opinion as a physical 
group. 
184
   
 Freedom of association, of course, necessarily includes other individuals to be 
meaningful.  It protects activity taken with others - not merely a right to physical assembly but 
also rights to political, intellectual, or simply social association.    
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 Within all of these fundamental freedoms is a common theme, however - recognition and 
protection of individual worth: "[h]uman dignity, equality, liberty, respect for the autonomy of 
the person and the enhancement of democracy are among the values that underly the Charter."
185
 
 I suggest that as one moves "outward" from conscience to expression to association, the 
more "internal" freedoms, as well as being inherently important, strengthen the more "external" 
freedoms.  Given the importance of conscience to individual self-fulfillment and human dignity, 
for example, expression that gives voice to matters of conscience are arguably of greater 
significance than expression that does not.  Similarly, association that is the collective exercise of 
freedom of conscience, or freedom of expression, is arguably of greater significance than 
associative activities that do not involve other Charter freedoms.   
 This may at first blush appear to run afoul of the doctrine that there is "no hierarchy of 
constitutional rights",
186
 which  
 
holds that guarantees of rights and freedoms that are contained in one part of the 
Constitution can not be used to prevent, restrict, or expand the implementation of rights 
or privileges that are contained in another part of the Constitution...
187
 
 As Mark Carter has noted, however, that doctrine is "something of a misnomer,"
188
 as 
there are a number of formal and informal hierarchies found among Charter rights.    
  
In particular, the rights and freedoms in the Charter that are universally applicable – 
which does not include all of them – are always subordinate to the (relatively few) special 
rights and privileges that are contained in other parts of the Charter or in the Constitution 
Act, 1867.
189
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 Further, the courts often set "contingent hierarchies" of rights when resolving disputes 
involving conflicting Charter rights, though this is usually done by performing a "balancing 
exercise under section 1" of the Charter rather than by insulating the government activity in 
question from review.
190
  Carter notes that in R. v. Keegstra, the Supreme Court balanced the 
rights of the targets of hate speech (equality under s.  15 and life, liberty, and security of the 
person under s. 7) and the freedom of expression of the producers of hate speech under section 1, 
before ultimately finding that the hate speech provisions of the Criminal Code were reasonable 
limitations on freedom of expression.
191
 
 In the case of sympathetic action I will argue that the section 2 freedoms strengthen each 
other rather than conflict with each other, but the principle that the interaction of Charter rights 
or freedoms should be addressed under section 1 seems applicable - particularly where all of the 
rights or freedoms involved are, as here, fundamental and universal.  
Direct and Indirect Derivation and "Derivative Rights" Under the Charter 
 Consideration of sympathetic action raises another question: whether a right to 
sympathetic action can be derived directly from a fundamental freedom, or if it must be derived 
indirectly, through another right that is itself directly derived from that freedom.  In recent 
Charter jurisprudence the concept of a derivative right has arisen.
192
  The concept of "derivative 
rights" is similar to the question of direct or indirect derivation, but as the concept has been 
applied by the Courts, it appears that a "derivative right" is not necessarily the same this as a 
right "indirectly derived".   
                                                          
190
 ibid. at 38. 
191
 ibid.  See R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 at 733-734. 
192
 For a recent discussion of ”derivative" rights under the Charter, see Ministry of Public Safety and Security 
(Formerly Solicitor General) and Attorney General of Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers' Association et. al., [2010] 1 S.C.R. 
815 ("Criminal Lawyers' Association"). 
52 
 
 It is arguable that the right to strike itself is a derivative or indirectly derived right, having 
value only insofar as it promotes the right to collective bargaining.  Sympathetic action adds an 
additional complication.  The right to sympathetic action could be seen as derivative of freedom 
of association directly; of the right to collectively bargain;  or of the right to strike.  I argue, 
however, that the right to sympathetic action deserves protection as a stand-alone right under 
each of the freedoms in question. 
 Criminal Lawyers' Association dealt with a request by the Criminal Lawyers' Association 
(the "CLA") for documents in the hands of the Crown, including a report by the Ontario 
Provincial Police relating to an investigation of police misconduct.  The responsible Minister 
refused to disclose the documents, citing exemptions in the Ontario Freedom of Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act.
193
  The CLA argued as one of its grounds of appeal that the Charter 
guarantee of freedom of expression necessitated the release of the documents; without access to 
the government's information, it was impossible to make public comment on the matter and the 
CLA's freedom of expression was infringed.  The Court, however, disagreed, stating: 
 
The first question to be addressed is whether s. 2(b) protects access to information and, if 
so, in what circumstances. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that s. 2(b) does not 
guarantee access to all documents in government hands. Section 2(b) guarantees freedom 
of expression, not access to information. Access is a derivative right which may arise 
where it is a necessary precondition of meaningful expression on the functioning of 
government.  
 
...The main question in this case is whether s. 2(b) is engaged at all. We conclude that the 
scope of the s. 2(b) protection includes a right to access to documents only where access 
is necessary to permit meaningful discussion on a matter of public importance, subject to 
privileges and functional constraints. We further conclude, as discussed more fully 
below, that in this case these requirements are not satisfied. As a result, s. 2(b) is not 
engaged.  
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...To demonstrate that there is expressive content in accessing such documents, the 
claimant must establish that the denial of access effectively precludes meaningful 
commentary...[Emphasis added.]
194
 
 Therefore, access to information, the Court held, was not a stand-alone right.  It was not 
absolute and in that case did not engage freedom of expression at all.  A right to access was, 
rather, derivative of the freedom of expression and only protected by the Charter where lack of 
access effectively precluded meaningful expression or commentary. 
 In Fraser v. Ontario, the Supreme Court cited Criminal Lawyers' Association in its 
discussion of when a government must take positive action to protect a fundamental freedom.  
The majority in Fraser held that  
 
[a] purposive protection of freedom of association may require the state to act positively 
to protect the ability of individuals to engage in fundamentally important collective 
activities, just as a purposive interpretation of freedom of expression may require the 
state to disclose documents to permit meaningful discussion.
195
 
 Notably, the Ontario Court of Appeal recently held on the basis of Fraser that collective 
bargaining was not a stand-alone constitutional right in itself.  Collective bargaining was instead 
a right derivative of freedom of association: 
 
...A government employer is obligated to engage in "collective bargaining" under s. 2(d) 
only when the employees are able to claim the derivative right under s. 2(d).  They are 
able to claim that derivative right upon showing that the exercise of the fundamental 
freedom of association is "effectively impossible".  Only where the "core protection of s. 
2(d)...to act in association with others to pursue common objectives and goals"...cannot 
be meaningfully exercised does the derivative right arise...
196
 
 With respect, however, the Ontario Court of Appeal appears to be making the matter 
more complicated than it needs to be.  "Derivative rights" as such were not discussed in Fraser; 
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rather, Criminal Lawyers' Association was cited in Fraser to demonstrate that the Supreme Court 
had  
 
...consistently rejected a rigid distinction between 'positive' freedoms and 'negative' rights 
in the Charter.  For example, it recently held that s. 2(b) may require the government to 
disclose documents to the public in order to enable meaningful discourse.
197
 
 The basic concept found in both Criminal Lawyers' Association and Mounted Police 
Association - that certain rights are valuable only insofar as they are necessary for the expression 
of other rights - may not in itself be problematic.  However, it is not clear why, in the labour 
context, rights such as collective bargaining, the right to strike, and (as I argue here) the right to 
sympathetic action are necessarily "derivative rights" and not manifestations of a fundamental 
Charter right in themselves.  Justice Ball, of the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench, in 
Saskatchewan Federation of Labour took the latter approach, holding that: 
 
I am satisfied that the right to strike is a fundamental freedom protected by s. 2(d) of the 
Charter along with the interdependent rights to organize and to bargain collectively.
198
 
 So, for instance, in the context of the right to strike, one could derive a right to strike 
directly from section 2(d): 
 
The right to freedom of association might require recognition of a right to strike because 
the latter is a species of the former.  This is similar to the way the relatively specific right 
not to be censored for uttering critical opinions about government can be derived from 
the more abstract right to free speech.  The right to strike would here be seen as a species 
of the wider genus of associated activity to which one has a fundamental entitlement.  In 
can also include, for example, the right to join with other citizens to mount a campaign on 
a matter of public concern or to pursue some private interest together in a club.
199
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 On the other hand, an indirect derivation would view the right to strike as instrumental to 
other rights that are directly derived from freedom of association, for instance as a necessary 
support for trade unions: 
 
The strike might not be protected as a species of the right to freedom of association, but 
could nevertheless be derived from that right by being seen as a means to furthering it.  
The most frequently found version of this view is that the right to strike furthers the 
functions of an institution - the trade union... 
 
There is a further subdivision within indirect derivation.  In asking just what are the 
essential supports for trade union activity, decisions in some jurisdictions say that the 
right to strike is indispensible.  Others, however, say that the right to strike forms part of 
a set of alternative supports, no single one of which is essential...The set taken as a whole 
is an indispensible support, but no single part of it is, including the right to strike...
200
 
 The distinction is more than academic.  An indirect derivation (or characterizing 
sympathetic action as a "derivative right") invites interpretations of a right that favour greater 
deference to legislative choices that restrict that right.  So in dealing with the right to strike,  
 
[w]hat is at stake in direct versus indirect derivation?  The latter permits greater judicial 
deference to the legislatures desire to shape the norms governing the right to strike.  If the 
derivation is indirect, then there will be persistent room for debate over whether or not 
the right to strike - or any particular element of it - is in fact indispensible to trade union 
freedom.  But if the derivation is one seeing whether the species is located within the 
wider genus, there is less room for deference to a variety of legislative choices.  The 
concrete right either is or is not legitimately included within the range of concrete 
examples of freedom of association.... 
 In dealing with the right to sympathetic action, the distinction between "positive" and 
"negative" rights discussed in Fraser is for the most part irrelevant.  Legislation enacted by 
government prohibits workers from taking sympathetic action.  The right in question (as with the 
right to strike) falls squarely into the category of "negative" rights.  The main question regarding 
a right to sympathetic action is whether it can be derived directly from one or more fundamental 
freedoms, or whether it is an instrumental or derivative right - in particular derivative of the 
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rights to collectively bargain and to strike, or necessary for the support of the institution of trade 
unions.  Therefore in this Part the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in Mounted Police 
Association will be, for the most part, rejected, and rather than the concept of "derivative rights" 
is will prefer to limit discussion to the related concept of direct versus indirect derivation. 
Freedom of Conscience 
 To argue that sympathetic action is a protected right under the Charter's freedom of 
conscience guarantee, it is of course necessary to establish that sympathetic action (and trade 
union solidarity generally) is, in fact, a matter of conscience.  To any dedicated trade unionist 
this is almost certainly a given.  Solidarity, as Chief Justice Brian Dickson noted in BCGEU, is at 
the heart of trade unionism.  It has been vital to the success of organized labour.  Its deceptively 
simple definition – “unity or agreement of feeling or action, especially among individuals with a 
common interest; mutual support within a group”201 – does not fully capture the emotional and 
moral impact of solidarity within the labour movement.  That impact is evident in rhetoric and 
songs that have arisen from the labour movement, both those that extol the virtues of solidarity – 
the most famous in North America being, no doubt, the labour anthem “Solidarity Forever”202 – 
and those that condemn, often in the bitterest terms, those that would cross a picket line or 
otherwise undermine their fellow workers.
203
  The term “scab” or “blackleg” continue to be 
terms of direst abuse and condemnation to trade unionists.
204
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 To those who do not ascribe to traditional trade union principles, however, the 
conscientious aspects of union solidarity may not be so obvious.   
 In this Part I will review the Charter caselaw around section 2(a) and draw from that the 
governing principles used by the courts in addressing questions of conscience. From the caselaw 
I will turn to the question of conscience generally. I will then apply those principles to the 
question of union solidarity and conclude that solidarity is indeed a question of conscience 
subject to Charter protection.   
Religion, Conscience, and the Charter 
 i. Freedom of Religion in the Courts 
 While freedom of religion under section 2(a) of the Charter has been judicially 
considered a number of times,
205
 freedom of conscience has, for the most part, received only 
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The Scab 
After God had finished the rattlesnake, the toad, and the vampire, He had some awful substance left with 
which He made a scab. 
A scab is a two-legged animal with a corkscrew soul, a water brain, a combination backbone of jelly and 
glue. Where others have hearts, he carries a tumor of rotten principles. 
When a scab comes down the street, men turn their backs and Angels weep in Heaven, and the Devil 
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cursory treatment by Canadian courts.  It is perhaps odd that this is the case.  After all, it would 
seem that the concept of conscience generally is broader than the concept of religion: "It is 
possible to think...that freedom of religion, for example, has no distinctive value that is not 
captured by the broader guarantee of freedom of conscience."
206
   Both freedom of religion and 
conscience are also protected under human rights instruments to which Canada is a party.
207
 
 The relative lack of cases regarding freedom of conscience may simply be an accident of 
history - that the first s. 2(a) cases dealt with questions of religion specifically. That said, the 
language used by the Supreme Court regarding section 2(a) for the most part seems to 
encompass matters of conscience beyond the explicitly religious. 
 In Big M Drug Mart, Dickson J. (as he then was) described freedom of conscience and 
freedom of religion as forming "a single integrated concept" in section 2(a).
208
  Dickson J. 
described section 2(a) as arising from centuries of opposition against State coercion in matters of 
belief: 
 
The basis of this opposition was no longer simply a conviction that the State was 
enforcing the wrong set of beliefs and practices but rather the perception that belief itself 
was not amenable to compulsion. Attempts to compel belief or practice denied the reality 
of individual conscience and dishonoured the God that had planted it in His creatures.
209
 
  Big M Drug Mart also established that freedom of conscience and religion is primarily a 
civil liberty (per the discussion in Part I, supra) and, as such, an individual right.  Freedom is 
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characterized by the absence of coercion or constraint and is founded upon "respect for the 
inherent dignity and the inviolable rights of the human person."
210
  Regarding the freedoms in s. 
2(a) Dickson J. stated: 
 
The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such religious 
beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear 
of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and practice 
or by teaching and dissemination. But the concept means more than that. 
 
... Freedom means that, subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect public 
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, no one 
is to be forced to act in a way contrary to his beliefs or his conscience.
211
 [Emphasis 
added.] 
 While Dickson J.'s reasons suggest that conscience and religion are linked, they are not 
indistinguishable.  However both freedoms speak to a rejection not only of the desirability of 
state-imposed belief but even of its possibility.  They represent a fear of attempts by the state to 
force conformity of conscience (given the inability of the state to actually enforce such 
conformity)
212
.   However, such freedom is not absolute.  The state is entitled to infringe upon 
freedom of conscience and religion to protect "public safety, order, health, or morals
213
 or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others". 
 In Edwards Books, the Supreme Court expanded upon Big M Drug Mart.  Though once 
again dealing with freedom of religion, the language used by then-Chief Justice Dickson does 
not require that beliefs have a religious source.  It is the nature of the beliefs, not their origin, that 
is important.   
 
...The purpose of s. 2(a) is to ensure that society does not interfere with profoundly 
personal beliefs that govern one's perception of oneself, humankind, nature, and, in some 
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cases, a higher or different order of being. These beliefs, in turn, govern one's conduct 
and practices. The Constitution shelters individuals and groups only to the extent that 
religious beliefs or conduct might reasonably or actually be threatened. For a state-
imposed cost or burden to be proscribed by s. 2(a) it must be capable of interfering with 
religious belief or practice.  In short, legislative or administrative action which increases 
the cost of practising or otherwise manifesting religious beliefs is not prohibited if the 
burden is trivial or insubstantial...
214
 [Emphasis added.] 
 The language used by the Court here clearly extends beyond the religious, but it also 
seems clear that conscience, in the Charter context, is interpreted to refer to beliefs that are, if 
not religious, then of almost-religious character: 
 
Section 2(a)’s reference to “conscience”, which is not found in the first amendment [of 
the United States Constitution], would protect systems of belief which are not theocentric 
(centred on a deity), and which might not be characterized as religions for that reason (or 
for some other reason).
215
  
 Edwards Books also reaffirms the individual character of section 2(a) and adds the 
"trivial and insubstantial" hurdle for Charter review of freedom of religion, which was applied 
by Linden J.A. in his dissent in Roach v. Canada, infra, regarding freedom of conscience. 
 More recent cases have reaffirmed that freedom of religion, while it may draw from a 
communal or group source, remains an individual freedom.  The Court cannot be arbiter of 
religious dogma, as the Court stated strongly in Syndicat Northcrest, nor should it judicially 
consider or determine the content of religious requirements.
216
  However, the Court can and will 
inquire into the sincerity of the claimant's belief, which simply suggests that the belief is held 
honestly and in good faith.
217
  The assessment of sincerity is a question of fact and can include a 
number of criteria including the credibility of the claimant's testimony and whether the claimant's 
belief is consistent with his or her other religious practices.  The courts should not be rigourous 
in studying the claimant's past practices; religious beliefs often change over an individual's 
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lifetime, and the focus of the courts must therefore be on the claimant's belief at the time of the 
alleged infringement.
218
  Expert testimony regarding the practices and beliefs of other adherents 
may be relevant to demonstrating the claimant's sincerity but is not required; what is important is 
what the claimant views his or her religious obligations to be, not what others professing the 
same faith may believe.
219
 
 Bastarache J. , writing for the minority in Syndicat Northcrest, would have required that 
the applicants demonstrate a "nexus" between personal beliefs and a religion's precepts.  
Religious precepts "constitute a body of objectively identifiable data that permit a distinction to 
be made between genuine religious beliefs and personal choices or practices that are unrelated to 
freedom of conscience."
220
  This would have lead to a more objective test regarding the validity 
of a given religious belief.  The majority, however, rejected such a test. 
 While sincerity should not be extensively questioned, the Supreme Court recently held
221
 
that the strength of belief may be relevant - not whether the practice is mandatory or voluntary, 
but rather how important the practice is to the claimant.
222
  Under this approach claimants might 
be asked how strongly they believe in their religious strictures and obligations or whether they 
have failed to observe those obligations in the past - indeed, potentially the very questions that 
the Court stated should not be asked in evaluating sincerity.
 223
   Even if sincerity is established 
the analysis may not be complete. 
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 Therefore, when it comes to religious doctrine, it is inappropriate for the Court to inquire 
into anything but the sincerity and strength of the individual's belief, and the inquiry into 
sincerity should be as unintrusive and minimal as possible.  It does not seem clear whether the 
inquiry into the "strength" of a claimant's belief will change the rigour and detail of the questions 
asked of a claimant. 
 The minimalist inquiry regarding sincerity was demonstrated in Syndicat Northcrest, 
where the applicants  believed that their Orthodox Jewish faith required them to construct an 
individual succah (a temporary shelter for the purposes of prayer during the annual religious 
festival of Succot) on their balcony, in contravention of the condominium complex's bylaws.  
Experts testified that Orthodox Judaism did not require individual succahs and that a communal 
one - which had been constructed in the complex's communal area - would suffice, but that was 
held to be irrelevant as it was the individual's beliefs that were important.  Similarly in Multani, a 
Sikh boy insisted on wearing a metal kirpan (a ceremonial knife) to school.  As in Syndicat 
Northcrest, the Court held it was not relevant that other Sikhs were agreeable to carrying a 
wooden kirpan or to other alternatives - it was the boy's individual belief that was important.
224
  
 It is important to note, however, that an applicant alleging infringement of their s. 2(a) 
rights still must prove the infringement on an objective standard.  The Supreme Court stated in a 
recent case: 
 
At the stage of establishing an infringement...it is not enough for a person to say that his 
or her rights have been infringed. The person must prove the infringement on a balance of 
probabilities. This may of course involve any legal form of proof, but it must nonetheless 
be based on facts that can be established objectively. For example, in Edwards Books, the 
legislation required retailers who were Saturday observers to close a day more than 
                                                          
224
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Sunday observers. In Amselem, the infringement resulted from a prohibition against 
erecting any structure on the balconies of a building held in co-ownership, while the 
appellants believed that their religion required them to dwell in their own succahs. 
 
It follows that when considering an infringement of freedom of religion, the question is 
not whether the person sincerely believes that a religious practice or belief has been 
infringed, but whether a religious practice or belief exists that has been infringed. The 
subjective part of the analysis is limited to establishing that there is a sincere belief that 
has a nexus with religion, including the belief in an obligation to conform to a religious 
practice. As with any other right or freedom protected by the Canadian Charter and the 
Quebec Charter, proving the infringement requires an objective analysis of the rules, 
events or acts that interfere with the exercise of the freedom. To decide otherwise would 
allow persons to conclude themselves that their rights had been infringed and thus to 
supplant the courts in this role. 
 
Furthermore, the following comment of Wilson J. in R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, at 
pp. 313-14, which Iacobucci J. quoted in Amselem, para. 58, bears repeating: s. 2(a) of 
the Canadian Charter “does not require the legislature to refrain from imposing any 
burdens on the practice of religion” (emphasis omitted; see also Edwards Books). “The 
ultimate protection of any particular Charter right must be measured in relation to other 
rights and with a view to the underlying context in which the apparent conflict arises” 
(Amselem, at para. 62). No right is absolute.
225
 
 The principles drawn from the above cases do seem applicable to a question of secular 
conscience and are relevant to the question at hand.  Nonetheless, secular conscience has been 
considered by our courts. 
 ii. Freedom of Conscience in the Courts 
 Most of the caselaw dealing with freedom of conscience has, perhaps surprisingly, arisen 
in taxation law, where taxpayers have had conscientious objections to particular areas of 
government spending and have sought an exemption from a portion or all of their income tax as 
a result.
226
  It should be noted, however, that the taxation cases do not deal exclusively with 
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secular conscience.  The objection to paying taxes that in part fund abortions is almost certainly a 
religious one, for instance, and some cases dealing with an objection to military spending by the 
government have been brought by Quakers who have a religious commitment to pacifism.  
However, the language used in the cases tends to be fairly neutral and would seem to have 
application whether the objection in question is religious or secular: 
 There has been some consideration of freedom of conscience in immigration law, usually 
where individuals have had conscientious objections to taking the oath of citizenship required 
under the Citizenship Act
227
 and, in particular, to the portion of the oath where a prospective 
citizen must swear or affirm that they will "will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her 
Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Canada, Her Heirs and Successors."
228
  Unlike 
the objection to abortion, the objection to swearing allegiance to a monarch is just as likely to 
arise from secular beliefs (such as political republicanism) as it is to arise from a religious one 
(such as a belief that a person owes allegiance only to God).  For example, 
 
[a] person could believe strongly that the Queen, or a person in general, is not a fit 
subject of allegiance. He could be an unwavering republican, and want to abolish the 
monarchy or change the structure of Canada. Despite personal convictions that the 
Canadian state should change radically, his conscience is burdened by the current oath 
because he must proclaim publicly his loyalty to the Queen, and that he will faithfully 
observe the laws of Canada and his duties as a citizen.
229
 
 A similar, secular, objection was raised, unsuccessfully, by a military officer to displays 
of allegiance to the Queen.
230
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 Conscience was also raised in Maurice v. Canada (Attorney-General).
231
  In Maurice, an 
inmate at a federal penitentiary had demanded vegetarian meals based on his "conscientiously 
held belief" that eating meat and certain other foods was "morally reprehensible and poisonous to 
society as a whole."
232
  The Federal Court held that the penitentiary's refusal to provide the 
inmate with vegetarian meals violated the inmate's freedom of conscience.  Vegetarian meals 
were provided to inmates with religious objections to eating meat, and as s. 2(a) provides for 
freedom of conscience as well as freedom of religion, "a similar entitlement for a vegetarian diet 
exists based on the right to freedom of conscience."
233
 
 In the area of labour law, freedom of conscience has received only the briefest of glances 
and generally speaking only at the administrative tribunal or lower court level, and even then has 
been rarely argued or formed the basis for a decision.
234
  Even Lavigne and Advance Cutting & 
Coring, both of which dealt with concerns about "ideological conformity",
235
 were decided on 
the basis of freedom of association (though freedom of expression was also raised in Lavigne) 
rather than freedom of conscience, although freedom from ideological conformity would seem to 
have a strong tie to freedom of conscience.
236
   And of course, freedom of conscience has not 
been considered in the context of refusing to cross a picket line, as in Grain Workers. 
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While freedom of conscience was given serious consideration in Maurice, conscientious 
objection in the context of either taxation or immigration have generally fared badly in the 
courts.  In the examples given above have universally been dismissed, often with only brief 
reasons; few of these cases have given detailed consideration to freedom of conscience.   Some 
judges have been critical of the very notion of bringing Charter challenges on the basis of such 
conscientious objections.  The majority in Roach, for instance, held that requiring a dedicated 
republican to swear an allegiance to the Queen in order to gain citizenship “could not be even a 
trivial or insubstantial interference with the appellant's exercise of those freedoms.”237  Morgan 
T.C.J. in Hertzog went so far as to state that a Charter challenge on the basis of conscientious 
objection to military spending demeaned the Charter.
238
 
The leading definition of conscience therefore remains that set out by Justice Bertha 
Wilson in her concurring reasons in R. v. Morgentaler:
239
 
 
...[I]t would be my view that conscientious beliefs which are not religiously motivated are 
equally protected by freedom of conscience in s. 2(a). In so saying I am not unmindful of 
the fact that the Charter opens with an affirmation that "Canada is founded upon 
principles that recognize the supremacy of God..." But I am also mindful that the values 
entrenched in the Charter are those which characterize a free and democratic society. ... 
 
It seems to me, therefore, that in a free and democratic society "freedom of conscience 
and religion" should be broadly construed to extend to conscientiously-held beliefs, 
whether grounded in religion or in a secular morality.  Indeed, as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, "conscience" and "religion" should not be treated as tautologous if capable 
of independent, although related, meaning.
240
 [Emphasis added.] 
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Linden J.A.'s dissent in Roach
241
 follows Wilson J.’s reasons, and while the majority in 
Roach came to a different result they accepted Linden J.A.’s reasoning in relation to section 
2(a).
242
  Regarding freedom of conscience, Linden J.A. held: 
 
It seems, therefore, that freedom of conscience is broader than freedom of religion. The 
latter relates more to religious views derived from established religious institutions, 
whereas the former is aimed at protecting views based on strongly held moral ideas of 
right and wrong, not necessarily founded on any organized religious principles. These are 
serious matters of conscience. Consequently the appellant is not limited to challenging 
the oath or affirmation on the basis of a belief grounded in religion in order to rely on 
freedom of conscience under paragraph 2(a) of the Charter. For example, a secular 
conscientious objection to service in the military might well fall within the ambit of 
freedom of conscience, though not religion. However, as Madam Justice Wilson 
indicated, "conscience" and "religion" have related meanings in that they both describe 
the location of profound moral and ethical beliefs, as distinguished from political or other 
beliefs which are protected by paragraph 2(b).
243
 
 Both Wilson J. In Morgentaler and Linden J.A. in Roach note the inter-relationship of 
conscience and religion.  Linden J.A. also notes the distinction between “profound moral and 
ethical beliefs”, on the one hand, and “political or other beliefs”, on the other.  While this 
distinction is both significant and necessary (given the freedoms set out in section 2(b)), it is 
hardly an easy one to draw or to maintain.  The advantage of religion, analytically speaking, is 
that even though freedom of religion technically adheres to the individual rather than necessarily 
to a church or congregation, one can generally point to a tradition or body of belief that goes 
beyond the individual.  A particular person’s religious belief system may be idiosyncratic or 
eccentric but they can still usually be identified as stemming from a given religious tradition, 
even if there may be significant overlap with political aims.  Secular morality, on the other hand, 
can be more difficult to distinguish from opinion or political beliefs.  It can be difficult to define 
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at which point a belief in republicanism or pacifism or trade union solidarity, for instance, 
becomes more than simply a political preference, however strongly held, and rise to the level of a 
profound moral or ethical belief.   
 Labour relations boards differ in their interpretation of what sympathetic strike action 
represents.  As has been noted previously, the British Columbia Labour Relations Board has 
tended to view refusal to cross a picket line (and potentially other sympathetic strike action) as 
almost instinctive - or to use Paul Weiler's word, "Pavlovian".  The Alberta Board, however, has 
viewed refusal to cross as a rational exercise in enlightened self-interest.  These categories are 
not mutually exclusive, of course (and neither has either Board suggested that they are).  
However, the latter interpretation suggests a version of union solidarity that may be a belief, but 
is not a profound moral or ethical one.  Rather, such an interpretation tends to remove solidarity 
from the realm of morality or personal conduct (and hence s. 2(a) of the Charter) and places it 
instead into the realm of opinion and belief (s. 2(b)) or association (s. 2(d)).   
 That being said, the fact that a belief is rational does not necessarily preclude it from 
being a matter of conscience.  Conscience may itself be a part of our "rational personality",
244
 a 
concept that will be explored further below. 
 Again, these are not mutually exclusive, and as was noted in Lavigne a given freedom 
may be protected by more than one section of the Charter.  But to trigger s. 2(a), the beliefs in 
question must have not only sincerity but also profundity, and following Grain Workers it seems 
likely that some courts, at least, would be entirely willing to question both.  The Charter 
application in Grain Workers was merely an attempt by workers to avoid just punishment, said 
the Federal Court of Appeal - hence, in 2(a) terms, it lacked sincerity.  The approach by the 
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majority in Grain Workers suggests that the courts would be less likely to give credence to the 
stated reasons why, exactly, a given worker or group of workers refused to cross a picket line, 
and, finding the reasons given not acceptable from the perspective of the Bench, consequently 
finding that refusal was not protected by s. 2(a).   
 iii. Conscience vs. Opinion and Belief  
 Timothy Macklem views conscience as part of our "rational personality".  "The 
commitment that conscience embodies," he writes, "...is a commitment that makes possible the 
creation and survival of central elements of what I will call our rational personality....[O]ur 
rational personality includes not only our distinctive capacity to appreciate reasons, but our 
virtues and vices and the demands of our conscience."
245
  He views conscience as a source of 
reason rather than exclusive of reason: 
 
[C]onscience has a role to play in the development as well as in the articulation of our 
practical reasoning.  This means that conscience must be something more than our 
concluded beliefs on a topic, for it has a part to play in generating those beliefs in the first 
place.  Conscience, it would appear, is a rational resource that we are able to call upon 
when we want to know what we should do, and the conclusions that we reach with its aid 
are the conclusions that we subsequently present to the world as the products of our 
conscience.  It is true to say, therefore, that the conscience that we express to others 
represents our concluded beliefs on the matter in question.  What is more, it is correct to 
describe those beliefs as the claims of our conscience.  Yet it is also true that the beliefs 
in question have the content they do only because they have already been shaped, within 
the process of our reasoning, by the existing claims of that same conscience.
246
 
 From Macklem's perspective, therefore, rationality is not a bar to profundity.  Indeed, the 
two are inseparable. 
 Similarly, Dianne Pothier has argued that respecting a picket line may be instinctive, but 
not irrational: 
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I have little difficulty with the general descriptive accuracy of the “signal effect”; 
conventional picket lines are designed to induce people not to cross, and are largely 
effective in that aim.  What I fail to understand is why the “signal effect” in any way 
detract from picketing being expression worthy of protection, or makes respect of a 
picket line irrational. 
 
... 
 
The assumption that the reflexive nature of observing a picket line makes it irrational is 
even more troubling.  The automatic response does not indicate an automaton state; 
instead, it means that the issue has been previously thought through.  Refusal to cross a 
picket line is a political and ideological statement of union solidarity; the fact that others 
may not share the same ideology does not make it irrational.  The equation of solidarity 
to irrationality attacks the core values of both freedom of expression and freedom of 
association, despite the fact that, as noted in the previous part, the Court so readily 
accepted the principle of freedom of association includes the collective exercise of 
freedom of expression. [Emphasis added]
247
 
 While Pothier's argument deals with the freedoms of expression and association, it seems 
entirely applicable to freedom of conscience.  Like Macklem, Pothier puts forward a rational 
basis for an ostensibly instinctive or irrational act - an issue that "has been previously thought 
through".  The danger this "rationality" presents to an argument on freedom of conscience, 
however, is that it may take the argument out of the realm of freedom of conscience and place it 
into the realm of freedom of expression.  For instance, while Justice Evans noted in Grain 
Workers that trade unionists regard it as an “ethical obligation” not to cross another union’s 
picket line, he interprets this only in the context of freedom of expression – promotion of the 
value of promoting diversity in forms of individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing.
248
   
Linden J.A. in Roach seems to assume that "reason" is incompatible with "conscience", though 
he does concede there is no bright line between them: 
 
Freedom of thought, belief and opinion is distinct from freedom of conscience. Freedom 
of thought, belief and opinion encompasses many ideas and principles that are not matters 
of conscience, nor of right or wrong; what is involved here are political, social, economic 
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or cultural ideas. We are dealing here in the realm of reason, not of faith, nor of morality. 
It is obvious that there are no sharp dividing lines here; these matters may blur into one 
another, making them difficult to differentiate.
249
 [Emphasis added.] 
 Linden J.A. held that infringement of freedom of conscience had not been made out in 
Roach; he held that the appellant's claim was not about the oath itself, but rather its content, and 
that therefore the claim was more properly brought under s. 2(b), though "[t]his is not to say that 
the appellant might not have made a valid argument regarding freedom of conscience had he 
articulated a conscientious objection to the content of the oath or affirmation."
250
  Linden J.A. 
appears to assume that because affirmation was an available alternative to swearing an oath, 
conscience was not engaged.   This is a problematic conclusion; as Bryce Edwards points out, the 
content of the oath is non-negotiable, and dictated by statute.  It is meant to commit the speaker 
to the promise made - to bind the speaker's conscience. If an individual refuses to take the oath, 
then he or she cannot become a citizen.  It is therefore properly a matter for s. 2(a), not s. 2(b).
251
 
 Because I will later argue that freedom of expression also protects the right to 
sympathetic action, it is not fatal to recognition of such a right if sympathetic action is not a 
matter of conscience.  However to a certain extent relegating beliefs in union solidarity to "mere" 
political beliefs would seem to ignore the role of such beliefs as part of the moral core of trade 
unionists.  
 That moral core can manifest in the initiation oaths within trade unions.  Many unions 
still include initiation rituals for new members, and include oaths therein.
252
  These are generally 
                                                          
249
 Roach, supra note 228 at para. 55. 
250
 ibid. at para. 49. 
251
 Edwards, "Let Your Yea be Yea", supra note 229 at para. 151. 
252
 See, e.g.,  2012 Constitution and Bylaws of the Service Employees International Union, available online at 
http://www.seiu.org/15728.SEIU-Constitution-Bylaws-2012.pdf (last visited April 4, 2013) at p. 45; 2011 
Constitution of the Canadian Union of Public Employees, available online at 
http://cupe.ca/updir/Constitution2011_english.pdf (last visited April 4, 2013) at p. 64;  2012 Constitution of the 
Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union, available online at http://www.cep.ca/sites/cep.ca/files/ 
docs/en/130117-Constitution-2012.pdf (last visited April 4, 2013) at p. 5. 
72 
 
not oaths to a higher power but, rather, to one's "honour", or simply phrased as a solemn 
promise.
253
  The fact that initiation rituals are generally done publicly and witnessed - an oath 
from the Communication, Energy, and Paperworkers Union, for example, has all members 
present state "your pledge will be remembered" after the new members complete their initiation.  
At least some Locals of the Canadian Union of Public Employees include a requirement that the 
promise be witnessed, adding a solemnity and seriousness to the occasion.  Like a citizenship 
oath, it is a "public ceremony, with personal, religious, social and political ramifications."
254
  
These are public declarations of allegiance and principle, meant to bind the conscience.   
 This is not to say that merely taking an oath renders everything one does an act of 
conscience.  Were that so, one can easily imagine oaths being taken to justify any number of 
dubious pursuits.  However, I submit that union oaths demonstrate the historical importance of 
union solidarity and that, at the very least, there can be a moral component to respecting a picket 
line.    
 If union oaths bind the conscience, however, it is not entirely to the benefit of unions.  
Such oaths are of questionable value when in a "union shop" environment, where union 
membership is a condition of employment.
255
  In theory, all in-scope workers would be required 
to take the oath.  Much like the citizenship oath, forcing an individual to swear an oath to a 
person or principle with which they have a profound disagreement would seem to go against the 
very point of conscience.  The greater the significance given to freedom of conscience in the 
labour relations context, the greater the chance that it will be used to weaken union authority.  
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However labour relations statutes generally limit the impact of union membership; 
Saskatchewan's Trade Union Act, for instance, provides that an employee cannot be dismissed 
for failing to maintain union membership, provided that employee pays dues
256
 and that those 
employees who have a religious conscientious objection (but not a secular one) to union 
membership and paying dues may be allowed to have their dues directed to a charitable 
organization.
257
  Furthermore, most jurisdictions in Canada utilize the "agency shop" model, 
where union membership is not a condition of employment and only payment of dues is required.  
In an "agency shop" workers may choose to join the union or not; as such the oaths will only be 
administered to those who choose to accept them.  Therefore conscientious objection to swearing 
a union oath appears to be addressed already in the labour relations regime.  If anything, "agency 
shop" situations make the claim of conscience that much stronger.  If union membership is 
optional, then it is arguable that those workers who choose to become union members and take 
the oath of membership understand their responsibilities and choose to bind their consciences 
accordingly. 
 The non-unionized worker is a different matter.  A non-unionized worker may have been 
a union member previously, or may even still be one; some unions allow members to maintain 
membership after they have ceased employment in a bargaining unit for which that union holds 
certification.  Or a non-unionized worker may never have signed a union card and may never 
have taken an oath; they have no basis for sympathetic action beyond their own beliefs.  
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Regardless, they do not have the protections within their own workplace that a unionized worker 
has.  They also will generally have to make a decision to respect a picket line on their own, 
without leadership or support from a union.  As noted above, this leaves non-unionized workers 
particularly vulnerable to retaliation by their employer if they choose to refuse to cross a picket 
line. 
 Whether unionized or not unionized, however, workers cannot take sympathetic action 
lightly.  Even where authorized on an individual basis (as in Manitoba), workers may face a loss 
of pay for work not performed and no doubt subtle and less-than-subtle pressure from their 
employer.  The choice to respect a picket line is not consequence-free even if that choice is 
permitted in law.  Where a worker chooses to take sympathetic action (other than in situations 
such as refusing to cross a picket line due to fear for their personal safety, of course) it seems 
almost certain that that choice will be taken as a matter of conscience.   
iv. Proving Infringement 
 That sympathetic action may be a matter of conscience is only part of the picture.  
Freedom of conscience appears to be subject to the same analysis as freedom of religion under s. 
2(a).  Therefore, applying that analysis, applicants must demonstrate that their freedom of 
conscience has, in fact, been infringed (Commission Scolaire des Chênes); it is not sufficient to 
simply state that they feel it has been infringed.  They must demonstrate that the infringement is 
not trivial or insubstantial (Edwards Books).  They must demonstrate that they are sincere in their 
beliefs (Syndicat Northcrest, Multani). 
 Commission Scolaire des Chênes set out the standard that the applicant must prove, on 
the balance of probabilities, that a religious practice or belief exists that has been infringed.  I 
submit that in the case of sympathetic action, this standard is easily met.  If sympathetic action is 
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a matter of conscience, then any statutory restriction on sympathetic action potentially infringes 
s. 2(a).  To believe strongly in solidarity and yet to be required to cross a picket line for fear of 
statutory penalty, for instance, is an actual infringement of a deeply-held moral belief.  The 
believer is forced to act in direct opposition to their moral code. 
 Is the infringement not trivial or insubstantial?  The majority in Roach held that being 
forced to swear an oath to the Queen or be denied citizenship was no infringement of freedom of 
conscience.  The Court in Commission Scolaire des Chênes held that mandatory classes exposing 
students to a variety of different religions did not violate freedom of religion.  And again, the 
majority in Grain Workers gives little faith that the courts will give much credence to unionists' 
claims that their Charter freedoms are infringed by the peace obligation.  
 I submit that the beliefs inherent to sympathetic action are more in line with 
conscientious objection to military service, which Linden J.A. suggested triggered freedom of 
conscience,
258
 or the right to carry a kirpan in school as in Multani.  The infringement upon 
unionists' freedom of conscience is a direct interference with their ability to exercise that Charter 
freedom.  Indeed, without the right to sympathetic action, solidarity as an expression of freedom 
of conscience is essentially impotent.  The ability to express support for strikers through other 
means, such as writing letters to the editor or joining the picket line on one's own time (as Evans 
J.A. suggested in Grain Workers) may address the interests inherent in s. 2(b), but not the basic 
affront to one's conscience at being forced to do something that one believes is morally wrong. 
 The evaluation of sincerity may be problematic.  However, the Supreme Court 
specifically rejected the "objective" test suggested by Justice Basterache in Syndicat Northcrest.  
As a result the Courts should keep to a minimum their assessment of an individual's sincerity of 
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belief.  Therefore while a court can inquire into an individual's sincerity, it should not pass 
judgment on the validity of beliefs nor whether such beliefs are in keeping with others' 
interpretation of religious precepts.  Applied to sympathetic action, the evaluation seems quite 
straightforward, especially given the prevalence of "solidarity" as the guiding principle for most 
trade unions.   
 All that being said, the application of freedom of conscience, as perhaps the most 
profoundly individual right, to a right to sympathetic action presents a very basic problem: what 
impact should it have on the law?  Individual sympathetic action is already not subject to 
statutory prohibition.  As such, can it have any impact on the status quo? 
v. Conscience and the Peace Obligation  
 The peace obligation under labour legislation is not directly challenged by individual 
freedom of conscience.  Individual action already does not contravene the peace obligation.  
However, when sympathetic action is undertaken by union members collectively - either refusing 
to cross a picket line or engaging in a full-on sympathy strike - the peace obligation is infringed.   
 What is relevant is therefore that the peace obligation prohibits the exercise of conscience 
in association.  It is the associational aspect that is itself illegal.  That said, Evans J.A. in Grain 
Workers did not consider freedom of association in his analysis but, rather, limited his analysis to 
freedom of expression.  The learned judge made his decision in this regard at least partly because 
the Supreme Court has used s. 2(b) as a basis to determine the validity of expressive conduct 
during a strike.  Reference was also made to the then-recently-decided BCTF case, where the 
B.C. Court of Appeal held that while a right to strike is, in principle, included in freedom of 
association,
259
 the “associative dimension” of the protest strikes (rather than the expressive 
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dimension) was directed at “an interference with free collective bargaining”, which was more 
properly the subject of a separate, pending, challenge on 2(d) grounds to the proposed 
legislation
260
 (that legislation being the reason for the protests in the first place). 
 However, with respect, both of these sets of reasons appear to miss the point.  Of the two 
cases cited by Evans J.A. - Pepsi-Cola and KMart Canada
261
 - both dealt with statutory 
prohibitions on expressive activities undertaken pursuant to an ongoing and legal strike.  In 
Pepsi-Cola, the issue was picketing secondary sites away from the worksite; in KMart Canada it 
was leafleting secondary sites.  Neither case dealt with the peace obligation nor with the statutory 
definition of a "strike".  In the case of Grain Workers, what made the workers' actions illegal was 
the fact that the actions were taken collectively. Individual workers refusing to cross the line 
would have been exercising their right to free expression without collaboration, and the statutory 
definition of "strike" would not have been an issue.  
 Similarly in BCTF, had the protests not been collective, the prohibition on mid-term 
strikes would not have been infringed.  It would have been a matter of individual teachers facing 
discipline.  Section 2(d) would have been appropriate and, indeed, even necessary if  the view of 
the section 2 rights set out herein is to be applied. 
 I submit on this basis that freedom of conscience serves to bolster sympathetic action 
under freedom of association, and that while conscience itself does not necessitate qualifying or 
removing the peace obligation, when taken in conjunction with freedom of association such 
qualification or removal is indeed called for. 
  
                                                          
260
 Ibid. at para. 42.  The legislative provisions themselves, of course, had been in effect for some years by the time 
the Court of Appeal heard the appeal. 
261
 U.F.C.W., Local 1518 v. KMart Canada Ltd., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083 (“Kmart Canada”) 
78 
 
 vi. Conscience and Provincial Human Rights Legislation 
 Three jurisdictions in Canada - Saskatchewan,
262
 Québec,
263
 and the Yukon Territory
264
 - 
guarantee freedom of conscience in their human rights legislation.  As such, the individual 
exercise of sympathetic action is arguably protected, even absent government action.  These 
statutes apply to private actors as well as public and quasi-public ones.   
Human rights legislation, while not truly constitutional, is of a “special character” and 
should be given a purposive interpretation.
265
  It is “fundamental [law] intended to apply to all 
other legislation of the enacting body in the absence of express words in the legislation denying 
it that power.”266  The language in the three statutes is “imperative”; like the Charter (and unlike 
the Canadian Bill of Rights) they can be seen intending to “set a standard upon which present as 
well as future legislation is to be tested.” 267   The Saskatchewan and Yukon statutes also 
expressly provide that they take precedence over other provincial legislation.
268
  Human rights 
legislation is already incorporated into all collective agreements and contracts of employment.
269
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Syndicat Northcrest (applying the Québec Charter) 
made clear the application of human rights legislation to the law of contract.  As Peter Hogg 
notes: 
It is not surprising that freedom of religion confers a constitutional right to hold and 
profess religious views that are purely personal and private.  The remarkable feature of 
the majority opinion in Syndicat Northcrest is that a person also has a constitutional right 
to act on those views... 
 
It is an extraordinary doctrine that permits a contracting party to invoke a sincere 
religious belief as the basis for ignoring a contractual promise that the promisor freely 
made but no longer wishes to keep.   After all, as Binnie J. emphasised, the counterparties 
will have ordered their affairs in reliance on the external manifestation of an agreement, 
and will be rightly disturbed by the promisor’s assertion of a hitherto secret religious 
scruple to justify not keeping the promise.
270
  
 The analysis set out supra regarding freedom of conscience under the Charter therefore 
seems applicable to freedom of conscience under provincial human rights legislation.  The 
implications are significant.  Arguably, an employer who disciplines or dismisses an employee 
for taking sympathetic action is violating that employee's freedom of conscience and may be 
subject to a human rights complaint.  Given the principle in Parry Sound, the human rights 
provisions may even be incorporated into wrongful dismissal claims or labour arbitrations, if 
only as an additional ground of damages, as at least one labour arbitrator has done in 
Saskatchewan with the Saskatchewan Code's guarantee of freedom of association.
271
  It is 
through these statutes that conscience might have its best chance of enforcement in the context of 
labour and employment. 
 vi. Worker Conscience and Employer Retaliation 
 Without the involvement of a government actor (for the Charter) or statutory 
enforcement (as under provincial human rights legislation), freedom of conscience cannot be 
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applied directly.  Therefore the employer's ability to discipline workers who refuse to perform 
work, grounded as that is in the employer's common law right to manage the workplace, is not 
subject to Charter review as such; the exception being where the employer is the government 
actor, where the Charter will apply directly
272
 and, hence, discipline or dismissal could 
conceivably be a direct breach of the worker's Charter rights. 
   The Supreme Court has urged caution in applying Charter values to interpretation of the 
common law: 
 
...Care must be taken not to expand the application of the Charter beyond that established 
by s. 32(1), either by creating new causes of action, or by subjecting all court orders to 
Charter scrutiny.  Therefore, in the context of civil litigation involving only private 
parties, the Charter will "apply" to the common law only to the extent that the common 
law is found to be inconsistent with Charter values. 
 
 Courts have traditionally been cautious regarding the extent to which they will amend 
the common law.  Similarly, they must not go further than is necessary when taking 
Charter values into account.  Far-reaching changes to the common law must be left to the 
legislature.
273
 
 
 At the same time the Court has stated:  “The law of tort may itself be expected to develop 
in accordance with Charter values, thus assuring a reasonable balance between free expression 
and protection of third parties.”274  In my view this must also extend to the law of contract; 
"[w]hile an individual who withdraws his or her labour may be immune from criminal liability or 
liability in tort, that individual breaches his or her contract of employment by non-performance, 
thereby giving the employer the option to terminate the contract or seek an alternative form of 
relief."
275
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 With the caution of the Courts in mind, however, I do not suggest that the application of 
freedom of conscience to sympathetic action warrants a broad intrusion into the common law 
rights and privileges of the employer.  However, I submit that an interpretation based on Charter 
values does require some amendment to the common law as it applies to sympathetic action. 
 As noted in Part I, a worker who undertakes sympathetic action such as refusing to 
handle "hot cargo" or refusing to cross a picket line is subject to discipline or even dismissal.  
Unlike refusal of dangerous work
276
, there is no explicit protection for sympathetic action at 
common law or in statute; quite the reverse.  A worker's reasons for refusing work may factor 
into the penalty applied; in the modern context where courts are more conscious of the idea of 
“proportionality” in the context of discipline277, it is possible that a court would find that absence 
from work due to sympathetic action does not warrant dismissal.  That mitigates the extent of 
discipline, though - it does not make the conduct not worthy of discipline. 
 If undertaking sympathetic action is a matter of conscience, then any analysis of its 
impact on the common law must balance the values at stake, as was done regarding the law of 
defamation in Hill v. Church of Scientology, or the law regarding secondary picketing in RWDSU 
v. Pepsi-Cola.  Some values underlying the Charter were enumerated by Dickson C.J. in the 
Alberta Reference, supra; in Hill, the Court considered "the innate dignity of the individual" as a 
theme that underlies all Charter rights.
278
    
 I submit that respect for an individual's strongly-held moral beliefs also promotes the 
innate dignity of the individual; conscience is as worthy of protection as reputation.  Therefore, it 
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is arguable that individually undertaking sympathetic action should no longer be considered 
worthy of discipline or dismissal at common law.  Parry Sound held that the Charter is 
incorporated into every contract of employment; as such, it should be an implied term in every 
employment contract that a worker may undertake sympathetic action without fear of discipline.  
Unlike the effect on the law of tort, placing this presumption into contracts of employment does 
mean that, at least in theory, individual workers could contract out of their right to undertake 
sympathetic action, just as (at least in theory) a worker could seek to have a clause allowing him 
or her to undertake sympathetic action placed into his or her contract.  Nonetheless, given the 
natural imbalance of bargaining power between employer and employee, I submit that a 
presumption in favour of sympathetic action better promotes Charter values and the "right to 
decency" that underlies modern employment law. 
 The countervailing value - the right of the employer to have performed work that was 
contracted for - is not founded in the Charter but, rather, in the "efficiency" paradigm and the 
capitalist system.  That does not make it unworthy of protection or concern, but it does take its 
underlying ethic out of Charter values and into the realm of public policy.  Were the Charter to 
apply directly, these would be concerns dealt with under section 1; when dealing with the 
common law, such concerns are addressed by placing the onus on the party alleging that the 
common law is inconsistent with Charter values: "[i]t is up to the party challenging the common 
law to bear the burden of proving not only that the common law is inconsistent with Charter 
values but also that its provisions cannot be justified."
279
 
 I do not suggest that a worker may refuse work without penalty.  As the Manitoba 
statutory provision authorizing sympathetic action suggests, it would not be fair for a worker to 
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be able to refuse work while at the same time expecting to be paid for work not done.  In this 
regard I submit that Charter values and the balancing of interests within the common law 
contract of employment would be served by drawing an analogy between the right to 
sympathetic action at common law and the right to strike under labour legislation.  A worker will 
not be paid for work refused, but will not be further penalized via discipline for insubordination 
or liability under the "industrial torts."  This approach, I submit, addresses a number of the 
considerations put forward by the Supreme Court in Pepsi-Cola, that is: 
 1) Conformity to Charter methodology; 
 2) Protection of the value of the Charter right in question; 
 3) Avoidance of excessive emphasis on protection from economic harm; 
 4) Adequate flexibility;  
 5) Rationality; and 
 6) Balance of power.
280
 
 Other considerations identified by the court in Pepsi-Cola - avoidance of the distinction 
between primary and secondary picketing and avoidance of the distinction between labour and 
non-labour expression - are of less relevance regarding freedom of conscience.  Concerns about 
the "signalling effect" of the picket line are not really factors regarding conscience except insofar 
as conscience may be triggered in response to a picket line - not itself an irrational decision, as 
discussed supra.   
 The final consideration identified by the Court in Pepsi-Cola, however, may be more 
problematic. At paragraphs 87ff, the Court mentions "undue harm to neutral third parties" as a 
                                                          
280
 Pepsi-Cola, supra note 184 at paras. 67ff. 
84 
 
consideration.  The Court found that a prohibition on secondary picketing based on neutral 
retailers' right to trade presented a number of difficulties: 
 
The first difficulty with this argument is that it gives no weight to free expression.  As 
discussed above, this runs counter to Charter methodology and values. 
 
A second difficulty is that the argument overstates the interests of third parties by 
positing a "fundamental" right to trade in the struck good...[T]he basis for this purported 
fundamental right is unclear. 
 
A third difficulty is that the argument glosses over the fact that third parties - producers 
and consumers - are harmed even as a result of primary picketing... 
 
Fourth, the argument contravenes at least the spirit of the Charter by sacrificing an 
individual right to the perceived collective good rather than seeking to balance and 
reconcile them... 
 
It is important that neutral third parties be protected from wrongful conduct and that 
labour disputes be prevented from unduly spreading...We are not persuaded, however, 
that it is necessary to ban all secondary picketing in order to accomplish these goals.  
Prohibiting strike conduct which is tortious or criminal offers protection against a wide 
variety of misconduct associated with strike action.  Insofar as conduct is non-tortious, it 
is not clear that more is required to protect third parties.
281
 
 These considerations, while dealing with freedom of expression, seem apt to the present 
argument. The current state of the common law, where workers can be disciplined, dismissed, or 
sued for engaging in sympathetic action, gives no weight to freedom of conscience.  There is no 
fundamental right of an employer to trade in struck goods; hence, there is no fundamental right 
for an employer to demand that a worker take action to facilitate that trade.  Economic harm is 
already present in any strike, whether or not workers engage in sympathetic action, and the 
common law sacrifices the individual right of conscience to the perceived collective good of 
market efficiency rather than seeking to balance and reconcile them. 
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 There is no question that as the common law presently stands, sympathetic action is 
potentially tortious, and involves the spreading of a labour dispute.  However the mischiefs that 
concerned the Court in Pepsi-Cola were damage to property or persons.  A simple refusal to 
perform work that would serve to weaken a strike does not involve such mischiefs. 
 Based on the above, therefore, I submit that sympathetic action is properly subject to the 
protections of freedom of conscience.  While s. 2(a) of the Charter does not directly protect 
individual decisions to undertake sympathetic action (since the statutory prohibition does not 
prohibit individual action), conscience-related association (i.e. sympathetic action undertaken 
collectively) arguably has a stronger s. 2(d) claim than other forms of association.   In those 
jurisdictions where it is protected under human rights legislation, freedom of conscience may 
directly protect a right to both individual and collective sympathetic action.  Finally, the values 
underlying freedom of conscience suggest there should be a tempering of the sanctions available 
to employers at common law in the case of individual workers exercising their right to 
sympathetic action.  
Freedom of Expression 
 In R. v. Sharpe,
282
 the Supreme Court set out its understanding of the interests underlying 
freedom of expression, describing freedom of expression as a fundamental right that makes 
possible liberty, creativity, and democracy by protecting not only popular expression but also 
unpopular or offensive expression.  Central to the freedom is the conviction that the "best route 
to truth, individual flourishing and peaceful coexistence in a heterogenous society in which 
people hold divergent and conflicting beliefs lies in the free flow of ideas and images." 283  
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 Freedom of expression is not absolute, though because of its importance the courts should 
strictly scrutinize any attempts to restrict it.
284
  Its underlying values include "individual self-
fulfilment, finding the truth through the open exchange of ideas, and the political discourse 
fundamental to democracy."
285
  While some expression is of more significance than others, all 
forms of expression are important:  
While some types of expression, like political expression,  lie closer to the core of the 
guarantee than others, all are vital to a free and democratic society...[T]he guarantee 
“ensure[s] that everyone can manifest their thoughts, opinions, beliefs, indeed all 
expressions of the heart and mind, however unpopular, distasteful or contrary to the 
mainstream. Such protection”, the Court continued, “is . . . ‘fundamental’ because in a 
free, pluralistic and democratic society we prize a diversity of ideas and opinions for their 
inherent value both to the community and to the individual”.  As stated by Cardozo J. in 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), free expression is “the matrix, the 
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom” (p. 327).286 [Citations 
omitted, emphasis added] 
 The value of free expression to a democratic society cannot be denied, though Cardozo 
J.'s comment in Palko v. Connecticut, quoted in Sharpe, seems to reflect a more American view 
where freedoms of assembly and association are seen as inherently tied to freedom of expression.  
It is also notable that in Sharpe the distinction between "conscience" and "opinion, thought and 
belief", discussed supra, becomes more clear.  Section 2(b) concerns the manifestation of belief, 
the exchange of ideas, and political discourse.  The interests are clearly interactive and not as 
strictly personal as the interests protected by section 2(a). 
 As with the earlier analysis of freedom of conscience, the first step in an analysis of 
freedom of expression and sympathetic action must begin with determining whether sympathetic 
action is not merely expression but protected expression.  As the Supreme Court stated in Irwin 
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Toy,  "the first step to be taken in an inquiry of this kind is to discover whether the activity which 
the plaintiff wishes to pursue may properly be characterized as falling within 'freedom of 
expression'".
287
  The second step is to determine if the purpose or effect of government action is 
to restrict freedom of expression.
288
 
 i. Sympathetic Action as Protected Expression 
 Unlike freedom of conscience, which has had very little application in the labour context, 
and freedom of association, which has had a somewhat convoluted relationship to the workplace, 
freedom of expression received early recognition as a vital component of labour rights and in 
particular an important aspect of the picket line.  This position pre-dated the Labour Trilogy, first 
finding voice in Dolphin Delivery, but the Labour Trilogy made it clear that as far as the 
Supreme Court was concerned, the s. 2 Charter freedoms had no role in the protection of the 
rights to collectively bargain or to strike.   
 It was no doubt galling to unionists that a mere two years after the Labour Trilogy, the 
Court ruled in Irwin Toy that freedom of expression protected the right of advertisers to advertise 
to children.  While the rationale for protecting advertising and not picketing seems baffling, 
nonetheless important principles can be drawn from Irwin Toy in determining what is "protected 
expression". 
 The first principle is that the content of the expression, in itself, cannot determine 
whether that expression is protected.  So long as it is intended to convey meaning, it is prima 
facie protected.
289
  Therefore, commercial expression is not inherently excluded from s. 2(b)'s 
protection.  The one exception appears to be violent expression.  Recent cases have affirmed that 
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violent expression and expression that advocates violence are not protected by s. 2(b).
290
  As 
noted in Sharpe, certain types of non-violent speech that may harm others, such as hate speech 
(R. v. Keegstra
291
) or dehumanize others, such as pornography (R. v. Butler
292
), do fall under s. 
2(b) as protected speech but may be justifiably limited. 
 Second, physical activity may or may not be protected as expression: 
 
Of course, while most human activity combines expressive and physical elements, some 
human activity is purely physical and does not convey or attempt to convey meaning. It 
might be difficult to characterize certain day-to-day tasks, like parking a car, as having 
expressive content. To bring such activity within the protected sphere, the plaintiff would 
have to show that it was performed to convey a meaning. For example, an unmarried 
person might, as part of a public protest, park in a zone reserved for spouses of 
government employees in order to express dissatisfaction or outrage at the chosen method 
of allocating a limited resource. If that person could demonstrate that his activity did in 
fact have expressive content, he would, at this stage, be within the protected sphere and 
the s. 2(b) challenge would proceed.
293
 
 Regardless of intent, however, violence cannot be protected expression.
294
  The 
application of section 2(b) is therefore broad, but not unlimited.   
 With the noted exceptions, so long as it is meant to convey meaning, expression or 
physical activity will fall within the ambit of s. 2(b).  Sympathetic action inevitably involves 
action - or, rather, omission; the refusal to cross a picket line or the refusal to perform work that 
will benefit an employer against its striking employees.  I argue that it is meant to convey 
meaning - solidarity with striking workers - and that it therefore falls within section 2(b). 
 Picketing in itself is inherently expressive, as the Supreme Court noted in Pepsi-Cola: 
 
...The act of picketing involves an element of physical presence, which in turn 
incorporates an expressive component.  Its purposes are usually twofold:  first, to convey 
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information about a labour dispute in order to gain support for its cause from other 
workers, clients of the struck employer, or the general public, and second, to put social 
and economic pressure on the employer and, often by extension, on its suppliers and 
clients... 
 
[...] 
 
Picketing represents a continuum of expressive activity.  In the labour context it runs the 
gamut from workers walking peacefully back and forth on a sidewalk carrying placards 
and handing out leaflets to passers-by, to rowdy crowds shaking fists, shouting slogans, 
and blocking the entrances of buildings.  Beyond the traditional labour context, picketing 
extends to consumer boycotts and political demonstrations...A picket line may signal 
labour strife.  But it may equally serve as a physical demonstration of individual or group 
dissatisfaction on an issue. 
 
[...] 
 
Picketing, however defined, always involves expressive action.  As such, it engages one 
of the highest constitutional values:  freedom of expression, enshrined in s. 2(b) of the 
Charter.  This Court’s jurisprudence establishes that both primary and secondary 
picketing are forms of expression, even when associated with tortuous acts...The Court, 
moreover, has repeatedly reaffirmed the importance of freedom of expression.  It is the 
foundation of a democratic society...The core values which free expression promotes 
include self-fulfilment, participation in social and political decision-making, and the 
communal exchange of ideas.  Free speech protects human dignity and the right to think 
and reflect freely on one’s circumstances and condition.  It allows a person to speak not 
only for the sake of expression itself, but also to advocate change, attempting to persuade 
others in the hope of improving one’s life and perhaps the wider social, political, ad 
economic environment. 
 
Free expression is particularly critical in the labour context.  As Cory J. observed for the 
court in U.F.C.W. Local 1518 v. Kmart Canada Ltd., ...”[f]or employees, freedom of 
expression becomes not only an important but essential component of labour 
relations.”...The values associated with free expression relate directly to one’s work.  A 
person’s employment, and the conditions of their workplace, inform one’s identity, 
emotional health, and sense of self-worth...[Citations omitted, emphasis added.]
295
 
 Strikes taken to protest government action are also inherently expressive, of course.
296
  
Public sector strikes, in particular, are inherently political
297
 and are “more a political than an 
economic weapon.”298 
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 It does not necessarily follow that refusing to cross a picket line is also expressive.  After 
all, a picket line, as noted in Pepsi-Cola, has as its very purpose communication.  It expresses 
dissatisfaction and protest; it is meant to garner public support.  The economic aspect of the 
strike is distinct from the expressive content of the picket line,
299
 but the ties between the strike 
and the picket line are well-recognized: 
 
To the labour movement picketing is essentially a demonstration of freedom of speech.  It 
is labour’s way of announcing its position to the world on a particular issue.  It is an 
action of solidarity and it is effective because it is backed by a powerful social sanction:  
one crosses a picket line at the peril of one’s self-interest, now and over time.  It is a 
useful device for reinforcing a strike – in fact striking and picketing are as dyadic as ham 
and eggs.  It is a useful means to following “hot” goods produced under unacceptable 
conditions and to induce a boycott of their use.  It is useful in organizing the workforce.  
It can close down an industry in pursuit of a settlement with a single employer.  It can be 
used for political purposes, as can the strike and the collective bargaining process itself.  
It can be an instrument of civil disobedience.  It can cause chaos.  It is too powerful an 
instrument to go unrestrained.
300
 
 
 Sympathetic action, however, may be significantly less public.  A true sympathy strike 
will almost certainly be expressive, as would workers joining with workers from other unions on 
a picket line.  The mere fact of a worker, or even a group of workers, refusing to cross a picket 
line, or even more so refusing to handle "hot cargo" within their own workplace, could be seen as 
potentially a matter of conscience but not a matter of expression.  Clearly there is a continuum of 
sympathetic action; however, I argue that it is all meant to convey meaning and as such falls 
under section 2(b). 
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 Evans J.A.'s dissent in Grain Workers, discussed supra, provides a rationale for refusal to 
cross a picket line as expressive action.  "Refusing to cross a picket line is a uniquely powerful 
means for employees to publicly express their solidarity with strikers,”301 and forcing workers to 
cross the line can make it appear as if those workers do not support the strike.  This reasoning 
would also suggest that essential services legislation (as in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour) 
that would force workers to cross their fellow workers' picket line also infringes upon the 
freedom of expression of those crossing the line. 
 I submit that even sympathetic action taken within one's own workplace is inherently 
expressive, however.  Clearly there is an economic aspect to the action - it is hoped that by 
refusing to perform work that benefits the struck employer, that employer's economic position 
will be weakened and the strikers' economic position correspondingly strengthened.  Workers 
who undertake such action, knowing that they will suffer at least a financial penalty if not 
discipline, will inevitably have goals beyond their own conscience.  They will perhaps mean to 
persuade other workers to take similar action, as with any boycott.  The refusal may publicized 
via a public statement from the workers' union, if they are unionized.  They may wish to 
persuade their own employer to pressure the struck employer to settle.  Or they may wish to 
express a broader principle, that is, solidarity with other workers, perhaps as part of individual 
self-fulfilment, perhaps as an inherent part of public decision-making (as Evans J.A. suggested in 
Grain Workers) or as part of the concept of "industrial democracy".  Regardless of motive, it 
would be quite bizarre for workers to take such action without intending to convey some 
meaning.  As such, given the overall context of labour relations, the fundamental importance of 
the strike and the picket line to collective bargaining and to democracy itself, I submit that 
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sympathetic action should be considered "protected expression" under s. 2(b) regardless of where 
it falls upon the continuum. 
 I accept the reasons of the Justices in Grain Workers that the purpose of the statutory bar 
on sympathetic action is to minimize industrial conflict, not to limit expression.  Therefore it is 
necessary to look to the purpose of the expression in question, and whether that expression falls 
within the core values of section 2(b).  I submit that sympathetic action does fall within those 
core values, and that the effect of the statutory prohibition therefore limits protected expression. 
 Clearly, this is at odds with the majority decision in Grain Workers, where sympathetic 
action was held not to involve seeking and attaining the truth, social or political decision-making, 
etc.  My disagreement with the majority decision is at least partly based on my argument that 
sympathetic action can be a matter of conscience.  As such, if sympathetic action is an 
expression of a fundamental moral principle on the part of a worker or workers, it would seem 
inherently worthy of protection under section 2(b) - though of course still subject to potential 
limitations if those limitations can be justified under section 1.   
 On a more basic level, however, I submit that the majority in Grain Workers has 
interpreted the principles of freedom of expression, as described in Irwin Toy, in a far too limited 
manner.  The principles as described in Irwin Toy 
 
can be summarized as follows: (1) seeking and attaining the truth is an inherently good 
activity; (2) participation in social and political decision-making is to be fostered and 
encouraged; and (3) the diversity in forms of individual self-fulfillment and human 
flourishing ought to be cultivated in an essentially tolerant, indeed welcoming, 
environment not only for the sake of those who convey a meaning, but also for the sake 
of those to whom it is conveyed.
302
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 Evans J.A., in his dissent, did find that these interests were served and expressed through 
sympathetic action.  Certainly matters of conscience would seem to fall within the seeking and 
attainment of truth, even if it be a moral "truth".  Refusal to perform work in the name of union 
solidarity seems to have an inherently political or at least socio-political aspect, in addition to the 
obvious economic "enlightened self-interest" that is also a fundamental part of sympathetic 
action - noting again that the mere fact that speech is "commercial" or economic does not 
exclude it from protection under s. 2(b).  Finally, choosing to act in solidarity with fellow 
workers must, I submit, be seen as part of individual self-fulfilment.  Such action can form an 
integral part of a person's identity and a declaration of their thoughts, opinions, and beliefs.  I 
submit the majority's interpretation of freedom of expression as it relates to sympathetic action is 
flawed and far too narrow, certainly not in keeping with the broad interpretation that freedom of 
expression has received in other contexts. 
 ii. Proving Infringement 
 As with freedom of conscience, however, the simple fact that sympathetic action may be 
protected under s. 2(b) does not end the inquiry.  It must be shown that the freedom has been 
infringed.  For reasons very similar to those raised under freedom of conscience, supra, I submit 
that the barriers to sympathetic action under statute and common law do infringe upon freedom 
of expression, that is: 
 1) While the "peace obligation" affects only expression taken in association, and as 
such expression stricto sensu does not violate nor is infringed by the peace obligation, the fact 
that the peace obligation bars the collective exercise of freedom of expression gives the 
associational aspects of sympathetic action greater value; 
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 2) In jurisdictions where human rights legislation protects freedom of expression, 
disciplining a worker for undertaking sympathetic action arguably infringes upon that worker's 
expressive rights; and 
 3) Under the common law, Charter values protected by freedom of expression 
should dictate that the managerial power to discipline workers for undertaking sympathetic 
action should be lessened or removed entirely, as should the industrial torts.  Where the 
employer is a government actor, retaliation for sympathetic action may contravene the Charter 
directly. 
 For these reasons, as with freedom of conscience, I submit that freedom of expression 
protects a right to sympathetic action, requires a change to the existing law in both union and 
non-union contexts, and strengthens a claim under freedom of association to limit or remove the 
prohibition on sympathetic action. 
Freedom of Association 
 It is generally recognized that freedom of association is “the most fundamental of all the 
rights of workers.”303  Indeed, in many cases when talking about “labour rights” or “workers’ 
rights” it is really freedom of association that is being discussed.  Freedom of association is 
recognized in Canada as a fundamental human right not only in the Charter but also in the 
human rights legislation of Saskatchewan,
304
 Québec,
305
 and the Yukon Territory,
306
 and in 
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several international human rights instruments to which Canada is a party
307
, particularly the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 22 of which provides that 
"[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form 
and join trade unions for the protection of his interests."
308
    
 In a more limited sense, the principles of freedom of association (insofar as they are 
phrased as “rights” or “freedoms” rather than in purely instrumental terms) also appear in some 
Canadian labour relations legislation.
309
   In international labour law, freedom of association has 
long been a key operating principle for the International Labour Organization: 
 
The function of the International Labour Organization in regard to freedom of association 
and the protection of the individual is to contribute to the effectiveness of the general 
principles of freedom of association, as one of the primary safeguards of peace and social 
justice. 
310
 
 Association is the “cornerstone of modern labour relations.”311  But its significance is not 
limited to the workplace.  The importance of freedom of association has been recognized for 
many years, perhaps most famously by Alexis de Toqueville: 
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The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting for himself, is that of 
combining his exertions with those of his fellow creatures and of acting in common with 
them.  The right of association therefore appears to me almost as inalienable in its nature 
as the right to personal liberty.  No legislator can attack it without impairing the 
foundations of society.
312
 
 And Virginia Leary has noted the role of freedom of association in protecting human 
rights and democratic society: 
 
The status of workers’ rights in a country is a bellwether for the status of human rights in 
general.  The first sign of a deteriorating situation is often the violation of freedom of 
association, the most fundamental of workers’ rights.  Repressive regimes inevitably 
attempt to suppress or control trade unions; thus, labor leaders are among the most 
frequent victims of repression.  Conversely, the development of free trade unions signals 
the dissolution of authoritarian regimes, as the example of Poland’s Solidarity movement 
recognizes.
313
 
 At the same time association is not always recognized as a stand-alone right.  It has been 
interpreted at times to be inherently tied to freedom of expression and assembly (freedom of 
assembly itself often seen as an expressive right)
314
.  Writing on the guarantee of "freedom of 
assembly and association" in the Canadian Bill of Rights,
315
 Walter Tarnopolsky stated: 
 
Freedom of assembly is concerned with the public expression of opinion by spoken word 
and by demonstration.  For our purposes it is necessary to distinguish between the liberty 
to express opinions, political or otherwise, which was dealt with in the previous section 
[on freedom of expression]...and the liberty which the law allows as to choice of time and 
place, which will be dealt with here.  Freedom of association, which can be said to be an 
outgrowth of the freedoms of speech and assembly, and the much earlier right to petition, 
concerns the right to join in common cause with another or others in the pursuit of lawful 
objects.  It has an important distinguishing characteristic in that it is of a continuing rather 
than a temporary nature. [Emphasis added.] 
 Freedom of association does not appear in the United States Constitution but is, rather, a 
right tied to freedom of speech under the First Amendment.  While freedom of association is 
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, basic to our democratic society, with roots deep in our 
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history",
316
 the American courts have traditionally used it as "little more than a shorthand for 
safeguarding an individual's rights of speech and petition when he exercises them through a 
group."
317
  Some American writers have argued that freedom of association should be afforded 
greater significance in its own right: 
 
...[M]ost of the time, association is instrumentally yoked to speech and is protected only 
because speech is protected, or it is held worthy of full constitutional protection only in 
associations of personal intimacy.  Only rarely does freedom of association receive a 
defense that honors it as integral to a free human life, to being a free person.  Picking 
one’s company is part of living as one likes; living as one likes (provided one does not 
injure the vital claims of others) is what being free means...
318
 
 And: 
 
Freedom of association is valuable for far more than its instrumental relationship to free 
speech.  Freedom of association is necessary to create and maintain intimate relationships 
of love and friendship, which are valuable for their own sake, as well as for the pleasures 
that they offer. ... Any serious consideration of [associational] activities...will indicate 
that not all the aims of associational activities are equally valued by individuals, or 
equally important for the well-being of a liberal democracy.  But all are valued and 
valuable, and associational freedom is not merely a means to other valuable ends.  It is 
also valuable for the many qualities of human life that the diverse activities of association 
routinely entail.  By associating with one another, we engage in camaraderie, 
cooperation, dialogue, deliberation, negotiation, competition, creativity, and the kinds of 
self-expression and self-sacrifice that are possible only in association with others.  In 
addition, we often simply enjoy the company.  The pleasures of association are typically 
by-products of our associating for other reasons.
319
  
 The drafters of the Charter saw fit to include freedom of association as a separate 
freedom from both speech and assembly, albeit after two initial drafts that included a "freedom 
of peaceful assembly and of association."
320
 At least one writer has argued that this is an 
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indication that the Canadian freedom of association guarantee should be seen as more robust than 
the American.
321
  
 While I assume herein that freedom of association is a free-standing right and not 
inherently connected to freedom of expression, nonetheless based on my prior argument that  
freedom of expression also protects a right to sympathetic action means that such a connection 
between association and expression is not necessarily fatal. 
 Whether on its own merits or tied to freedom of expression, freedom of association 
recognizes that there is a value to common purpose that goes beyond mere strength in numbers.  
The Canadian courts have recognized this broad principle, though they have perhaps not 
demonstrated a de facto commitment to it in their actual judgments.    
Freedom of Association in the Canadian Courts 
 Ironically, despite its own exhortations to give Charter rights a generous and purposive 
interpretation,
322
 the Supreme Court has not given freedom of association a broad interpretation.  
The Supreme Court first considered freedom of association under the Charter in the Alberta 
Reference
323
, where the Court interpreted freedom of association in a manner that has been 
described as “confined”, “demoralizing”, “minimalist”, 324  and perhaps more charitably, 
“restrained.”325    
 
By enshrining freedom of association as one of its fundamental freedoms, Canada 
followed the lead of international and European human rights instruments.  In this, the 
Charter’s framework filled a gap in the much-hallowed Bill of Rights:  Canada had the 
foresight to guarantee a right Americans do not explicitly enjoy.  By making it the equal 
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of the Charter’s other guarantees, the text of s. 2(d) created an opportunity for the 
Supreme Court of Canada to develop a distinctive concept of associational freedom.  
Rather than seize the opportunity, the Court flinched.... 
 
Against its stated commitment to a generous and purposive approach to other Charter 
guarantees, the Court gave s. 2(d) a minimalist interpretation....
326
 
The majority in the Alberta Reference stated bluntly, in a mere four paragraphs, that the 
rights of trade unions to collectively bargain and to strike unworthy of constitutional protection.  
Freedom of association under section 2(d) of the Charter was not offended by legislative 
restrictions on these activities; these rights were “modern” rights, the “creation of legislation, 
involving a balance of competing interests in a field which has been recognized by the courts as 
requiring a specialized expertise”, and not “fundamental” rights which were more properly the 
domain of the courts and worthy of judicial attention.
327
  Furthermore, s. 2(d) itself was given a 
restrictive interpretation; freedom of association did not protect the purposes or activities of an 
association as such, but rather the freedom to “work for the establishment of an association, to 
belong to an association, to maintain it, and to participate in its lawful activity without penalty or 
reprisal.”328  In fairness, LeDain J. did note that these rights are themselves  “not insignificant”; 
however by simply dismissing the broader implications of the freedom of association in labour 
relations – especially considering the broad interpretation given to freedom of expression shortly 
thereafter – the majority rendered 2(d) effectively impotent.  In his more extensive concurring 
judgment, McIntyre J. stated that “[p]eople, by merely combining together, cannot create an 
entity which has greater constitutional rights and freedoms than they, as individuals, possess.  
Freedom of association cannot therefore vest independent rights in the group.”329 
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 Cases alleging infringement of s. 2(d) outside of the labour context were limited and for 
the most part unsuccessful.  Freedom of association was found not to be infringed by statutory 
provisions prohibiting street solicitation by prostitutes;
330
 prohibiting the inter-provincial sale of 
eggs outside of the auspices of a national marketing agency;
331
 or allowing the deportation of 
refugees who were members of or contributed to terrorist organizations.
332
 
 Meanwhile in the United States, "[d]espite not being protected in the text of the 
constitution, freedom of association is regarded as one of the cornerstones of that country’s 
constitutional tradition"
333
 while the fact that the cases that have defined the scope of freedom of 
association under the Charter have been labour cases has meant that section 2(d) has been given 
a more limited scope than the other section 2 freedoms.  This has lead one writer to describe the 
Supreme Court's approach to section 2(d) as "skittish".
334
  Indeed, the prevalence of labour cases 
in Canadian freedom of association jurisprudence, and the Supreme Court's consequent 
reluctance to give the freedom a broad reading, has led to an interpretation of freedom of 
association that may not have much relevance outside of the labour relations context.
335
 
i. Freedom of Association and Labour Rights 
 Following the Labour Trilogy  there were, however, cases that tempered the absolute 
prohibition on the application of the Charter to trade union rights.  In Dunmore
336
 the Supreme 
Court held that freedom of association could require the state to provide at least some basic 
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organizational rights to workers, though the freedom did not guarantee inclusion in the full 
Canadian labour relations model.  In Pepsi-Cola and KMart Canada, the Court upheld a 
constitutional right to secondary picketing and leafleting under freedom of expression.  It was 
not until 2007, with the release of B.C. Health Services that freedom of association, the 
fundamental right most heavily associated with labour, could truly be applied to labour relations.  
For the first time since the inception of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Court held 
unanimously
337
 that freedom of association under section 2(d) the Charter provided 
constitutional protection to the right of trade unions to bargain collectively with their employers, 
free from “substantial interference” by government.  B.C. Health Services did not, however, 
address the right to strike;
338
 indeed, the Court explicitly refused to rule on that issue, noting that 
“the present case does not concern the right to strike, which was considered in earlier litigation 
[i.e. the Labour Trilogy] on the scope of the guarantee of freedom of association.”339   
In coming to its decision, the Court embraced the strong and even inspirational language 
used by Chief Justice Dickson in his dissent in the Alberta Reference, affirming that  
 
“[h]uman dignity, equality, liberty, respect for the autonomy of the person and the 
enhancement of democracy are among the values that underly the Charter...All of these 
values are complemented and, indeed, promoted, by the protection of collective 
bargaining in s. 2(d) of the Charter...The right to bargain collectively with an employer 
enhances the human dignity, liberty, and autonomy of workers by giving them the 
opportunity to influence the establishment of workplace rules and thereby gain some 
control over a major aspect of their lives, namely their work...” [citations omitted] 340 
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 In coming to its decision the Court expressly over-ruled the Labour Trilogy on the 
following grounds.   
 First, characterizing the right to bargain collectively as “modern rights” and not 
“fundamental freedoms” was held not to “recognize the history of labour relations in Canada.”341  
The Court declared that “collective bargaining, despite early discouragement from the common 
law, has long been recognized in Canada.   Indeed, historically, it emerges as the most significant 
collective activity through which freedom of association is expressed in the labour context.”342 
 Second, the Court noted that the right to engage in collective bargaining was also 
supported by “international conventions” as “part of the protection of freedom of association.”343  
Dickson C.J. had stated in his dissent in the Alberta Reference: 
 
...I believe that the Charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at least as 
great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights documents 
which Canada has ratified. 
 
In short, though I do not believe the judiciary is bound by the norms of international law 
in interpreting the Charter, these norms provide a relevant and persuasive source for 
interpretation of the provisions of the Charter, especially when they arise out of Canada’s 
international obligations under human rights conventions.
344
 
 The Court in B.C. Health Services cited this approach with approval.
345
   
 Third, the Court noted that guaranteeing collective bargaining under the auspices of s. 
2(d) was compatible with and enhanced Charter values, as mentioned supra. 
 As the Supreme Court noted in Fraser: 
 
After Dunmore, there could be no doubt that the right to associate to achieve workplace 
goals in a meaningful and substantive sense is protected by the guarantee of freedom of 
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association, and that this right extends to realization of collective, as distinct from 
individual, goals.  Nor could there be any doubt that legislation (or the absence of a 
legislative framework) that makes achievement of this collective goal substantially 
impossible, constitutes a limit on the exercise of freedom of association.  Finally, there 
could be no doubt  that the guarantee must be interpreted generously and purposively, in 
accordance with Canadian values and Canada's international commitments.
346
 
 
 The use of international law in B.C. Health Services and Fraser has been subject to much 
commentary.
347
  However, it seems clear that while international law does not necessarily bind 
Canadian courts in interpreting the Charter, it is nonetheless an important source of guidance in 
the level of protection the Charter demands. 
 It should be noted that while the application of freedom of association to trade union 
rights generally is therefore no longer in question, its application to the right to strike specifically 
remains an open question.  As noted previously, the majority in Grain Workers stated that the 
Labour Trilogy remains good law and that the right to strike is not guaranteed by the Charter.  
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour came to a similar 
conclusion.
348
 
 Unlike freedom of conscience and freedom of association, however, freedom of 
association would appear to have little application to individual sympathetic action.  For 
example, the fact that an individual is refusing to cross a picket line does not seem sufficient to 
ground a claim that that individual is acting "in association" with the strikers for the purpose of 
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freedom of association.  The worker's right to refuse would be embodied in freedoms of 
conscience or expression in that case.  When considering freedom of association, therefore, I am 
speaking only of collective sympathetic action. 
 ii. Freedom of Association as an Individual Right 
 Despite the significant changes to the courts' treatment of freedom of association post-
B.C. Health Services, the Supreme Court has consistently held that section 2(d) (and the other 
section 2 rights) is a right held by individual workers. This principle was first expressed by 
McIntyre J. in the Alberta Reference: 
 
While freedom of association like most other fundamental rights has no single purpose or 
value, at its core rests a rather simple proposition: the attainment of individual goals, 
through the exercise of individual rights, is generally impossible without the aid and 
cooperation of others. “Man, as Aristotle observed, is a ‘social animal, formed by nature 
for living with others’, associating with his fellows both to satisfy his desire for social 
intercourse and to realize common purposes.” (L. J. MacFarlane, The Theory and 
Practice of Human Rights (1985), p. 82.)
349
 
 In his dissent, in the Alberta Reference, Dickson C.J. (with Wilson J.) argued, inter alia, 
that such an interpretation would render freedom of association superfluous – “the express 
conferral of a freedom of association is unnecessary if all that is intended is to give effect to the 
collective enjoyment of other individual freedoms.”350  The freedom was “most essential in those 
circumstances where the individual is liable to be prejudiced by the actions of some larger and 
more powerful entity, like the government or an employer;”351 it did not protect “associational 
activities qua particular activities, but the freedom of individuals to interact with, support, and be 
supported by, their fellow humans in the varied activities in which they choose to engage.”352 
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 In a subsequent case Wilson J. summarized the Court's s. 2(d) jurisprudence thusly: 
 
[T]his Court has been unanimous in finding on more than one occasion and in a variety 
of contexts that the purpose which s. 2(d) is meant to advance is the collective action of 
individuals in pursuit of their common goals.
 353
 
Lavigne dealt with the constitutionality of the use of compulsory union dues for purposes 
unrelated to collective bargaining.  While the Court was unified in the result, that such use of 
compulsory dues was constitutional, what is significant for the purposes of this discussion is that 
a majority of the Court (Wilson J. and two other judges dissenting) held that inherent in the 
freedom of association is a freedom from association - that section 2(d) protected the individual's 
right not to be compelled to associate.
354
  La Forest J. and two other judges held that while the 
use of union dues for purposes beyond the immediate workplace concerns of the bargaining unit 
violated infringed workers' section 2(d) rights, this infringement was justified under section 1.
355
  
McLachlin J. (as she then was) held that freedom of association included a freedom from 
compelled association, but that the use of union dues complained of in Lavigne did not constitute 
"ideological conformity" and therefore did not infringe upon s. 2(d).
356
  Lavigne's principle that 
there is a "freedom not to associate" was confirmed in a subsequent case where a statutory 
requirement of union membership as a condition for hiring in Quebec’s construction industry 
was narrowly upheld under s.1.
357
 
The Court has also recognized that there will be activities, such as collective bargaining, 
where the nature of the activity is inherently collective. 
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There will, however, be occasions when no analogy involving individuals can be found 
for associational activity, or when a comparison between groups and individuals fails to 
capture the essence of a possible violation of associational rights. . . . The overarching 
consideration remains whether a legislative enactment or administrative action interferes 
with the freedom of persons to join and act with others in common pursuits. The 
legislative purpose which will render legislation invalid is the attempt to preclude 
associational conduct because of its concerted or associational nature.
358
 
Dickson C.J.'s reasons in the Alberta Reference were accepted and built upon in 
Dunmore, where the majority held: 
 
As I see it, the very notion of “association” recognizes the qualitative differences between 
individuals and collectivities. It recognizes that the press differs qualitatively from the 
journalist, the language community from the language speaker, the union from the 
worker. In all cases, the community assumes a life of its own and develops needs and 
priorities that differ from those of its individual members. Thus, for example, a language 
community cannot be nurtured if the law protects only the individual’s right speak (see R. 
v. Beaulac, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768, at para. 20). Similar reasoning applies, albeit in a limited 
fashion, to the freedom to organize: because trade unions develop needs and priorities 
that are distinct from those of their members individually, they cannot function if the law 
protects exclusively what might be “the lawful activities of individuals”. Rather, the law 
must recognize that certain union activities — making collective representations to an 
employer, adopting a majority political platform, federating with other unions — may be 
central to freedom of association even though they are inconceivable on the individual 
level. This is not to say that all such activities are protected by s. 2(d), nor that all 
collectivities are worthy of constitutional protection; indeed, this Court has repeatedly 
excluded the right to strike and collectively bargain from the protected ambit of s. 2(d)... 
It is to say, simply, that certain collective activities must be recognized if the freedom to 
form and maintain an association is to have any meaning.
359
 
Freedom of association, like all of the section 2 freedoms, has at its heart protection of 
the individual's human dignity and self-fulfilment.  As discussed supra, however, the statutory 
prohibition on sympathetic action only comes into play when collective action is taken.  The 
freedoms of conscience and expression may themselves protect individual workers, but it is 
association, I submit, that is the greatest challenge to the statutory definition of a "strike" and to 
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the peace obligation, because the peace obligation does prohibit associational activity qua 
associational activity. 
 iii. Freedom of Association,  Collective Action and "Substantial Interference" 
 In Fraser, the Supreme Court noted: 
 
It follows that Health Services does not support the view of the Ontario Court of Appeal 
in this case that legislatures are constitutionally required, in all cases and for all 
industries, to enact laws that set up a uniform model of labour relations imposing a 
statutory duty to bargain in good faith, statutory recognition of the principles of exclusive 
majority representation and a statutory mechanism for resolving bargaining impasses and 
disputes regarding the interpretation or administration of collective agreements (C.A. 
reasons, at para. 80).  What is protected is associational activity, not a particular process 
or result.  If it is shown that it is impossible to meaningfully exercise the right to associate 
due to substantial interference by a law (or absence of laws: see Dunmore) or by 
government action, a limit on the exercise of the 2(d) right is established, and the onus 
shifts to the state to justify the limit under s. 1 of the Charter.
360
 
 The right to sympathetic action is not itself reliant on the Wagner Act model of labour 
relations; sympathetic action takes place under many different labour relations schemes.  I 
submit, however, that the peace obligation does make it "impossible to meaningfully exercise the 
right to associate", insofar as it prohibits collective exercise of workers' fundamental rights 
entirely.  A blanket prohibition on collective conscience or expression, or on associative activity 
in itself, necessarily infringes upon freedom of association. 
 I also submit that the inherent focus on goals within the workplace is not a necessary part 
of a right to sympathetic action grounded in freedom of association.  Workers who undertake 
sympathetic action almost by definition do not have in mind the achievement of goals within 
their own workplace.  To rely overmuch on the goals, however worthy, of sympathetic action, in 
my view leads to an interpretation of freedom of association that is too closely tied to the labour 
context and leads to a problematic interpretation.  It maintains a tortured distinction between 
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association in the labour and non-labour context, and between fundamental freedoms in the 
labour and non-labour contexts; yet eliminating the distinction between labour and non-labour 
expression was seen as eminently desirable by the Court in Pepsi-Cola.
361
  
 Even the "substantial interference" standard set out in B.C. Health Services and Fraser 
treats s. 2(d) very differently from ss. 2(a) and (b).   
 B.C. Health Services established that the Charter does not protect against all legislative 
interference with the right to collectively bargain, but only that which  
 
substantially interferes with the collective bargaining process. Substantial interference 
must be determined contextually, on the facts of the case, having regard to the importance 
of the matter affected to the collective activity, and to the manner in which the 
government measure is accomplished.  Important changes effected through a process of 
good faith negotiation may not violate s. 2(d).  Conversely, less central matters may be 
changed more summarily, without violating s. 2(d).  Only where the matter is both 
important to the process of collective bargaining, and has been imposed in violation of 
the duty of good faith negotiation, will s. 2(d) be breached.  [emphasis added]
362
 
 In this regard the more recent cases did not fully incorporate Dickson C.J.'s dissent in the 
Alberta Reference, where he stated: 
 
In my view, these decisions illustrate an internal balancing of the implied freedom of 
association with the public interest at the point of definition of the freedom itself. The 
cases in which a line was drawn to exclude strike activity from the scope of 
constitutionally protected associational activities are indicative of the strength of the 
countervailing concerns (i.e., the public interest) which would find recognition under the 
Charter in s. 1 rather than in defining the scope of s. 2(d). When this balancing 
phenomenon is considered in conjunction with the implied or derivative status of freedom 
of association, the hesitation of courts to extend freedom of association to include the 
right to strike in the public sector is understandable.
363
 
 That said, as Brian Etherington has noted in the context of the right to strike generally: 
 
However, if the Supreme Court of Canada were to adopt a very broad notion of the right 
to strike as protected associational activity, as Dickson C.J. did in the Labour Trilogy, all 
restrictions on the right to strike could be held to violate s. 2(d), and therefore to be 
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unconstitutional unless they could pass scrutiny under s. 1. Indeed, Dickson C.J.'s close 
examination of all aspects of the restrictions on strike activity and of the substituted 
interest arbitration mechanism in his dissent in the Alberta Reference, 16 and his analysis 
of the restrictions imposed in the two companion cases in the Labour Trilogy, provide a 
taste of the detailed second-guessing of legislative choices that could ensue from 
recognition of a broad and unrestricted right to strike. 
 
[...] 
 
I believe it is likely that the Supreme Court's pragmatic inclinations will lead it to 
recognize a fairly limited right to strike - one that will require legislatures either to allow 
strikes or to provide a suitable substitute in the form of some other form of bargaining 
impasse resolution that gives access to a meaningful process of collective bargaining. 
Under this model, the right would be violated only where strike activity was totally 
prohibited or so severely restricted as to effectively deny access to meaningful collective 
bargaining...
364
 
 There is no compelling theoretical or logical reason, however, that freedom of association 
should be treated any differently from the other fundamental freedoms.  I submit that it is 
inappropriate for the Court to impose a further initial hurdle - to prove not merely interference, 
but substantial interference - in a claim based on freedom of association.  The very factors that 
would be considered in determining if the interference is substantial - the context, the balance of 
power between labour and employers, the availability of alternate dispute resolution processes, 
etc. - should be considered under section 1.  It not only provides a more logical and self-
consistent approach to section 2 generally, it also fits with the logic of "emanating" or 
"expanding" rights as argued herein. 
 Even if the "substantial interference" model is retained, however, an infringement upon 
freedom of association is made out under existing legislation.  By virtue of the absolute 
prohibition on collective exercise of Charter freedoms, the inteference is more than substantial - 
it is absolute.  
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 iv. Deriving Sympathetic Action from Freedom of Association 
 At the same time the analysis may differ if sympathetic action is derived directly or 
indirectly from freedom of association.  I am suggesting a direct derivation, but sympathetic 
action could be seen as indirectly derived from the right to collectively bargain or to strike. 
 The Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the International 
Labour Organization is an important source of international law on freedom of association, and 
has stated that sympathetic action is protected by international freedom of association 
guarantees: 
 
534. A general prohibition of sympathy strikes could lead to abuse and workers should 
be able to take such action provided the initial strike they are supporting is itself lawful. 
 
538. A ban on strike action not linked to a collective dispute to which the employee or 
union is contrary to the principles of freedom of association.
365
 
 The Freedom of Association Committee does not have within its Conventions an explicit 
right to strike, however.  Rather, the right to strike is itself a corollary to the right to organize 
under Convention 87.
366
  Similarly, the Committee refers to sympathetic action only in the 
context of sympathy strike action; it appears to view sympathetic action as not a right in itself, 
but rather derivative of a right to strike. 
 Perhaps ironically, while the most robust protection of sympathetic action may be found 
under freedom of association, it may also be the freedom under which it is most difficult to find a 
direct derivation from freedom of association.  With the status of the right to strike itself still in 
question in Canada (its uncertain status reinforced by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal's 
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decision in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour), a right to sympathetic action indirectly derived 
may rise and fall on the basis of the right to strike simpliciter. 
 I submit, however, that sympathetic action can be derived directly from freedom of 
association.   
 First, it can be understood, as argued previously, as the direct exercise of the fundamental 
freedoms in section 2 - not derivative of other freedoms, but rather the outer emanation of 
section 2 and the values and principles underlying the Charter. 
 Second, sympathetic action taken in concert seems the very essence of association: action 
taken in solidarity with one's fellow workers, itself in solidarity with other workers who are 
themselves acting in concert.  It is the pursuit not only of individual moral and ethical beliefs or 
the expression of support but also of the economic, social, political, and democratic virtues that 
were set out by Dickson C.J. in Alberta Reference and later accepted in B.C. Health Services 
regarding collective bargaining.  Sympathetic action need not be indirectly derived via collective 
bargaining to give voice to those virtues.  It can be a direct application of those virtues and an 
expression of the "right to decency" in itself.  It can be seen as part of the social and political 
discourse within society without reference to other aspects of the labour relations scheme.  It is a 
recognition of the importance of union solidarity in Canadian labour history. 
 As such, I submit that a free-standing right to sympathetic action, even if the right to 
strike is itself not independently protected under the Charter,
367
 is justified.   
 However, I also suggest that a right to sympathetic action can also be derived from any or 
all of the interdependent rights identified in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour (Q.B.) - the 
                                                          
367
 I suggest, however, that a right to strike should be recognized, at a minimum, as a necessary corollary to the 
already-recognized right to organize and to collectively bargain, as the ILO has done internationally. 
112 
 
rights to organize, to collectively bargain, and to strike.  It can have, like the right to strike, a 
"second-order" justification "that gives it particular force and scope in the context of 
employment..."
368
 
 
Freedom of association allows workers to form trade unions, which in turn provide a 
basis for collective bargaining.  This is the means by which workers can overcome the 
limitations inherent in individual contracts of employment and participate in making 
those decisions which affect their lives and their society.  To the extent that the right to 
strike assists workers in the achievement of these goals, it may be viewed as the logical 
extension of freedom of association in the workplace.
369
 
 As such sympathetic action can be seen as part of the "suite" of labour rights, whether as 
derivative of or interdependent with the rights to organize, collectively bargain, and strike.  This 
analysis, however, does not seem to allow room for sympathetic action as expressions of other 
fundamental freedoms; it is an instrumental analysis.  As such I submit the direct derivation 
model is to be preferred, given the role of conscience and expression described earlier. 
 v. Association and the Peace Obligation 
 Unlike the freedoms of conscience and expression, association directly challenges both 
the statutory definition of a "strike" in Canadian law and the prohibition on mid-term strikes - 
which when taken together renders collective sympathetic action inherently illegal.  As an 
absolute and automatic prohibition, the peace obligation is, I submit, necessarily an infringement 
of workers' freedom of association.  Further, because the prohibition is statutory, the Charter 
applies directly; as such, the analysis herein would require that the peace obligation must be 
relaxed or removed to conform to principles of freedom of association. 
 The same holds true under provincial human rights legislation.  Where freedom of 
association is protected at the provincial level, statutes that violate freedom of association - such 
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as trade union legislation which includes the peace obligation - may be vulnerable to challenge 
under human rights legislation as well as the Charter. 
 For reasons given earlier, I do not view the "substantial interference" standard as a bar to 
finding infringement and as such the analysis must proceed to justification under section 1, 
discussed infra. 
 vi. Association and the Common law 
 Association does not present a direct challenge to the law of tort or of contract.   This is 
not only because the Charter does not directly apply to the common law; the same would hold 
true even if considered under provincial legislation.  Even if workers exercise sympathetic action 
collectively, they may run afoul of the peace obligation whether or not they are unionized, but in 
terms of the common law their "offence" is no greater in terms of refusal of work - they may be 
disciplined, dismissed, or sued for breach of contract individually. 
 It is not clear, however, that the industrial torts are entirely out of the picture, and it is 
possible that workers may find themselves facing lawsuits from a (one assumes former) 
employer if they undertake collective sympathetic action.  For instance, the old tort of conspiracy 
to injure may have joined restraint of trade on the dustbin of labour history,
370
 but other torts 
remain that can have an impact on strikes and strikers.  The Supreme Court in RWDSU v. Pepsi-
Cola noted that torts such as trespass, intimidation, nuisance, defamation, and inducing breach of 
contract can be used to protect property interests and access to private premises.
371
  The Charter 
does not grant immunity to criminal or tortuous conduct, just as freedom of expression does not 
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grant immunity to defamation claims.  As Harry Arthurs notes, “[a]nyone familiar with the 
common law or criminal law of picketing will recognize how drastic a restriction lies concealed 
within this apparently modest caveat.”372 
 It is also possible that sympathetic action may ground liability for the strikers themselves, 
even if the sympathizers are not themselves sued. For instance, the very purpose of a strike is to 
convince people not to do business with the employer while the strike is ongoing, and it is not 
clear that the tort of inducing breach of contract would not apply if, for instance, the sympathetic 
action caused the sympathizers' employer to choose not to do business with the struck employer.  
This makes this tort distinct from the conspiracy to injure (eliminated by statutory reform but 
arguably also untenable at common law if a right to strike is constitutionally protected) 
defamation (which, as set out above, may well apply regardless of the strength of the right to 
strike)  and intimidation (less applicable now that picket lines are commonplace).  Inducing 
breach of contract between an employer and a supplier or customer is a potential outcome to the 
general economic pressure which is integral to most strikes.  Liability could accrue to the 
primary strikers (as the cause of the sympathetic action) or the sympathizers (as the ones who put 
pressure on the secondary employer). 
 The Charter values underlying freedom of association, therefore, would seem to have the 
most impact on the industrial torts when considering sympathetic action.  The freedoms of 
conscience and expression would be the freedoms that would more directly shape the common 
law regarding penalties to individual workers. 
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Section 1 - Limits Justifiable in a Free and Democratic Society 
 None of the foregoing freedoms are absolute, a principle expressly recognized in section 
1 of the Charter, which "guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in [the Charter] subject only 
to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society."   
 The test to be applied under section 1 was first set out in R. v. Oakes
373
 and has remained 
essentially unchanged, though it has been refined in subsequent decisions.  The Oakes test is a 
two-step analysis: 
 First, are the legislative objective or objectives of the legislation pressing and substantial? 
 Second, does the legislation satisfy the criteria for proportionality?  This is a broad 
question that can be divided into three narrower questions: 
1) Is the impugned law rationally connected to its objective? 
2) Can the objective of the law be achieved by less restrictive means?  And, 
3) Is there an overall proportionality between the objective of the impugned law and its 
deleterious effects?
374
 
i. Pressing and Substantial Objective 
 In the first step of the inquiry, the focus is on the law's objective and not its effects; while  
The objective of a law can be inferred from its effect, [it] cannot be determined solely by 
reference to its effect. Otherwise, any law that has the effect of infringing on a Charter 
right could be said to have the infringement as its objective. The effect of the challenged 
law is best considered at the fourth step of the Oakes analysis, which concerns the 
proportionality between the object of the law and its deleterious effects.
375
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 As discussed in Part I, Canadian labour relations is marked by strict restrictions on the 
use of the strike and, hence, on sympathetic action.  The model has as one of its central concerns 
the limitation of economic harm to third parties to the strike.  The Supreme Court recognized this 
concern as a pressing and substantial objective early in the Charter era.  In Dolphin Delivery the 
Court held: 
 
It is reasonable to retrain picketing so that the conflict will not escalate beyond the actual 
parties.  While picketing is, no doubt, a legislative weapon to be employed in a labour 
dispute by the employees against their employer, it should not be permitted to harm 
others.
376
 
 Dickson C.J. in his dissent in  Dairy Workers found that the prevention of economic harm 
to third parties was a pressing and substantial objective under section 1.
 377 
 Notably, Wilson J. 
disagreed on this point, arguing inter alia that economic harm to third parties, in itself, was not 
necessarily a pressing and substantial concern: 
Industry and the public accept a certain amount of damage and  inconvenience as the 
price of maintaining free negotiation in the work place. Such damage and inconvenience 
cannot therefore constitute the "pressing and substantial concern" which the Court held in 
Oakes was required in order to justify government intervention. Otherwise every work 
stoppage would give rise to a "pressing and substantial concern" and government 
intervention would be the rule rather than the exception. There has to be more to it than 
that.
378
 
 Similarly in Pepsi-Cola the Court recognized there would inevitably be some damage to 
third parties in any labour dispute, but that they should be protected from undue suffering: 
 
...[A]lthough McIntyre J.'s comments [in Dolphin Delivery] reflect a concern with the 
interests of third parties to labour disputes who may incur collateral damage, they should 
not be read as suggesting that third parties should be completely insulated from economic 
harm arising from labour conflict.  As Cory J. noted in KMart, supra, the objective of the 
restraint on picketing in Dolphin Delivery was to ensure that third parties did "not suffer 
unduly from the labour dispute over which it has no control"...Therefore, third parties are 
to be protected from undue suffering, not insulated entirely from the repercussions of 
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labour conflict.  Indeed, the latter objective would be unattainable.  Even primary 
picketing imposes costs, often substantial, on third parties to the dispute, through 
stoppages in supplies or the loss of the primary employer as a customer...Indeed, labour 
disputes in important sectors of the economy may seriously affect a whole town or 
region, even the nation itself... 
 
...[T]he protection of innocent third parties from the economic fallout of labour disputes, 
while a compelling consideration, is not absolute.  Such economic harm to third parties is 
anticipated by our labour relations system as a necessary cost of resolving industrial 
conflict.
379
 
 In Grain Workers Evans J.A. confirmed the Canadian Industrial Relations Board's ruling 
that "the purpose of the broad statutory prohibition of mid-contract strikes is to avoid the social 
and economic costs of unpredictable interruptions to production and services," and that this was 
a "pressing and substantial objective" for the purposes of s. 1.
380
 
 As the very point of sympathetic action is to expand the impact of a strike, the same 
principles would seem to apply and limiting the unpredictability of sympathetic action as well as 
limiting the economic harm to third parties are likely "pressing and substantial objectives."  The 
analysis must then turn to whether the prohibition on sympathetic action is proportional. 
ii. Proportionality: Rational Connection 
 Similarly, it would seem that the statutory prohibitions on sympathetic action are 
rationally connected to the objectives identified above.  In B.C. Health Services the Court noted 
that it is "not particularly onerous" to establish a rational connection between legislation and that 
legislation's objective.
381
  The connection does not need to be directly proven; it can be inferred 
"on the basis of reason or logic".
382
  In both Grain Workers (per Evans J.A.) and BCTF the 
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prohibition on mid-contract strikes was found to be rationally connected to the objective of 
preventing unpredictable work stoppages and interruption of services.
383
 
 If the objective of legislation is to limit the impact of strikes, then a bar on sympathetic 
action would appear to be rationally connected to that objective.  
iii. Proportionality: Minimal Impairment   
 In both the "pressing and substantial objective" inquiry and the "rational connection" 
inquiry, the analysis would seem to apply regardless of which freedom is involved.  However, 
when dealing with "minimal impairment" and "proportionality" aspects of the inquiry, the right 
involved may change the analysis.   
 A s. 1 approach that varies depending on the right concerned may be described as 
"pluralistic" as opposed to "monistic".
384
  The "monistic" approach sets a single standard that 
applies to all Charter infringements, i.e. the standard does not differ based on which Charter 
right has been infringed.
385
  The "pluralistic" approach, on the other hand, potentially applies a 
different standard for each Charter right.  Each standard would reflect the underlying structure of 
section 1 but would also take into account the context and underlying values of the Charter right 
in question.
386
  The Supreme Court has arguably applied a "pluralistic" approach to the freedoms 
under section 2 by adding "substantial interference" as a criterion for demonstrating infringement 
of freedom of association in the context of trade union rights. 
 However because the Charter rights in question here all exist as fundamental freedoms 
under section 2, a "monistic" approach may be warranted: 
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...[T]he fundamental freedoms in section 2 – freedom of conscience, freedom of 
expression, freedom of peaceful assembly, and freedom of association – are all set out in 
ringing terms that apparently do not brook internal limitation.  Consider the wording of s. 
2(b), which declares roundly that everyone has “freedom of thought, belief, opinion and 
expression, including the freedom of the press and other media of communication.”  
Arguably, the question whether this fundamental freedom has been infringed is 
analytically distinct from the question whether such an infringement is “reasonable”, and 
the latter question is governed by the uniform criteria set out in section 1.
387
 
 The approach of "emanating freedoms" that was mentioned earlier also suggests a 
uniform standard, i.e. a "monistic" approach to s.1.  Infringement should be the initial question 
(absent, as argued previously, any filter such as "substantial interference"), followed by a 
potential justification of that infringement under s.1. Certainly in the context of sympathetic 
action, I have argued that the individual freedoms trigger different interests and express 
themselves in different ways, but they are not ranked in importance, only character.   However 
when considering minimal impairment and the detrimental versus salutary effects of legislation, 
that character may affect the result. 
 Indeed, the Supreme Court has tended to reject internal limits to section 2.  For instance 
in B.(R.) v. Children’s Aid Society,388 the majority held that parents had a right under s. 2(a) to 
refuse to have a blood transfusion given to their child, but that the limits on that right were 
justified under s. 1 on the basis of protecting the child's welfare.  The minority argued that there 
was an internal limit to freedom of religion that was reached when the child's welfare was 
endangered;
389
 however this approach was rejected by the majority.
390
  The B.(R.) decision also 
reinforces the principle implicit in Pepsi-Cola that the mere fact that one's fundamental freedom 
may have an impact on another's welfare (physical welfare in B.(R.), economic welfare in Pepsi-
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Cola) does not, in itself, present an internal limit to that freedom.  The balancing of interests 
takes place under section 1. 
 Similarly when engaging in section 1 analysis of limits on protected expression under s. 
2(b), the Court examines the context of the expression, often not to the benefit of those claiming 
infringement:  “the jurisprudence reveals that a contextual approach has been consistently 
applied to restrict the scope of 2(b), not to expand it”.391  Indeed, while the Court has found that 
freedom of expression applies to limits on posting election results on the Internet,
392
 election 
spending,
393
 advertising to children,
394
 or the publication of public opinion poll results within 
three days of an election,
395
  the Court has not shied away from accepting limits on expression 
(as in Harper and Bryan).   
 In particular, as one works back "inwards" through the emanating circle of section 2 
freedoms, one can see a greater infringement on the integrity of the individual.  This is not 
because the freedoms are necessarily more important the more "internal" they become, but they 
are certainly more individual.  So, for instance, under the current law, freedom of association is 
certainly infringed by the existing bar on collective sympathetic action.  However, freedom of 
expression and conscience are not directly infringed; it is only their collective application that is 
forbidden.  On the other hand, a law that would vest the right to engage in sympathetic action 
only in trade unions rather than individual workers (which would not be in keeping with the 
approach taken by Canadian courts to freedom of association but which the ILO has said is 
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acceptable
396
) might adequately protect the freedom of association while not providing adequate 
protection to the more individual freedoms of conscience and expression.  Similarly the existence 
of alternate dispute resolution mechanisms may protect freedom of association in the context of 
the right to strike,
397
 but might not satisfy the expressive or conscientious interests of ss. 2(a) and 
(b).  The "proportionality" aspect of the Oakes test therefore is not a "one size fits all" exercise 
even if the "monistic" approach is accepted. 
 While the "freedom not to associate", as described by the Court, appears to have as its 
core a resistance to "ideological conformity", prohibition on collective sympathetic action is the 
opposite problem - not forced association, but forbidden association.  Indeed, if anything, the 
"ideological conformity" that the current state of the law enforces is that of the capitalist state 
and the "efficiency paradigm".  While no right is absolute, neither is the ability of the state to 
infringe upon it; as Wilson J. stated in Morgentaler: 
 
The Charter is predicated on a particular conception of the place of the individual in 
society. An individual is not a totally independent entity disconnected from the society in 
which he or she lives. Neither, however, is the individual a mere cog in an impersonal 
machine in which his or her values, goals and aspirations are subordinated to those of the 
collectivity. The individual is a bit of both.
398
 
 Indeed for reasons that will be discussed further in Part III, I submit that the unified s. 2 
approach to sympathetic action would mandate that strike discipline in the context of 
sympathetic action is not justifiable and would offend the prohibition on "ideological 
conformity" that all of the s. 2 freedoms entail. 
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 At the same time the prohibition on association leaves individual workers profoundly 
vulnerable in their individual exercise of conscience and expression.  As the Supreme Court has 
recognized, there is a qualitative difference between individual and collective action.  While the 
peace obligation may only be an infringement of association de jure, it is an infringement of 
conscience and expression de facto, insofar as it renders the solitary exercise of those freedoms 
impotent.  It is analogous to the Court's recognition in Dunmore that positive action by the State 
may be necessary where the practical realities render the exercise of a fundamental freedom (in 
that case, association) unreasonably difficult or impossible. 
 Therefore, the current state of the law regarding sympathetic action: 
 1) Offends freedom of association outright by forbidding the collective exercise of 
sympathetic action; 
 2) Offends freedom of expression by unreasonably limiting its exercise through 
restriction on collective action but can also de facto force unwanted expression upon workers by 
requiring them to cross a picket line, as recognized by Evans J.A. in Grain Workers; and 
 3) Offends freedom of conscience by de facto forcing those committed to trade 
union principles to act against their conscience. 
 As the very words "minimal impairment" would suggest, an absolute prohibition on the 
exercise of a Charter right is likely to fail when lesser measures are available.  For example: 
 An absolute ban on Sikh students carrying a kirpan was held to offend s. 2(a).  A 
lesser measure, where the kirpan was sewn into the bearer's clothing to prevent 
easy access, was substituted by the Court (Multani). 
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 An absolute ban on advertising during children's programmes was held to offend 
s. 2(b) (Irwin Toy). 
 An absolute prohibition on strike action by public servants, without recourse to 
alternate dispute resolution or adequate input from public sector unions regarding 
what services were affected, was held to offend s. 2(d) (Saskatchewan Federation 
of Labour (Q.B.)).
399
 
 As discussed previously, because the law in this case is prohibitive, it is not necessary to 
consider the imposition of positive obligations such as the duty to bargain in good faith (as in 
Fraser).  It is also notable that in the case of sympathetic action, unlike the right to strike, it is 
difficult to see what alternative measures might be used to resolve the dispute.  Sympathizers do 
not have access to arbitration or conciliation, for instance, even if the primary strikers do.   
 However, particularly in the labour context, governments are given a certain amount of 
discretion to make legislative choices and develop legislative schemes.  The Courts will not 
enforce a particular statutory scheme.
400
  As LeBel J. noted in Advance Cutting & Coring, "the 
effects of legislative choices, especially in the realm of social and economic policy remain hard 
to assess."
401
   
 Nonetheless, I submit there are clearly lesser measures available to governments beyond 
the blanket prohibition.  These will be discussed in more detail in Part III, but they include: 
 Allowing workers to "contract out" of the peace obligation; 
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 Inserting a statutory exemption for sympathetic action, along the lines of the 
Manitoba exemption, into the "peace obligation", either collectively (or 
individually for government employees, to whom the Charter applies 
directly); or 
 Amending the definition of "strike" to allow for sympathetic action, or 
bringing sympathetic action fully into the definition of "strike" and allowing 
unionized workers to engage in sympathetic action on similar terms to 
primary strikes. 
 There are a number of ways the economic impact and social disruption of strikes, and of 
sympathetic action, can be contained without absolute prohibition of sympathetic action.  In 
particular, the "bright line" analysis used by the B.C. Court of Appeal in BCTF and by Evans 
J.A. in Grain Workers seems to overstate the delicacy of the balance within labour relations 
legislation.  The suggestions above are not unprecedented nor impossible to implement. 
 On that basis, I submit that the current statutory prohibition does not minimally impair 
the freedoms in question and as such must be amended or removed. 
 iv. Proportionality: Detrimental vs. Salutary Effects 
 Given the argument that the "peace obligation" fails at the "minimal impairment" stage 
the measure of detrimental effects of the peace obligation versus its salutary effects is not 
necessary. 
 Nonetheless, I submit that the detrimental effects - the infringement both de jure and de 
facto on the freedoms set out in ss. 2(a), (b), and (d) of the Charter - outweigh the salutary 
effects of the legislation.  
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PART III 
SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
  
126 
 
Statutory Reform 
 i. The Peace Obligation 
 The main reform I suggest is to the Canadian definition of "strike".  This serves as the 
main bar to the traditional exercise of sympathetic action.   
 The existing labour relations regime does not require that sympathetic action be 
contained within the definition of a "strike" or, indeed, that there by any statutory definition of a 
"strike" at all.  As discussed in Part I, British Columbia operated for a number of years with a 
statute that allowed for protest strikes and sympathetic action while regulating primary strikes.  
Saskatchewan operated for decades without a statutory definition of "strike".  However, there 
appear to be a range of legislative choices available that would address the prohibition on 
sympathetic action without leaving the existing Canadian model topsy-turvy. 
  a. Negotiated Exceptions 
 Perhaps the approach that would be most in keeping with the underlying premises of 
Canadian labour relations would be to allow parties who have a collective bargaining 
relationship to negotiate a clause in their collective agreement permitting workers to refuse to 
cross a picket line.  This is hardly an original concept; many collective agreements already 
include such a clause (indeed, the collective agreement in Grain Workers did so) and some 
jurisdictions have given full effect to such clauses in the past
402
 though the current approach 
seems to be that such clauses will immunize workers from discipline but not statutory penalty. 
 The late Professor Geoffrey England suggested an innovative approach: clauses in 
collective agreements that provide that the employer will not schedule work where that would 
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force employees to cross a picket line.
403
  If there is no work to refuse, then there can be no 
strike.
404
  However, I submit that such an approach should not be necessary; unionized workers 
should be entitled to negotiate a clause that outright exempts them from the "peace obligation".  
This is in keeping with the idea of autonomy within labour relations - though at least one 
commentator
405
 argued as far back as the late 1970's that the concept of autonomy was 
endangered and that we would eventually "stop paying lip service to the pristine ideal of labour 
and management autonomy".
406
  It is difficult to argue that that evaluation was wrong; however, 
the Supreme Court's rulings (however convoluted) that collective bargaining is constitutionally 
protected would seem to give that concept of autonomy some new life - not to the extent of 
giving collective agreements constitutional status per se, as Professor Peter Hogg contends,
407
 
but rather recognizing that there is constitutional value to that autonomy.   
 It is perhaps a great irony of Canadian constitutional law that the fear of the “strike 
weapon” has lead to convoluted decisions to justify constitutionalizing collective bargaining, 
where loosening strike laws may have prevented the need for such decisions in the first place.  In 
terms of uncertainty and unintended impact of a strike, this approach would also allow 
employers to negotiate clauses where unions would agree not to undertake sympathetic action, or 
to only do so under certain conditions, such as providing advance notice, or even to provide 
limited services - along the lines of a negotiated "essential services agreement" - rather than a 
full refusal.  While I argue that sympathetic action is a function of fundamental constitutional 
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freedoms, that does not mean parties cannot negotiate self-imposed limits to those freedoms, 
particularly in a unionized environment where there is greater parity of bargaining power.  At the 
very least, the negotiated approach may breathe some life into the right to sympathetic action.  
After all, as it stands now, the employer gets that commitment from unions for free, and unions 
and employers are forbidden from recognizing a right to sympathetic action.  Under the proposed 
model, an employer will need to bargain its own peace obligation, and the union can choose to 
accept or reject that proposal as it wishes. 
 Allowing parties to regulate their own relationship via collective bargaining seems fully 
in keeping with constitutional principles and with the analysis of s. 2 freedoms argued herein.  It 
seems perhaps most in keeping with the interests inherent in section 2(d) in particular.  It also, 
unlike the option of treating sympathetic action as a full strike discussed infra, does not have any 
inherent tie to the right to strike itself. 
 The "negotiated" approach is not without risks, however.  In the context of the right to 
strike, it has been argued: 
 
...Just as political citizenship requires that all citizens having [sic] certain rights, such as 
the right to vote, so too does industrial citizenship require that all union members have 
the same rights.  However, by giving up the right to strike, unions also undermine the 
basis for their defence of free collective bargaining, as both of these rights rest upon an 
acceptance by the state that workers have the right to form and act as independent unions 
as part of their rights to industrial citizenship.  by giving some of these rights away, 
unions are in danger of unwittingly undermining their capacity to defend their other 
rights, opening the door for further erosion of workers' freedom of association and the 
basis for industrial citizenship...
408
 
 This does not mean that unions could not negotiate away their right to strike or 
sympathetic action, however, just that they should not.  This could be addressed by including the 
right to sympathetic action as a matter that cannot be bargained to impasse; it is something a 
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union can offer to give up, but not something that can be wrested from them under threat of 
lockout. 
  b. Sympathetic Action as a Full "Strike" 
 A second alternative is to treat sympathetic action as a full "strike" under labour relations 
legislation.  It is already subject to the restrictions on mid-contract strikes and as such is 
inevitably illegal; there is no corresponding power or immunity under the law as it stands, unlike 
true strikes.  This approach, however, would likely be unworkable and render the "peace 
obligation" entirely meaningless unless it were tied to  supporting an already legal strike. 
 Much like the collectively bargained approach, collective sympathetic action would be 
allowed provided certain statutory conditions were applied, such as a strike vote authorizing the 
action and a period of advance notice to the employer (and possibly the primary employer and 
the Minister of Labour as well).  It would potentially, in the public sector, fall under the various 
"essential services" statutes around the country - services are no less essential
409
 just because 
workers are striking in support of other workers. 
 This approach would also rob sympathetic action of its immediacy, unless unions were to 
co-ordinate ahead of time.  If, say, forty-eight hours' notice were required to engage in 
sympathetic action, that is potentially forty-eight hours where a picket line is up but workers are 
required to cross.  Nonetheless, this approach lessens, but does not remove, the peace obligation.  
I submit it would balance the interests of workers as well as third parties in a manner that does 
not offend the Charter. 
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  c. Sympathetic Action Exemption 
 A third option which would fully respect the Charter rights engaged would be to either 
exempt sympathetic action from the definition of a "strike" itself, or incorporate provisions 
similar to the Manitoba sympathetic action exemption.  The former option has been used in the 
past and there is no compelling public policy reason why that could not be instituted or re-
instituted now. 
 In the latter option, however, to fully respect Charter freedoms, and particularly freedom 
of association, certain changes would be required to the Manitoba model. 
 For reference, the Manitoba statute reads, at s. 15(1): 
 
An employee who is in a unit of employees of an employer in respect of which there is a 
collective agreement in force and who refuses to perform work which would directly 
facilitate the operation or business of another employer whose employees within Canada 
are locked out or on a legal strike is not by reason of that refusal in breach of the 
collective agreement or of any term or condition of his employment and is not, by reason 
of that refusal, subject to any disciplinary action by the employer or the bargaining agent 
that is a party to the collective agreement. 
 As an exclusively individual protection, this would seem to protect workers' freedom of 
both conscience and expression.  However it does no immunize workers from the peace 
obligation or penalties for engaging in a "strike".  Therefore the provision should be expanded to 
include an employee or group of employees - a true exemption for meaningful sympathetic 
action.  (The fact that the provision does not allow workers to engage in sympathetic action for 
fellow workers at another branch of the same employer would seem to potentially infringe the s. 
2 freedoms and potentially even s. 15 of the Charter.)  This could, again, be subject to certain 
conditions to minimize the disruption of sympathetic action. 
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 d. Union Picket Discipline and Sympathetic Action 
 As I alluded to in Part II, however, I do not believe that either the "autonomy" approach 
nor the "full strike" approach would allow unions to impose "sympathy strike discipline" upon 
workers who do not wish to undertake sympathetic action.  This is because, in my view, one 
cannot argue on the one hand that sympathetic action triggers fundamental moral and ethical 
values, and on the other hand argue that one should be forced to conform to values that one does 
not believe in. 
At the same time, concern about the ability of individuals to cross a picket line (their own 
or someone else's) or perform struck work or handle "hot cargo" without fear of penalty seems to 
be a paper tiger.  Unions can expel workers from their union if that worker crosses a picket line, 
for instance, but in a “closed” or “union” shop environment, that can no longer result in the 
forced dismissal of that worker.  Similarly, Saskatchewan is the sole jurisdiction in Canada, by 
virtue of section 35 of its Trade Union Act, that allows a union to fine members who cross that 
union's own picket line.  Other jurisdictions have ruled such fines void, for example on the basis 
of “unconscionability”.410  A union is certainly not permitted to use physical force to prevent a 
member from crossing the picket line, and one can only ask what impact expulsion from a union 
would be to a worker willing to cross a picket line in the first place.  In the end, this fear seems 
overblown, or at least a battle that has, for the most part, been lost. There would also seem to be 
a corresponding argument that a strong right means that the common law in this regard must 
adapt to allow for union discipline, or at least to uphold statutory provisions like s. 35 of the 
Trade Union Act; but in the end, union membership is a contract, and a union member may 
choose to remain a union member, with all of the obligations that entails, or may resign from the 
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union and cross the picket line.
411
  The current state of the law where union discipline has been 
found to be “unconscionable” is that workers may remain union members and cross the picket 
line with impunity.  Where union membership is a condition of employment, it would seem that 
stripping workers of union membership for refusing to participate in sympathetic action would 
be a violation of those workers' freedoms of conscience and expression, just as forcing workers 
to cross a picket line when they do not wish to would be. 
The Law of Tort and Contract 
 I argued in Part II that the laws of tort (particularly the industrial torts) and the law of 
contract should be interpreted so as to conform to Charter values, and to provide greater freedom 
for workers to engage in sympathetic action without fear of discipline.  This would entail 
"reading in" Charter rights in all contracts of employment, and consigning the industrial torts to 
irrelevance.  I will not repeat those arguments here.  However I submit certain statutory 
amendments would be necessary to fully promote Charter values (and coincidentally in at least 
three Canadian jurisdictions, conformity with human rights legislation), even with the 
presumption that workers are entitled to engage in sympathetic action without fear of discipline. 
 A presumption that sympathetic action cannot be the subject of retribution by the 
employer may be sufficient, but statutory protection - whether as part of provincial human rights 
legislation, employment standards legislation, or labour relations legislation - would provide 
greater protection and a more reliably Charter-compliant employment law regime.  The 
"Manitoba option" mentioned above is perhaps the simplest possibility, and has the advantage 
that it already exists in one jurisdiction and need not be invented from whole cloth. 
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 The "contractual" model  presents difficulties in the non-unionized sector.  If there were 
equality of bargaining power within the non-unionized sector,
412
 it would certainly be entirely 
proper to allow employers to freely negotiate a commitment from their employees not to 
undertake sympathetic action.  However, given the inherent inequality of the bargaining process, 
this employer power to over-ride a constitutional right seems open to abuse.  At the same time, 
employees often sign contracts that limit their right to exercise their other freedoms; dress codes, 
for instance, interfere with freedom of expression, but are common in a number of industries.  
For certain non-profit organizations, conformity to a particular ethic or religion can be required 
of employees; in some jurisdictions this must be a bona fide occupational requirement
413
, in 
other jurisdictions not
414
, but it can be an implied or express part of the contract of employment.  
The main concern must be, particularly given the history and value of sympathetic action in the 
labour context, that employers' superior bargaining power does not render workers' rights 
illusory.  It seems likely that if there is found to be a presumption in favour of sympathetic action 
at common law, contracts of employment will contain standard clauses rebutting that provision.  
Unlike in the unionized context, an assurance that this is not a matter that can be required, but 
only volunteered, to be relinquished, would seem to have little effect in the non-unionized sector. 
 Another option would be a statutory provision setting out that no contract can include a 
clause preventing a worker from undertaking sympathetic action, perhaps softened by a proviso 
that a worker can, in emergency circumstances, be required to perform work that could normally 
                                                          
412
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be refused on the basis of sympathetic action - similar to the provisions regarding overtime in 
some employment standards legislation. 
 However when viewed in the overall context of the freedoms in question and the power 
dynamics in the workplace, the "Manitoba model" seems the safest choice to protect the rights of 
non-union workers to engage in sympathetic action.   
Conclusion 
 While I submit sympathetic action is a matter worthy of protection under the fundamental 
freedoms in section 2 of the Charter, there is no absolute answer to what that means in terms of 
public policy.  Parliament and the Legislatures must have the freedom to craft labour relations 
regimes that meet the requirements of the times and of their particular jurisdiction.  However 
these concerns are perhaps less urgent or profound than they seem at first blush, as what meets 
the requirements of the times and of a particular jurisdiction has seemed remarkably uniform 
across Canada for decades.  Nonetheless I submit that two things are clear: the absolute ban on 
sympathetic action under Canadian labour law violates the Charter and must be removed; and 
the hostility of the law of tort and the law of contract to sympathetic action is not in keeping with 
Charter values.  Whether through adjudicative interpretation or statutory reform, the law must 
adapt to reflect these truths. 
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